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Promises and Perils of
Sentence Guidelines
By DAVID CRUMP*
[Trial judges in other jurisdictions are making innovative
use of sentencing guidelines. These guidelines help judges in
their attempts to eliminate disparity. Also, the use of guide-
lines properly formulated will return to trial judges their dis-
cretion in assessing punishment and sentencing defendants
which they have lost because of plea bargaining. We should
encourage those seeking to eliminate disparity in assessment
of punishment and in returning the proper discretion to trial
judges.'
INTRODUCTION
Determinate sentencing has arrived in this nation with the
force of an idea whose time has come. From Maine, which
passed the first of the new sentencing laws,2 to California, with
its detailed new Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act,3 more
and more jurisdictions are considering, drafting and adopting
definite sentencing systems.' There are some commentators
who have argued persuasively that sentencing reform of this
nature is a constitutional necessity.' But irrespective of the
* A.B. Harvard; J.D., University of Texas. Associate Professor of Law, University
of Houston. Board Certified, Criminal Law-Texas Board of Legal Specialization;
Member, State Board of Criminal Law Examiners.
I Morano v. State, 572 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (approving sentence
guidelines and limitations upon plea bargaining imposed by judges in Bell County,
Texas). The Morano decision is an example of both the advantages and disadvantages
of determinate sentencing. The benefits mentioned in the opinion seem evident; how-
ever, the defendant was sentenced to five years' imprisonment for possession of mari-
juana and complained that he should have had the benefit of plea bargaining in the
hope that the district attorney would recommend a sentence that was less harsh and
more in line with current notions of proper use of the criminal sanction for this offense.
2 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1252 (1978).
3 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (West Supp. 1979).
See notes 96-109 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the determinate
systems of Maine, California, Arizona, Colorado, Illinois and Indiana.
I See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENrENcEs: LAw WrrHouT ORDER 103-04 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as M. FRANEL]; Comment, Disparity and Discretion in Sentenc-
1979-80]
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validity of that argument, the potential advantages of determi-
nate sentencing in producing consistent results are so readily
apparent that its widespread legislative adoption in the near
future seems a real possibility.6
At the same time, there are other authorities who counsel
caution. They argue that the benefits of determinate sentenc-
ing are offset by the problems it may create, some of which are
not obvious at first blush. Determinate sentencing, they say,
might transform plea bargaining to undesirable forms or in-
crease its use. 7 Or it may give rise to substantial claims con-
cerning the violation of constitutional provisions.' These critics
also maintain that determinate sentencing threatens to in-
crease the cost of the adjudicatory process, to change the com-
ing: A Proposal for Uniformity, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 323 (1977). Indeed, the Supreme
Court has already held unguided discretion unconstitutional in death penalty cases,
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and the arguments of that case are really
applicable to sentencing generally.
I In my home state of Texas, for example, proposals for determinate sentencing
have been advanced by such diverse advocates as the Republican nominee for state
Attorney General (J. BAKER, POSITION PAPER-ISSUE NUMBER ONE: FIGHTING CRIME 9-16
(1978)), the Democratic United States Senator, Lloyd Bentsen (Houston Chronicle,
Apr. 7, 1978, §1, at 1, col. 2), and the editor of the popular magazine Texas Monthly
(Broyles, Behind the Lines, TEXAS MONTHLY, March 1978, at 5). A few Texas counties
have adopted local sentencing guidelines, and the concept was sanctioned by the
state's highest criminal court in Morano v. State, 572 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Crim. App.
1978).
Kentucky's General Assembly considered and rejected determinate sentencing
legislation during its 1978 regular session. A new section of Kentucky Revised Statutes
Chapter 532 would have provided that
the intent of this Act [is] to provide for court sentencing rather than jury
sentencing, except in capital prosecutions. And, for those offenders sen-
tenced to a term of imprisonment by the court, it is the intent of this legis-
lation that such offender's date of release from the prison shall not depend
upon the offender's participation in rehabilitative programs but rather upon
that offender's orderly behavior while in the prison. It is the intent of this
Act to provide for a more rational and equitable system of justice.
HR 442, Reg. Sess. (1978).
See, e.g., Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of
Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 550,
566-68 (1978). But see COUNCIL OF STATE GovERNMENTS, DEFINITE SENTENCING: AN Ex-
AMINATION OF PROPOSALS IN FOUR STATES 34-35 (1976) [hereinafter cited as DEFINITE
SENTENCING]. See notes 379-98 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
administration of sentence guidelines and problems caused by sentencing reform.
8 See, e.g., Uelmen, Proof of Aggravation Under the California Uniform Determi-
nate Sentencing Act: The Constitutional Issues, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 725 (1977). See
notes 233-351 infra and accompanying text for consideration of the constitutionality
of determinate sentencing.
DETERMINATE SENTENCING
position of our jails and prisons in unpredictable ways and to
deprive inmates of incentives for good behavior.9 The major
change in philosophy that definite sentencing reflects will, they
accurately observe, result in challenges to some of our most
deeply felt values."° Finally, the sheer complexity and cost of
some determinate systems are cited by many as serious draw-
backs."1
This article reflects an effort to relate the promises and
perils of determinate sentencing and sentence guidelines in a
comprehensive manner. A comprehensive analysis, rather than
a dissection of selected issues, is necessary because solutions to
any given problem in the sentencing process have an annoying
tendency to reappear as new problems elsewhere in the sys-
tem.'2 The article therefore begins with a study of the elements
that may be found in determinate sentencing systems, includ-
I Some of these arguments are set forth in McGee, California's New Determinate
Sentencing Act, 42 FED. PRoBAToN 3 (1978). Arizona, the only determinate-sentencing
state to retain discretionary parole, did so precisely because the prison population
could not be predicted. See note 107 infra for a discussion of Am. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-701-709 (1978). See also Bums, Correctional Reform: Britain and the United States
Compared and Contrasted, 42 FED. PRoSATioN 21 (1978), for a discussion of the merits
of retaining parole.
10 See notes 112-232 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of sentencing
guidelines and sentencing goals; see also Alschuler, supra note 7, at 577. A striking
example of such a challenge is presented by the California Act, which states flatly that
the "purposes [sic] of imprisonment for crime is punishment." CAL. PENAL CODE §
1170(a)(1) (West Supp. 1979). See note 66 infra and accompanying text for a discussion
of the California Act.
11 See notes 384-403 infra for a discussion of the administration of sentence guide-
lines; cf. Uelmen, supra note 8, at 727 (asserting "the possibility of a vast multiplica-
tion of the commitment of jucicial resources" in California). See generally Cassou &
Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in California: The New Numbers Game, 9 PAc. L.J.
1, 5 (1978). Cassou & Taugher observe that the California Act creates "tremendous new
complexity," but they state: "Fortunately, however, patient study of the new law
forces even the most skeptical to conclude that it is ultimately comprehensible." Id.
at 5. Determinate sentencing need not, however, be so complicated. See notes 92-95
infra and accompanying text for a description of the system advocated by Wilkins et
al.
12 Alschuler puts this point extremely well:
[In terms of accomplishing its end, the system of criminal justice is some-
times not much of a system. . . . In terms of protecting its bureaucratic
methods of processing criminal cases, however, the American system of crim-
inal justice is indeed a system, and the effect of suppressing an injustice at
one point in the criminal process may be to cause a comparable injustice to
appear elsewhere.
Alschuler, supra note 7, at 574-75.
1979-80]
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ing the varieties of control that may be asserted over discretion-
ary power, the processes by which the control is affected and
the points at which sentencing decisions are influenced. It next
examines some particular determinate sentencing statutes and
sentence guideline systems, with emphasis on the California
Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976. Against this
background, the article considers the effects of definite sent-
encing upon traditional sentencing goals such as rehabilitation,
condemnation, uniformity, deterrence and incapacitation.
Questions of legality and constitutionality are then examined,
and that examination is followed by a section considering ad-
ministrative difficulties such as cost, complexity and plea bar-
gaining. A final section summarizes the author's conclusions.
I. PATTERNS OF DETERMINATE SENTENCING
Many who hear the phrase "determinate sentencing" mis-
takenly assume that it describes a system in which all penalties
are mandatory and fixed. 3 In fact, no sentencing system is
either perfectly mandatory or perfectly discretionary. Even
those jurisdictions that provide great discretion to sentencing
judges put outer limits on the range,'4 and even jurisdictions
with relatively rigid sentencing do not provide across-the-board
mandatory sentences." Various terms such as "fixed,"
11 An attitudinal survey conducted for this article disclosed that many attorneys
so understood the term. See notes 183-92 infra and accompanying text for a discussion
of the attitudinal poll. Other commentators have observed this lack of understanding
of the terminology: "For instance, many people seem to think that flat time sentences
mean mandatory prison sentences." McAnany, Merritt & Tromanhouser, Illinois Re-
considers "Flat Time": An Analysis of the Impact of the Justice Model, 52 CHi.-KENT
L. Rav. 621 n.2 (1976).
"1 For example, Texas affords the trial judge or jury a discretionary range of five
to ninety-nine years or life for first-degree felonies, which include aggravated rape,
aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, some types of burglary, murder and cer-
tain other offenses. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 12.32 (Vernon 1974). For some of
these offenses, probation is available, but for others it is not. TEx. CODE Caru. PRoc.
ANN. art. 42.12 (Vernon 1979). Similar discretionary ranges with maximums and mini-
mums apply to other grades of offenses. See generally TaX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 3,
ch. 12 (Vernon 1974).
See notes 102-06 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Indiana
system, which illustrates that determinate sentencing sometimes employs similar dis-
cretionary ranges.
1" For example, the California system, described at notes 65-91 infra, is a relatively
narrow determinate system, but even it leaves wide discretion. "[I]ts net effect on
[Vol. 68
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"presumptive," "guideline" or "flat-time" sentencing,"6 used
to describe different types of determinate systems, have no
universal meaning. Nor, for that matter, does the word
"determinate;" it is a relative concept. Many systems that are
correctly called "determinate" retain wide ranges of discre-
tion." What "determinate sentencing" really describes is a sys-
tem in which discretion deemed excessive has been removed or
controlled in an effort to produce equitable results, but in
which that discretion deemed necessary remains.
The issues in determinate sentencing, therefore, boil down
to these: How much control over discretion is there to be?
Whose discretion is to be controlled? and, How is the control
to be effected? 8
A. The Degree of Control over Discretion
The most determinate sort of sentencing is mandatory
sentencing. In this pattern, the determination of certain facts
leads inexorably to a prescribed sentence, which cannot be
avoided except perhaps by proof of other facts in mitigation or
aggravation. 9 The primary drawback of mandatory sentencing
time that inmates serve in prison cannot be as readily predicted as proponents and
opponents believe." Cassou & Taugher, supra note 11, at 5-6.
11 "Fixed" may be used to refer to almost any type of determinate sentencing,
though it sometimes connotes narrow discretion, mandatory terms or abolition of pa-
role. "Presumptive" sentencing describes a system in which a certain sentence is
postulated for given circumstances, with the court having discretion, however, to de-
part from it. "Guidelines" are similar to presumptive sentencing, though the term
connotes looser control over discretion. "Guidelines" may also be used to describe
statistical derivation of information to be furnished to sentencing judges, or it may be
applied to determinate systems generally. See L. WILIKNs, J. KREss, D. GorrEDSON,
J. CAPLiN & A. GELMAN, SENTENCING GuIDELINES: STRucTURING JuDIcIL DIsCRETION
(1976) [hereinafter cited as L. WInKIms]. "Flat time" refers generally to sentences in
which parole discretion has been narrowed or abolished, although it too is used to refer
to different types of systems. McAnany, Merritt & Tromanhouser, supra note 13, at
622-23, 627.
" The sentencing systems of Maine and Indiana, described at notes 96-106 infra,
are examples.
" See generally K. DAvIs, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969). See also DEFINrrE SENT-
ENCING, supra note 7, at 1.
11 An example is to be found in TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 12.42(d) (Vernon
1974), which provides a sentence of life imprisonment for a third sequential felony
conviction. Such "habitual offender" statutes are common among the states. See
generally AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, SENTENCING COMPUrrAlON LAws AND PRACTICE: A PRE-
LIMINARY SuRvEY (1974). Even such mandatory laws, however, may be interpreted to
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is that the varieties of offenses and offenders are infinite;
hence, it produces some ill-fitting sentences and leads to judi-
cial "fudging." For these reasons, truly mandatory sentencing
has not been extensively adopted and has met constitutional
obstacles in some cases.2" Mandatory sentencing does, of
course, offer the possibility of relatively uniform results if con-
fined to appropriate situations, and it probably also offers in-
creased deterrent effects as well as simplification of, and better
control over, the sentencing process. 21 The use of "quasi-
mandatory" systems, employing limited escape valves for the
exercise of discretion, is a related option.22
Most of today's sentencing, however, is at the opposite
pole from the mandatory model because most jurisdictions vest
allow some discretion: Texas judges, for example, may resort to the fiction of "failing
to find" prior convictions of habitual offenders undeserving of life sentences.
A sentencing law may be mandatory in one sense but highly discretionary in
another, such as one that prohibits probation but gives a range for the resulting prison
sentence. See McAnany, Merritt & Tromanhauser, supra note 13, at 622-23 n.8.
For example, in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), the Supreme
Court struck down a mandatory death penalty statute on eighth amendment grounds.
Its reasons were threefold: (1) "evolving standards of decency" (as evidenced by legis-
lative and jury actions) disfavored mandatory death sentencing; (2) juries would
"fudge" their verdicts to avoid death sentences in some cases, but they would do so
with no standards, and hence the results would be haphazard; and (3) mandatory
death sentencing failed to respect individual human dignity. Id. at 292-305. See
generally Crump, The Eighth Amendment, the Death Penalty and the Prohibition on
Cruel and Unusual Punishments, CONsTrrrTiONAL LAW DEsKsooK 3-1, 3-8 (Nat'l Coll.
Dist. Att'ys ed. 1977). There has been some application of these concepts in non-
capital sentencing. E.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978) (Texas habit-
ual offender statute, requiring the trial court to sentence a defendant to life imprison-
ment upon a third conviction for any felony, held constitutional, but that some sent-
ences may be so disproportionate as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment). The
Rummel decision was reversed by the court en banc. 590 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1979).
21 James Q. Wilson, for example, argues that there should be "a penalty that
involved a deprivation of liberty," even if slight, for every "nontrivial offense." He
further posits that every subsequent conviction should "invariably" result in increased
deprivation. J. WILSON, THINKING ABoUT CRlIAE 180 (1975). At the upper end of the
spectrum, capital punishment statutes sanctioned by the Supreme Court are
"mandatory" in the sense that they require, at maximum, life imprisonment. Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262 (1976).
2 For example, the Texas death penalty process, TFx. CODE CIA1. PROC. ANN. art.
37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1978), has been called quasi-mandatory because it provides for
life or death sentences on the basis of "yes" or "no" answers to three questions, but
the questions themselves allow for discretion in the answering. Crump, The Prohibition
on Cruel and Unusual Punishments and Its Application in Texas, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
IN TExAs 4-1, 4-5 (Nat'l Coll. Dist. Att'ys ed. 1977).
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virtually uncontrolled discretion in sentencing judges. The
hornbook law in the federal courts, for example, is that the
sentencing judge has discretion to consider any factor from any
source, with the exception of unconstitutional factors.2 The
judge is required to choose a term within limits provided by
legislation, but these limits are usually broad: for some offen-
ses, a federal judge has options ranging from less than a year's
incarceration to life imprisonment.4 Lesser ranges of five, ten
or twenty-five years are common,2s and the exercise of discre-
tion within these ranges is virtually unreviewable. 6 The pres-
ent system thus comes as close as it practicably could to one
in which the judge is allowed to choose whatever sentence he
pleases for whatever reasons he pleases.
Between these two extremes there is a range of alternatives
offering varying control over discretion. In presumptive sen-
tencing systems, for example, a fixed sentence is postulated
for a given situation, but the judge has discretion to depart
from it if he states the reasons for doing so. Such a system
gives the promise of consistent results without requiring that
individual differences be ignored and without "fudging" by
the judge.? Guidelines that do not bind the sentencing entity
A sentencing judge in federal court may "appropriately conduct an inquiry
broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider,
or the source from which it may come." United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446
(1972). Tucker allowed the judge to consider even the conduct underlying
constitutionally invalid prior convictions, provided the court was aware of the invalid-
ity and did not use the conviction itself. Id. at 448-49. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241 (1949), is the basic case upon which approval of the discretionary model of sentenc-
ing is founded. See also M. FRANKEL, supra note 5, at ch. 1. For a description of
discretionary state sentencing, see note 14 supra.
21 E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111(b), 1201 (1976) (penalties for second degree murder and
kidnapping one year to life); 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976) (probation). There is, however,
some question under the language of § 3651 whether probation can be granted for an
offense for which life imprisonment is possible. See United States v. Denson, 588 F.2d
1112 (5th Cir.), rehearing granted, 593 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1979).
E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2114 (1976) (armed robbery of person having custody of United
States property-probation to 25 years); 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1976) (armed robbery
of bank-fine, probation or up to 25 years); 18 U.S.C. § 113(a) (1976) (assault to
commit murder or rape-probation to 20 years); 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (1976) (interstate
theft of securities-fine, probation or up to 10 years).
" See notes 49-55 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of appellate review
as a method of controlling sentence disparity.
2 One of the best known presumptive proposals is set forth in TwENTwrm CENTURY
FUND, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT: RPORT OF THE wENTmrIH CENTURY FUND TAsK
FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING (1976) [hereinafter cited as TWENTMH CENTURY
FUND].
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but that merely inform its discretion are a variation on the
presumptive model.2" Similar results may be obtained by
narrowing the range of sentence options-by making sentence
ranges of three to five years, for example, rather than of one to
ten-and by allocating relatively unguided discretion to the
judge within this range.29 Each of these controlled-discretion
systems may be extended by the specification of factors add-
ing to, or subtracting from, the sentence and by providing for
the effect of each-a system that might be called the "base-
plus-enhancement" model.3
A good sentencing structure would be neither too manda-
tory to be inflexible nortoo discretionary to produce haphazard
results. Each of the different approaches-mandatory, pre-
sumptive, guideline, base-plus-enhancement and discretion-
ary-could be incorporated into a single system; for example,
mandatory minimum prison terms and denial of probation
might be appropriate for serious offenses or habitual offenders,
presumptive sentences might be adopted for the majority of
dispositions, enhancements might be available for common
aggravated situations and guidelines might be provided for the
exercise of discretion when a judge considered departing from
a presumptive sentence or enhancement.
B. The Discretion That Is To Be Controlled
If one is able to decide whether, and how much, to narrow
discretion in the system, one is immediately faced with the
next question: Whose discretion is to be controlled? The most
visible level of discretion is that of the sentencing court, but
there are other levels in the criminal justice system to which
21 E.g., L. WILKINS, supra note 16. The Wilkins guidelines, however, partake some-
what of the nature of presumptive sentences, because a departure from them requires
statement of reasons and is subject to appeal. There may in practice be little difference
between presumptive and guideline sentencing, except as a matter of degree.
2 A narrowed range may, indeed, be part of a presumptive system. The Twentieth
Century Fund proposal, for instance, includes this feature. TwFT'nMIrH CENTUY FuND,
supra note 27, at 20-22.
11 The California Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976, an example of a
complex base-plus-enhancement statute, is discussed at notes 65-91 infra. The Federal
Dangerous Special Offender Statute, a base-plus-enhancement law of a different sort,
is discussed at notes 251-57 infra.
[Vol. 68
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current law also extends discretion.
The parole board is an important example. In fact, some
states, through the indeterminate sentence, have removed
sentencing discretion in felony incarcerations from the court
and accorded it to a parole board which has become, for all
practical purposes, the sentencing entity.31 Reducing sentenc-
ing discretion while leaving parole unaffected would be mean-
ingless in such a system; therefore, most determinate sentenc-
ing systems include provisions controlling discretionary power
over parole." Another major area in which discretion is exer-
cised is in the actions of attorneys for the prosecution and the
defense. This area includes plea bargaining, but it also includes
related kinds of discretion involving the initiation of prosecu-
tions," reduction of charges," recommendation of probation,
use of programs for diversion or alternative sentences35 and
abandonment of counts.36 No determinate sentencing statute
yet enacted has attempted direct regulation of attorney discre-
tion (probably because it is the riskiest level to control), but
local rules governing this conduct have been proposed and in a
few instances actually adopted.37 In any event, the impact of
11 For example, in California before 1977 a court made no decisions at all with
respect to prison sentences. It merely committed the defendant to prison "for the term
provided by law," which could be as broad a term as one year to life. See CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1168 (West 1970). The Adult Authority, California's parole board, then had
power to consider parole. Thus the "real" sentence was set by the Adult Authority
rather than the court. See Cassou & Taugher, supra note 11, at 8-9.
3 In fact, all states that have thus far adopted determinate sentencing have abol-
ished discretionary parole except Arizona, which has retained it because of concern for
the unpredictability of prison populations. See note 107 infra and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Arizona system.
3 See, e.g., F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION To CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A
CRIME 154-62 (1969); LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 Am.
J. CoMP. L. 532, 533-35 (1970).
1 See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 33, at 539-41; Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in
Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50, 52-53 (1968).
35 See, e.g., R. NIMMER, DIVERSION: THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE FoRms OF
PROSECUTION 5, 14-16 (1974).
14 See note 34 supra and authorities cited therein for an examination of this propo-
sition.
E.g., C. VANCE, OPERATIONS MANUAL app. 2, at 1-3, 8-15, (1976) (manual setting
forth internal rules promulgated by district attorney of Harris County [Houston],
Texas); J. VAN DE KAMP, SPECIAL DIRECTIVE: FELONY CASES SErLEMENT POLICY 1-12
(1976) (internal directive promulgated by district attorney of Los Angeles County); cf.
K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 188-207 (1969) (arguing that the prosecutor's uncon-
trolled discretion vests too much power in his office); NATIONAL COLLEGE OF DISTRICT
1979-801
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determinate sentencing upon attorney discretion is an impor-
tant consideration, because it might be self-defeating to limit
sentence discretion only to see that discretion shifted to the
defense lawyer and prosecutor."
Actually, an accurate picture of these three levels-
attorneys, court and parole board-must account for the many
different kinds of decisions that are made at each level.39
Evidence indicates, for example, that a sentencing court
usually makes a decision whether to incarcerate before deter-
mining the length of incarceration; the decision between incar-
ceration or probation is qualitatively different from that as to
length.' Given the frequency of probation, the difficulty of
formulating criteria for it and the disparity it can produce, this
decision needs to be a major focus of any effort at determinate
sentencing.'
Creation of a rational system thus requires comprehensive
consideration of the exercise of discretion at many different
decision points.42 The problem is further complicated by the
differing functions served by the different levels. 3 As a rough
approximation, it might be postulated that the parole board is
ATTORNEYS, DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY OF THE PROSECUTOR 78-161 (1977) (reproducing
arguments of various authorities in favor of rules); Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discre-
tion of Criminal Justice Officials, 1976 DUKE L.J. 651 (a proposal for legislative, admin-
istrative and judicial actions designed to reduce official discretion as regards the han-
dling of common law-or "street"-crimes).
13 See notes 379-98 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of this impact.
Indeed, Alschuler argues that the narrowing of judicial discretion is "likely" to enlarge
attorney discretion unless the latter is also narrowed. Alschuler, supra note 7, at 550-
51.
" For example, plea bargaining is preceded by a decision whether to bargain. See
NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 91
(1977) (suggesting that a prosecutor's office manual should contain a "description of
cases in which no plea is to be accepted").
10 See L. WILKINs, supra note 16, at 1.
" "Judicial discretion is nearly unlimited as to whether or not to incarcerate." Id.
For examples of disparity, see notes 49-54 infra and accompanying text. For a descrip-
tion of the manner in which the decision whether to imprison is guided in California,
see notes 72-75 infra and accompanying text.
42 There are, of course, other levels at which criminal justice discretion is exer-
cised. The discretion of police to arrest or charge, of probation officers to recommend
revocation and of parole officers to take action on violations is part of the same system.
Furthermore, still other agencies may impinge upon the system; legislative investiga-
tion may check discretion, for example, or the intervention of an individual politician
may influence it. See K. DAVIS, supra note 18, at 9-12, 24, 80-84, 126-30, 146 (1969).
13 See generally Alschuler, supra note 7.
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the proper repository for discretion concerning the defendant's
behavior after conviction, including some factors related to the
further need to protect the public from him." But the parole
board may not be in as good a position as the trial court to
determine the deterrent value of the sentence or the need to
serve the ends of retributive justice or uniformity.45 Exercise of
discretion at the attorney level, finally, serves the purpose of
bringing a rational cost-benefit factor into the process through
plea bargaining." It also serves more substantive goals, such as
the prevention of unwarranted proceedings.4"
A good sentencing structure, then, would recognize the
function and the limits of beneficial discretion at each level. It
would not constrict sentencing power at one level only to cause
equivalent power to reappear at another level, absent good rea-
son for doing so. Neither would it destroy the legitimate func-
tion of discretion at any of the three levels.
" See M. FRANKEL, supra note 5, at 86-102 (1972) (arguing that while indetermi-
nate sentences with discretionary parole are "usually evil and unwarranted," they may
be useful "in specific cases involving (1) demonstrated needs for rehabilitation and
incapacitation and (2) rationally organized means for serving those needs"). For argu-
ments upholding the value of discretionary parole, see Bums, Correctional Reform:
Britain and the United States Compared and Contrasted, 42 FED. PROBATION 21 (1978);
Reid, A Rebuttal to the Attack on the Indeterminate Sentence, 51 WASH. L. REv. 565
(1976).
11 "The 'seriousness of the crime' is a matter of law and policy within
the province of judges, best known to the participants in the trial, and
properly to be estimated for purposes of voicing the community's condemna-
tion at the time of pronouncement of sentence. It is, more importantly, not
a subject on which there is need to 'wait and see' whether the defendant is
ready for release."
Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. Rav. 1, 37 (1972).
46 See C. VANCE, supra note 37, at 8-15 (estimating that Harris County, Texas,
would need "five to twenty times the number of courts and personnel if every case were
to go to trial on a contested basis").
'1 Id. at 1-3. Vance requires that prosecutors considering charge initiation consider
as primary criteria (1) whether there is probable cause and (2) whether a conviction is
likely to be obtained and upheld. Other criteria that should also be considered, he
indicates, include improper motives of the complainant, costs and benefits of prosecu-
tion, prolonged nonenforcement, convictions or other deprivation of liberty which the
accused has already suffered, existence of other greater or lesser charges and coopera-
tion rendered to law enforcement. Similar criteria are provided for bail and charge or
sentence reduction. Id. at 8-15. Limits on plea bargaining would inevitably affect these
areas of discretion as well.
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C. Methods for Controlling Discretion
The most straightforward method through which to con-
trol discretion is to set forth a determinate sentencing system
and direct the court (or attorneys or parole authority) to follow
it. But what is to be done if the court does not follow it? And
specifically, what is to be done in the instance of presumptive
results if the court is faced with the decision whether to depart
from them? Some cases cannot be controlled by specific guide-
lines; they tend to be cases in which consistent sentencing is
most difficult and most important.48 Accordingly, a rational
determinate sentencing system might well include mechanisms
for the structuring of necessary discretion remaining in the
system.
One obvious solution to sentencing disparity, with or with-
out the prior drafting of guidelines, is appellate review. 9 In
fact, one attractive feature of determinate sentencing is that it
creates better prospects for the success of sentence review." To
date, sentences have been effectively reviewable only in ex-
traordinary situations in most jurisdictions: when they have
been heavily disproportionate to the offense,5' when they have
been outside legislative ranges" or when the trial judge has
made the tactical mistake of recording his reliance on a factor
that the appellate court considered improper.53 Appellate re-
view in a determinate sentencing system would allow for the
briefing, argument and shared decision of difficult cases, 54 and
"I See notes 218-26 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the level of
discretion most appropriately accorded the sentencing judge.
" See generally AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW
OF SENTENCES (1967); Coburn, Disparity in Sentences and Appellate Review of
Sentencing, 25 RUTGERS L. REv. 207 (1971).
0 If sentence review is undertaken without advance statement of guidelines, the
result is likely to be the mere substitution of the "judgment of an appellate court...
for that of the lower court. . . on an ad hoc basis without. . . a considered overreach-
ing policy." Because appellate evolution is slow, a "common law of sentencing may
well take several decades to develop." L. WILKINS, supra note 16, at 2.
5, E.g., In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921 (Cal. 1972) (life imprisonment for second offense
of indecent exposure held cruel and unusual).
52 E.g., People v. McClendon, 265 N.E.2d 207 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970) (probation held
required by statute in all but certain kinds of cases).
53 E.g., United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972) (sentencing judge may con-
sider facts underlying invalid prior conviction but not conviction itself).
51 For example, Maine has long had statutory authority for sentence review, but
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it might clarify standards so as to produce greater consist-
ency. 5
A sentencing court might also be required to state the
reasons for its discretionary decisions. 6 This process would
serve at least four separate purposes: (1) it would force the
judge to explain his reasons to himself (and thus reduce un-
principled decisions); (2) it would serve as a basis for appellate
review; (3) it would increase understanding and acceptance of
decisions; and (4) it would create a body of precedent that
might aid other judges.57 To perform these functions, a state-
ment of reasons need not be in the form of a full-fledged opin-
ion. 8 It could be similar to findings of fact made by trial judges
in civil cases or to findings that are currently made for certain
types of criminal sentencing.
There are many other mechanisms for ensuring rational
exercise of residual discretion in a determinate system. One
such method is to disseminate information about sentences to
judges on a regular basis. Respectable evidence indicates that
such information, even without other control, leads to more
consistent sentencing.59 Diffusion of the decision among several
it has been used little in practice. It is expected that Maine's new determinate sentence
law will make such review far more meaningful. Cf. Halperin, Determinate Sentencing
in Other States, Sentencing Practices Quarterly, Sept. 30, 1977, pp. 13-14 (newsletter
published by California Judicial Council).
"1 It might have this effect. A respectable argument can also be made that ad hoc
intervention by appellate courts will obfuscate rather than clarify and will cause dis-
parity rather than uniformity. Notes 367-78 infra and accompanying text provide a
discussion of the distortion of legislative intent that occurs in the application of deter-
minate sentencing laws. See also L. WILKINS, supra note 16, at 2.
" See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 45, at 9-16; Zeisel & Diamond, Search for Sentenc-
ing Equity: Sentence Review in Massachusetts and Connecticut, 1977 Am. B. FOUNDA-
TION RESEARCH J. 881, 928-34.
" See also M. FRANKEL, supra note 5, at 39-49; L. WILKINS, supra note 16, at 29.
n E.g., "[Tihe judge shall state in simple language the primary factor or factors
that support the exercise of discretion .... The statement need not be in the lan-
guage of these rules. It shall be delivered orally on the record." CAL. RULES OF COURT
443.
,$ See, e.g., L. WILKINS, supra note 16, at 25 (reporting that 85 percent of decisions
fell within statistically derived, but nonbinding, guidelines furnished judges in one
sample jurisdiction and period); Strauss & Baskir, Controlling Discretion in Sentenc-
ing: The Clemency Board as a Working Model, 51 NoTRE DAME LAW. 919, 932-34 (1976)
(promulgation of a Clemency Law Reporter resulted in "key cases being debated and
decided very strictly according to the rules" and in panel decisions that "rarely wan-
dered far from what precedent dictated"). The sentencing institute, at which judges
exchange views on hypothetical cases, is a method of information dissemination. It
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individuals is another technique; for instance, the sentence
might be formulated by a panel of judges, or by a single judge
whose discretion is guided by the consultation of two
"advisory" judges who give non-binding opinions."0 Finally, a
judicial council might be charged with the responsibility of
drawing loosely worded guidelines that would operate in areas
where discretion is necessary. For example, such guidelines
might direct the court as to the kinds of considerations that
could be legitimate factors in a decision, without mandating
their weight or the result. Here, too, there is evidence that more
consistent sentencing will result."
These alternatives to direct control might be considered as
alternatives to determinate sentencing. That is to say, a given
jurisdiction might reasonably decide that an articulation-of-
reasons requirement, together with general guidelines for sen-
tencing and appellate review, is preferable to determinate
sentencing. But one of the most important benefits of deter-
minate sentencing is that it will enable these other mechanisms
for structuring discretion to work properly. If no uniform cri-
teria are provided, the statement and evaluation of reasons for
decisions will be less meaningful.2 The requirement also might
results in the tempering of extremes of lenience or severity and in most individual
judges being influenced more closely toward a kind of "average" of all their colleagues.
See Frankel, supra note 45, at 20-22. In an effort to take advantage of these effects,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.4 (West Supp. 1979) requires the California Judicial Council
to "collect, analyze and quarterly distribute . . . relevant information to trial judges
and other interested persons relating to sentencing practices in this state and other
jurisdictions."
0 E.g., Strauss & Baskir, supra note 59, at 931 n.61 (reporting that the Clemency
Board's use of three-member panels, each balanced by the inclusion of "one conserva-
tive, one moderate and one liberal," met "unanimous approval," resulted in a few
sharp divisions, promoted compromise and avoided previous "very uneven" adjudica-
tion). Cf. Chamberlain, A New Look at Sentencing from a Court that Doesn't Exist,
37 TEx. B.J. 235 (1974) (arguing that sentencing should be handled by a distinct state
court established solely for that purpose). See also Frankel, supra note 45, at 22-23
(discussing sentencing panels composed of the judge, "a psychiatrist or psychologist,"
and "a sociologist or educator." This tribunal "would bring to the task attitudes,
modes of thought, and values that could usefully broaden and temper the lawyer's
view.")
"1 E.g., Strauss & Baskir, supra note 59, at 925-28; L. WiLKIms, supra note 16, at
28-30.
62 This phenomenon is persuasively documented by Zeisel & Diamond, Search for
Sentencing Equity: Sentence Review in Massachusetts and Connecticut, 1977 AM.i. B.
FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 881, 931. The authors demonstrate that a reason-statement
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be unduly burdensome if imposed in every case, and could
become trivialized.63 In contrast, the preliminary formulation
of guidelines would make not only reason statements but also
appellate review, advisory sentences and data dissemination
more effective mechanisms for the control of discretion."4
D. Specific Determinate Sentencing Systems
1. The California Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of
1976
California has a new determinate sentencing law5 that
took effect in mid-1977. It combines several discrete ingredi-
ents to determine the length of prison sentences in a way that
severely limits discretion, and it cannot be regarded as any-
thing less than a revolutionary change from California's past.
A judge in California computing a prison sentence today
begins by choosing one of three "base terms" provided by law
for the category of offense for which the defendant has been
convicted.66 The court makes this choice by considering
supporting a severe sentence, and containing some aggravating and some mitigating
material, can be rearranged so that it supports a lenient sentence without changing
the factors contained in it.
11 "It is imperative that reasons not simply be. . . some phrase made meaningless
through rote repetition (which we believe would occur frequently were written reasons
required for all sentences). . . ." L. WnxiNs, supra note 16, at 20. The Wilkins model
requires that judges state reasons whenever they sentence outside the guidelines. For
reasons stated both in the Wilkins work and in notes 222-26 infra and accompanying
text of this article, however, it is submitted that a judge should also be required to
state reasons when he refuses to depart from guidelines after being given arguments
for doing so upon which reasonable persons could differ.
1, L. WILKINS, supra note 16. Advisory sentencing would be too expensive and
would become trivialized if done in every case. As for data dissemination, the data
must be collected and organized according to some sort of categories before it can be
disseminated, and sentencing standards would facilitate both this process and their
receipt.
65 See generally, e.g., Oppenheim, Computing a Determinate Sentence: New
Math Hits the Courts, 51 CAL. ST. B.J. 604 (1976); Cassou & Taugher, supra note 11;
McGee, supra note 9; Comment, Senate Bill 42-The End of the Indeterminate
Sentence, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 133 (1977). The best and most complete of these
references is Cassou & Taugher, which contains a comprehensive, subject-by-subject
exposition and analysis of the California Act.
6 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(2) (West Supp. 1979). The amended Act provides
ten tripartite sentence ranges: 16 months, two or three years; two, three or four years;
two, three or five years; three, four or five years; two, four or six years; three, four or
six years; three, five or seven years; three, six or eight years; five, seven or nine years;
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whether circumstances in "aggravation" or "mitigation" re-
quire that the "upper" or "lower" term be chosen; if not, the
court must select the "mid'dle" term, which is thus analogous
to a presumptive sentence. 7 The crime of second-degree mur-
der, for example, carried base terms of five, six or seven years
under the Act as adopted; 8 thus the first step in computing a
prison sentence for this offense would be to decide whether
circumstances in mitigation or aggravation required a five year
or seven year base term. If not, the presumptive middle term
of six years would apply. The California Act also provides for
"enhancements" of one to three years. 9 For instance, if the
second-degree murderer referred to above had been convicted
of another violent felony within the last ten years, his sentence
would be subject to an enhancement of three years under the
Act. The addition of this enhancement to the base term would
yield a total sentence of nine years. This system of base terms,
aggravation, mitigation and enhancements is the core of the
California Act, although the act is far more complex than this
example would indicate." The new Act is radically different
five, seven or 11 years. For examples of offenses falling in these categories see McGee,
supra note 65, at 4; Comment, supra note 65, at app. B (Act before amendment).
For examples of the workings of the Act, see, e.g., People v. Roberson, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 777 (1978) (demonstrating interplay between base terms, aggravation, enhance-
ment and limitations); People v. Schmidt, 146 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1978) (showing base
terms, aggravation, mitigation, enhancement and consecutive sentences).
'7 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (West Supp. 1979).
61 This set of base-term options would apply to offenses committed after the
effective date of the California Act but before January 1, 1978, when amendments
increasing base terms became effective. The principle here illustrated remains un-
changed by the amendments. See note 221 infra for a discussion of the Act.
61 "Specific" enhancements include one year for personally possessing a firearm
or using a deadly or dangerous weapon during the felony (known colloquially as the
"arming clause"); two years for personally using a firearm (the "use" clause); one year
for taking, damaging or destroying property worth more than $25,000 (or two years for
more than $100,000); and three years for personally inflicting great bodily injury during
a felony other than murder, manslaughter or assault. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12022,
12022.5-.7 (West Supp. 1979). "General" enhancements include one year for a prior
felony conviction and three years if both the present crime and the prior were violent
felonies and certain other circumstances are present. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5 (West
Supp. 1979). See also note 100 infra for a description of the simpler Maine system. Cf.
People v. Caudillo, 580 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1978) (holding evidence insufficient to support
great bodily injury enhancement).
70 One important complication is that enhancements are sometimes inapplicable
because of provisions called limitations. For example, in certain cases the total sen-
tence may not exceed twice the base term. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1(f) (West Supp.
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from California's prior system of indeterminate sentences, in
which the Adult Authority had wide discretion to determine
release dates within a range that sometimes stretched from one
year to life imprisonment.
In keeping with its stated goal of uniformity, and in a
further departure from the indeterminate sentence, the new
California Act deals with parole release by all but abolishing
it. An inmate serving a determinate sentence can reduce it by
up to one third through "good time," but no further reduction
is allowed. Furthermore, the reduction is mandatory; it can
only be limited by the denial of good time in specified amounts
under specified procedures. 71 This treatment of parole, which
is characteristic of most determinate sentencing systems
throughout the nation, will make sentences served in California
more closely similar to sentences actually assessed than ever
before.
But the California Act is also notable for the discretionary
options that it retains. Discretion in the granting of probation,
for instance, is unchanged by the Act itself,72 although it is
restricted to "unusual" cases for some crimes and denied for
certain others.73 The ability to impose conditions of probation,
1979). Other limitations are imposed by CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170.1(a), 1170.1(d), and
1170(b) (which provide, respectively, that enhancements cannot exceed five years for
consecutive nonviolent felonies; that arming or use enhancements cannot be "stacked"
upon great bodily injury enhancements except in cases of actual or attempted robbery,
rape or burglary; and that a fact used in aggravation-in determining the base
term-cannot be used also to enhance).
For an example of a case construing these limitation provisions, see People v.
Roberson, 146 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1978) (trial court could not use firearm and prior convic-
tion for both aggravation and enhancement but could use other convictions to show
"pattern of violent conduct" for aggravation in addition to prior conviction used for
enhancement).
7 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2930-2932 (West Supp. 1979). But some indeterminate and
life sentences are retained; for these, parole is discretionary. And even determinately
sentenced prisoners must serve one year after release under supervision, during which
time they are subject to revocation with reincarceration limited to six months. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 3057 (West Supp. 1979).
72 See CAL. PENAL CODE 1170(a)(2) (West Supp. 1979) (non-prison dispositions
unaffected).
" For provisions prohibiting probation, see CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203.06-.07, 12311
(West Supp. 1979); CAL. HEALTH & SAFrv CODE § 11370 (West Supp. 1979). But see
People v. Tanner, 587 P.2d 1112 (Cal. 1979) (trial court nevertheless has authority to
strike prohibitory portion of charge and grant probation in extraordinary case in which
interests of justice so dictate). Situations in which probation should be limited to
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including jail terms, also remains discretionary. Misdemeanor
sentences, alternative drug commitments and mentally disor-
dered sex offender dispositions are unaffected by the Act. 74 Ex-
traordinary sentences such as life imprisonment and death
remain, 75 and the discretion inherent in them is preserved. 7 In
addition, the California Act creates new discretionary deci-
sions. There is a power on the part of the sentencing judge, for
example, to strike the additional punishments required by en-
hancements when mitigating circumstances so require, and
the Act itself does not provide significant guidance in the
exercise of this power.77 The kinds of aggravation or mitigation
that justify deviation from the presumptive middle term are
not specified by the Act.
7
1
To structure this remaining discretion, the California Act
designates an agency called the California Judicial Council 7' to
draft rules for the uniform decision of questions regarding ag-
gravation, mitigation," probation,"' striking of enhancements
"unusual" cases are enumerated by CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(d) (West Supp. 1979),
including those involving use of a deadly weapon, arming with a deadly weapon,
infliction of great bodily injury or torture and offenders with certain prior records. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1203(a) (West Supp. 1979), however, provides that all eligible defen-
dants must first be considered for probation.
71 See Cassou & Taugher, supra note 11, at 27; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(2)
(West Supp. 1979).
11 For example, life imprisonment is still the penalty for six crimes, including first-
degree murder and kidnapping for ransom. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190, 209 (West Supp.
1978); see also Cassou & Taugher, supra note 11, at 29. The life sentence may be with
or without possibility of parole. For murder (§ 190), the death penalty is also available
in California. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (West Supp. 1978). Retention of some indetermi-
nate sentences, such as parole life sentences, are a feature which California shares with
other determinate systems.
11 Certain other indeterminate sentences are retained in California for various
reasons, including offenses kept as low-grade felonies for ease of extradition. E.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1979) (failure to provide for children). See Cassou &
Taugher, supra note 11, at 29 n.182.
" CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170.1(c),(g) (West Supp. 1979). In effect, enhancements
are presumptive; they must be imposed unless the court finds mitigating circum-
stances on the record.
7s See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (West Supp. 1972).
7' CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.3 (West Supp. 1978).
80 Circumstances in aggravation and mitigation are set forth in CAL. RULES OF
CouiRT 421, 423. Examples are discussed in notes 193-209 infra and accompanying text.
8, Criteria affecting probation generally are set forth in CAL. RuLs OF COURT 414
and include such factors as
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and similar matters."2 The Council has responded by drafting
lists of factors to be considered in the exercise of this discre-
tion."' The Act alo guides discretion by requiring articulation
of reasons, 4 providing for sentence review and setting proce-
dures for the sentencing hearing.8
The California Act is thus both comprehensive and ambi-
tious. It is the most rigid of the new definite sentencing laws,
(b) The likelihood that if not imprisoned the defendant will be a danger to
others.
(c) Facts relating to the crime, including:
(1) The nature, seriousness and circumstances of the crime.
(2) The vulnerability of the victim and the degree of harm or loss
to the victim.
(d) Facts relating to the defendant, including:
(1) Prior record of criminal conduct, including the recency and
frequency of prior crimes ....
It can readily be observed that many of the circumstances are very general, but others
are more specific-such as subsections (c)(6)-(c)(8), which refer to provocation, profes-
sionalism or breach of trust. These latter factors, if actually applied, may have very
discernible and concrete effects such as decreasing the availability of probation in
white collar cases.
Probation for some kinds of crimes is denied altogether and for others is restricted
to "unusual" cases (see note 73 supra). CAL. RULES OF COURT 416 sets forth criteria for
determining the existence of an unusual case.
12 For example, the rules also cover striking of punishment for enhancements. See
CAL. RULES OF COURT 441, 445, 447; Advisory Committee Comment, CAL. RULES OF
CouRT 441.
3 The rules, in other words, are not "rules" in the ordinary sense; rather, they
consist of factors to be weighed against each other. As the council explains, "A single
criterion will rarely be determinative; in most cases, the sentencing judge will have to
balance favorable and unfavorable facts." Advisory Committee Comment, CAL. RULES
OF COURT 416. Such rules may nevertheless be useful in structuring necessary discre-
tion.
8, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(c) (West Supp. 1979). See also CAL. RULES OF COURT
443.
1 There are several ways, including appeal, in which the sentence may be re-
viewed. See generally Cassou & Taugher, supra note 11, at 70-73. The court may recall
the defendant within 120 days and resentence, either on the court's own motion or on
that of the Director of Corrections or Community Release Board. The purpose is to use
the information gained in the first three months to eliminate disparity. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1170(d) (West Supp. 1979). The Community Release Board must also review
the sentence within one year after its commencement and may then recommend re-
sentencing. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(f) (West Supp. 1979). It is unclear whether an
increase in sentence is allowed by this provision, but there is no express prohibition.
See notes 30-38 supra and accompanying text for discussion of multiple jeopardy
considerations related to such resentencing.
85 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (West Supp. 1979).
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using a mix of presumptive and guideline approaches, as well
as existing mandatory laws, to limit discretion. It seems likely
to produce consistent results, and its treatment of parole makes
it likely that effects at that level will not cancel the uniformity
produced in sentencing. But the criticisms of the Act are also
legion: it may be the object of voluminous litigation, it will
probably increase the cost of sentencing, and its complexity
creates a danger that general practitioners will have difficulty
practicing under it.7 An alleged failure to take the attorney's
level of discretion into account has caused one commentator to
call it a "bargainer's paradise." s A further problem is that no
one knows what the new Act's ultimate effects will be; it has
been called both a "mass jail break" and a law to send "more
felons . . . to prison for more time."" Finally, the Act may
depreciate the seriousness of some offenses 0 and, in some in-
stances, may produce longer sentences for conduct that seems
less blameworthy than crimes treated less severely.' Most of
these criticisms await experience to prove or disprove them.
2. A Different Kind of Determinate Model: The Wilkins
System
A system proposed by Leslie Wilkins and others 2 presents
an interesting counterpart to the California Act. The Wilkins
model produces sentence guidelines by evolution rather than
by legislation. The system begins in a given jurisdiction with
the use of multiple regression analysis or similar techniques to
81 See notes 374-78 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the impact that
adoption of a determinate system will have on cost.
" Alschuler, supra note 7, at 571. For reasons set forth in text accompanying notes
379-98, however, this article does not share Professor Alschuler's conclusion.
11 Cassou & Taugher, supra note 11, at 30. Cassou & Taugher's own tentative
prediction is that median sentences may drop slightly while the number of prison
sentences may increase slightly, the latter because judges will be provided with realis-
tic intermediate sentences rather than with the choice between a long indeterminate
sentence and one year in county jail as a condition of probation; hence, they may
sentence more marginal offenders to prison without appreciable increase in their incar-
ceration.
10 See notes 174-79 infra and accompanying text for examples of offenses which
the Act depreciates in seriousness.
, See Cassou & Taugher, supra note 11, at 30.
" L. WILINS, supra note 16.
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ascertain the criteria that judges are "really" using to assess
sentences. These criteria are then used to formulate guidelines
that reflect the sentence that should ordinarily be assessed for
a given crime and a given offender.9 3 The heart of the system
is the furnishing of these guidelines to judges and the voluntary
use of them in the computation of sentences. Variations from
the guidelines are permitted (indeed, they are encouraged), but
must be accompanied by a statement of reasons which serves
as the basis for appellate review and for the formulation of
additional guidelines by a judicial panel. The setting of sen-
tences by legislation is not involved, nor need sentencing
ranges be changed.
The Wilkins system has its disadvantages. It offers little
or no democratic control over the absolute level of sentences9 4
and it offers little satisfactory direction outside the guidelines
it produces. It does not identify the ingredients of the sentence
as clearly as does California's Act. But the Wilkins proposal
achieves many of the objectives of determinate sentencing, and
it has an elegant simplicity that is its chief asset. No new laws
are needed. If it fails, judges can correct the problem by ceasing
to use it. The system would neither depreciate the seriousness
of offenses, stimulate plea bargaining, ignore individual cases
nor produce distortion (at least, none that is not already pres-
ent in criminal sentencing). In addition, it would not result in
dramatic increases in cost.
The Wilkins model is thus a kind of poor man's determi-
nate sentencing act. This fact alone may mean that it will be
workable in more places than the more ambitious California
model. Critics point out that the system is a half-way measure
g3 The categorization of penalties is thus crime-by-crime and offender-by-offender
rather than in the kind of across-the-board provisions used in California. A grid ex-
pressing the offense score plotted against the offender score is used. See, e.g., id. at
xv. At least one commentator implies that this difference may make a determinate
sentencing system more likely to be upheld as constitutional. Uelmen, supra note 8,
at 734.
" The lack of democratic control is intentional. Wilkins and his co-workers regard
sentencing as "primarily a judicial concern." They reject legislative action because it
is likely to ignore judicial experience, result in judicial hostility, transfer discretion to
prosecutors or police and add an "additional bureaucratic layer." For reasons set forth




that may become a permanent solution if adopted; however,
one might as easily argue that a more ambitious system will be
difficult to remove if enacted. In any event, the significance of
the Wilkins system is great. The proposed federal criminal code
revision, for instance, would create a United States Sentencing
Commission that would derive sentence guidelines, and that
proposal has a great deal in common with the Wilkins model.15
3. Determinate Sentencing in Other States
Determinate sentencing systems have been adopted in sev-
eral states other than California, among them Maine, Illinois,
Indiana, Arizona and Colorado." The only pattern to these new
laws, however, is that each is different from the others. The
differences, as one commentator has observed, may be a happy
coincidence because they increase the likelihood that the best
approaches will be identified."
The Maine law8 was the first of these new statutes. If the
California Act exemplifies rigid determinate sentencing, the
Maine law is barely deserving of the label. As a rural state,
Maine had fewer difficulties with sentence disparity than oth-
ers; consequently, reform concentrated on the parole system.
The law that emerged abolished parole, allowing for fixed good-
time credits in a manner similar to the California Act and
enabling the department of corrections to petition the trial
court to reduce sentences.9 Judicial discretion was left vir-
tually absolute, but it was structured into five felony ranges.10
11 See Imlay, Legislation: The Proposed Criminal Code, 42 FED. PROB. 55 (1978).
See also notes 108 and 111 infra for a discussion of the new Illinois "flat-time" law
which provides for statistically derived guidelines.
The spirit of the Wilkins system may even be imposed without the mathematics
by judges who conceive of a point system for offenses and offenders and agree to follow
it. See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 561 n.37.
:a See generally Halperin, Determinate Felony Sentencing, 2 STATE CT. J. 8 (1978).
, Halperin, supra note 54, at 13, 15.
, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1252 (1978).
" ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1254 (1978). Moreover, parole supervision is
also abolished.
10 The ranges are defined by maximums of 20 years for Class A felonies, 10 years
for Class B, 5 years for Class C, one year for Class D and 6 months for Class E.
There is one circumstance in aggravation specified by statute-the use of a deadly
weapon-which elevates the grade of the offense one class, creates a mandatory mini-
mum term and disallows suspension. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1252 (1978).
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Thus sentences in Maine are "determinate" in the sense that
once assessed they must be substantially served, but there is
little control (other than the corrections department petition
procedure) over their assessment."'
In a quite different vein, Indiana's new law (which bears
a basic resemblance to a proposal by a public interest group
known as the Twentieth Century Fund' 2) provides presump-
tive sentences within broad ranges of judicial discretion. For
example, the presumptive term for a "class D felony" in' Indi-
ana is two years, but the judge may deviate from that result
and assess a sentence of any length between zero and four years
by consulting and applying a statutory list of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. 13 For more serious offenses, pre-
sumptive sentences are higher and ranges wider. Murder, for
example, carries a presumptive sentence of thirty years within
an effective range04 of twenty to fifty years."5 Parole, as in
California, is abolished in favor of nondiscretionary good
time.' 8 The Indiana system is thus simpler than the California
one, but not so simple as the Wilkins proposal.
The Arizona,' 7 Illinois'0 ' and Colorado'09 statutes represent
101 However, Maine has appellate sentence review. ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
2141 (1978). It is possible, as Halperin suggests, that the abolition of parole may make
review more frequent and successful. Halperin, supra note 54, at 13-14. If that happens,
the combination of centralized appellate review, narrowed ranges, reconsideration at
the insistence of a centralized prison director and no parole may make Maine's sen-
tencing system nearly as consistent as a more determinate scheme.
10 Both Indiana's statute and the Fund proposal provide for presumptive sen-
tences within broad ranges; Indiana's law differs from the Fund proposal in that the
ranges are broader and the presumptive sentences more severe. See TWENT=H CEN-
TURY FUND, supra note 27, and notes 103-06 infra and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the Indiana statute.
"3 IND. CODE § 35-50-2-7 (Supp. 1978). See Halperin, supra note 54, at 14.
"' IND. CODE § 35-50-2-3 (Supp. 1978).
00 IND. CODE § 35-50-2-2 (Supp. 1978). See also Halperin, supra note 54, at 14.
Actually, the ranges themselves do not tell the whole story since the statute gives the
judge authority to suspend any part of most felony sentences, so the de facto minimum
in most cases is probably zero. Id.
'0 IND. CODE § 35-50-6-1 (Supp. 1978). Good time will ordinarily be one-half the
sentence.
"I ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701-709 (1978). Presumptive sentences in Arizona
range from one and one-half years for Class 6 felonies up to seven years for Class 2.
Ranges for non-presumptive sentences are also included, in that the court may de-
crease a sentence by 25 percent or increase it by 50 percent (100 percent increases are
authorized for Class 2 and 3 felonies).
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variations on these basic themes. Arizona is especially notewor-
thy as the only determinate-sentencing state that has retained
discretionary parole."' The Illinois statute, like the proposed
federal code, creates a sentencing commission that has the
duty of deriving guidelines from statistics in a manner similar
to that suggested by Wilkins."' All of these systems, in spite
of their differences, present common advantages and disadvan-
tages.
The Arizona statute also retains discretionary parole after one-half the sentence
is served. And in an interesting response to the unpredictability of prison populations,
Arizona makes low-grade felons eligible for parole after three months if facilities are
inadequate. ARnz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 31-411 (1978). See also Halperin, supra note 54,
at 14.
The Arizona system is thus similar to the California one, but with slightly higher
presumptive sentences and correspondingly increased discretion at both the court and
parole levels.
'" Illinois' system is a cross between the system of California and the system of
Maine. It retains wide ranges of judicial discretion without presumptive sentences; the
penalty for non-capital murder without special circumstances, for example, is 20 to 40
years, and the penalty for low-grade felonies is one to three years. This feature resem-
bles the Maine system. But the Illinois statute also provides express aggravating and
mitigating factors that must be consulted to determine the length of incarceration (or
probation), and it provides enhanced ranges of discretion for specific circumstances
(e.g., prior convictions). In this respect, the Illinois system bears some relation to
California's. ILL. REv. STAT. 38 §§ 1005-5-3-1005-5-3.2; 1005-6-1-1005-6-4 (1979). See
generally, McAnany, Merrit & Tromanhauser, supra note 13.
The Illinois system also creates a Criminal Sentencing Commission which is re-
quired to create guidelines for sentencing within the statutory ranges. In this respect,
the Illinois system resembles the Wilkins model.
112 The Colorado Act requires the maintenance of records by the state court ad-
ministrator, which must contain specified information concerning each felony defen-
dant relevant to sentence. Felonies are divided into five classes with presumptive
sentences established for each, ranging from life imprisonment or death for a class 1
felony to eighteen months plus one year of parole for a class 5 felony. If aggravating or
mitigating circumstances are found, the court may impose a definite sentence varying
not more than 20 percent from the presumptive sentence, unless the defendant has
been previously convicted of a felony, in which case an increase of up to 50 percent is
authorized. The statute abolishes discretionary parole in favor of "good time" deduc-
tions of ten days per month. If the court grants probation, it must impose the condition
that the defendant make restitution to the victim in an amount determined by actual
pecuniary damages and the defendant's ability to pay. COL. Rav. STAT. §§ 16-11-105,
16-11-201-16-11-212 (1978).
,,0 See note 107 supra for a discussion of the Arizona statutory system.
I" See note 108 supra for a discussion of the Illinois statutory system. See also
Halperin, supra note 54, at 15.
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I. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND SENTENCING GoALs
Whichever of these models one considers, determinate
sentencing is likely to affect achievement of the goals of crimi-
nal justice in a fundamental way."' It is not completely clear,
however, what direction this change will take. As the argu-
ments over the California Act show, the effects of determinate
sentencing are outside the range of precise prediction; but more
importantly, there is no consensus on the goals of sentencing
that sufficiently allows us to evaluate their achievement. After
centuries of debate, the proper significance of rehabilitation,
retribution, uniformity, deterrence and incapacitation is still
the subject of vigorous disagreement;"' furthermore, these
goals are in unavoidable and constant conflict. A sentence that
is consistent with a policy of deterrence, for example, is likely
to be inconsistent with a policy of rehabilitation. 4
Discretionary sentencing "solves" this problem by ignor-
ing it. The traditional view allows one judge to sentence for
rehabilitation, another for retributive justice, and still others
112 Most advocates of sentence guidelines acknowledge that fundamental change
is the aim. See, e.g., Bayley, Good Intentions Gone Awry-a Proposal for Fundamental
Change in Criminal Sentencing, 51 WASH. L. Rav. 529 (1976).
M See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). In this decision upholding the
Georgia death penalty statute, the plurality opinion of Justice Stewart examines sev-
eral philosophical goals of sentencing. Deterrence, Justice Stewart states, is a
"complex factual issue the resolution of which properly rests with the legislatures." Id.
at 186. Retribution, he also says, may not be a dominant feature of the criminal law
but is an "essential" one, although that view "may be unappealing to many." Id. at
183. Incapacitation is relegated to a footnote, with Justice Stewart concluding that it
"may" be a proper function. Id. at 183-84. Justice Marshall, however, maintains that
the Georgia statute will not deter, that it is not necessary for incapacitation, and that
retribution is not a proper consideration. Id. at 233-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
For conflicting policy statements, compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West
Supp. 1978) ("the purpose of imprisonment is punishment") with Criminal Justice
Reform Act of 1973, S. 1, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. § 1-1A2 (1973) (foremost purpose of
the Code is "deterrence;" "rehabilitation" and "incapacitation" are purposes when
deterrence "proves ineffective"), In re Minnis, 428 P.2d 997 (Cal. 1972) (California's
indeterminate sentence laws "place emphasis on reformation"), and NATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE ON CmRhm AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING ACT 1 (2d ed. 1972) ("[p]ublic
protection" is the only valid basis, though "persons convicted of crime shall be dealt
with in accordance with their potential for rehabilitation;" "retribution and revenge"
are disapproved).
"I See, e.g., J. WILsoN, supra note 21, at 162-82 (1977). Professor Wilson examines
the differing effects of rehabilitative, incapacitative, deterrent and retributive philoso.
phies upon sentencing a given offender, showing that the results may range from a
policy of sending no offenders to prison to a policy of incarcerating every "non-trivial"
offender. Id. at 193, 202.
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for deterrence or incapacitation, without demanding an ac-
counting of reasons or consistency from any of them. Determi-
nate sentencing, however, requires that at least some of these
hard choices be incorporated into the system from the begin-
ning and followed by all."' Therefore, one of its by-products
may be that it will force us, at long last, to formulate a careful
sentencing philosophy.' The discussion that follows focuses
chiefly on the California Act, but it is an effort to identify the
philosophical changes that determinate or guideline sentencing
of any type may reflect.
A. Rehabilitation
1. The Decline of the Medical Model
For years, sentencing philosophy has been dominated by
the rehabilitative ideal. "7 This concept, which has also been
referred to as the "medical model,""' regards criminal acts as
analogous to "symptoms" of a "disease" that correctional
"experts" may "treat" and "cure.""' As a consequence of this
"I See notes 227-32 infra and accompanying text for a consideration of the weight
to be given the goal of uniformity when the absence of rehabilitative or deterrent
purposes is the only basis for severity; see Frankel, supra note 45, at 5, and notes 391-
94 infra and accompanying text for a consideration of the weight to be given a bar-
gained plea of guilty; and see notes 193-209 infra and accompanying text for a consider-
ation of the weight to be given the mental capacity, attitudes or church attendance of
the defendant. It is important to remember, however, that even the most determinate
systems in practice leave wide ranges of discretion, and so only some, and by no means
all, of these choices must be made in advance; furthermore, the choices need not be
absolute but may admit of exceptions.
' See M. FRANKEL, supra note 5, at 62.
"7 "Rehabilitation must be the goal of modem corrections." R. CLARK, CRmIE IN
AMERICA 220 (1970). "[T]he supreme aim of prison discipline is the reformation of
criminals, not infliction of vindictive suffering." S. RuBn, THE LAW OF CRUMNAL
CoRREcTroN 755 (1973), citing AMERicAN CoRRECTIoNAL ASS'N, TRANSACTIONS OF THE
NATIONAL CONGRESS ON PENriT Y AND RETORMATORY DiscEPsm 541 (1970). The
decline of the rehabilitative ideal can be traced through law school casebooks in a
striking way. The first edition of S. KADISH & M. PAUlSEN, CRMuNAL LAW AND ITs
PocEssEs 89-124 (1962), for instance, contained a thirty-six page section entitled "The
Rehabilitative Ideal," which was the focus of the book's treatment of sentencing philos-
ophy. With the second edition, the section shrank slightly to thirty-three pages. S.
KADisH & M. PAULsEN, CRumNAL LAW ANm ITs PRocEsSEs 125-57 (2d ed. 1969). The third
edition, however, eliminated the term "rehabilitative ideal" entirely. S. KADISH & M.
PAULSEN, CRwrNAL LAw AND ITS PROcESSEs 33-39 (3d ed. 1975).
1I8 See Bayley, supra note 112, at 530; see also notes 119-31 infra and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of the "medical model."
"I "The offender is 'sick,' runs the humanitarian thought. . . .He needs to be
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view, rehabilitation has been seen as the dominant (some have
suggested the only) permissible theme in much sentencing phi-
losophy. 2' The rehabilitative ideal reached its ultimate expres-
sion in the indeterminate sentence, in which the court sen-
tenced the convict to a broad range of years so that the parole
board could evaluate his treatment and readiness for release.' 2'
There were a number of difficulties with both the medical
model and the indeterminate sentence. By its insistence that
retributive justice had no place in the assessment of sentences,
the rehabilitative philosophy both ignored a necessary function
of the criminal law 2 and made proportional sentencing un-
likely. For without consideration of moral blameworthiness,
rational grading of sentences and equal justice were lost as
goals and as results.12s At the same time, many questioned
whether the medical model worked. Its assumption that the
disease of crime could be treated and cured was too facile;'
24
treated and cured.. . . [T]hose charged with treating and observing him must be
left to decide the time for release." Frankel, supra note 45, at 31. See also K. MENNIN-
GER, THE CRUME OF PuNISHmsNm 17-18 (1968).
'' E.g., R. CLAnK, CR:Im IN AMERICA 220 (1970).
£2, "[T]he legislature has abandoned the ancient notion of categorical punish-
ment, the infliction of fixed terms for certain crimes, and substituted the indetermi-
nate sentence, leaving to the Adult Authority the judgment of the period of incarcera-
tion. The Authority does not fix that period pursuant to a formula of punishment, but
in accordance with the adjustment and social rehabilitation of the individual. .. ."
People v. Morse, 388 P.2d 33, 39-40 (Cal. 1964). See also In re Minnis, 498 P.2d 997
(Cal. 1972) (holding Adult Authority's setting of maximum term for narcotics dealers,
apparently for deterrent purposes, illegal). But see note 124 infra and authorities cited
therein for the position that rehabilitation is often a difficult, if not an impossible, goal.
'2 See notes 163-70 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the theory of
"retributive justice."
£23 "Consistency," "equality," "uniformity," "proportionality," "rational grad-
ing" and similar terms are all based on notions of retributive justice. When one says
that the sentence given offender A is "consistent" with that given offender B, one
probably means that the relationship between the severities of the two sentences is
roughly the same as the relationship between the degree of moral blameworthiness of
the two offenses under the circumstances of each.
,M' "It is assumed [by proponents of the rehabilitative ideal] . ..that human
behavior is the product of antecedent causes, [that] [t]hese causes can be identified
...[and that] [k]nowledge of the antecedents of human behavior makes possible
an approach to the scientific control of human behavior." Allen, Criminal Justice,
Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. Cram. L.C. & P.S. 226 (1959). But the
psychiatric data refute these assumptions. Even presently existing phenomena affect-
ing "causes" cannot in fact be identified with agreement; estimates as to mental illness
in the inmate population "vary from 10 to 20 percent to well over 50 to 75 percent."
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worse yet, this scientific terminology gave an impression of
accuracy that was unrealistic, and it probably led to the unnec-
essary incarceration of persons diagnosed as dangerous when in
fact they were not (as well as to the premature release of others
mistakenly considered harmless). ' Furthermore, the medical
model implied no logical limits on the power of government to
tamper with the personalities of individuals within its care.
Bizarre terminology adopted by the corrections industry sought
to legitimize every coercive device in terms of benevolence to
the inmate, and from this rationalization, it was a short step
to behavior modification through psychological or even physi-
cal means. 2 ' Above all, however, the indeterminate sentence
produced haphazard and sometimes cruel results that weak-
ened respect for the entire criminal justice system.1 27 In some
A. FREEDMAN,.H. KAPLAN & B. SADOCK, MODERN SYNOPSIS OF COMPREHENsIVE TEXTBOOK
OF PSYCHIATRY II 1220 (1972) [hereinafter cited as TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY]. As for
drug dependency, "[t]here seems to be no unified theory to explain opiate addiction"
or alchoholism. Id. at 654, 681. Furthermore, "[m]any prisons offer inmates an emo-
tional climate that is destructive of rehabilitation." Id. at 220. For the "antisocial
personality," which is present in a "substantial number of criminal and violent peo-
ple," "the evidence is insufficient to support any conclusions about treatment," ex-
cept, ironically, "punishment." Id. at 651.
None of this is to suggest that rehabilitation is impossible in all cases, or that hope
for the future is in vain. But the process should not be conceptualized as a simple one,
"as though it involved a simple medicine that could be poured into a killer's head to
make him refrain permanently from his conduct." D. CRUMp & G. JACOBS, CAPIrAL
MURDER 276 (1977). See also TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY at 1221-22.
'" For a case illustrating excessive incarceration, see Bayley, supra note 112, at
534 n.18 (16-year-old held nine years for single offense of riding in stolen vehicle). For
a case illustrating misdiagnosis of a dangerous offender, see D. CRrMi' & G. JACOBS,
CAPIrrAL MURDER 112 (1977) (five-time ex-convict escaped and committed three rape-
robbery murders in two states after being transferred to minimum security facility and
evaluated as "definitely [having] the ability to remain in the community without
violating the law"). This inaccuracy is consistent with psychiatrists' ovm evaluation
of their science: "[T]he psychiatrist's ability to predict dangerous behavior ...is
not as reliable as one might hope." TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 124, at 1219.
2I See also J. MrrFORD, Knm AND USUAL PuNsmsmrr (1973); AhmmcAN FRIENDS
SERV. COMI., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971). Cf. Bayley, supra note 112 ("[Tlhe treat-
ment model is inappropriate because it fails to consider fundamental principles of
justice and the purposes of the criminal law. . . ." Id. at 530. Bayley concludes that
"coercion intrinsically involves an element of punishment." Id. at 532).
' "Until or unless we have some reasonable hope of effective treatment, it is a
cruel fraud to have parole boards solemnly order men back to their cages because cures
that do not exist are found not to have been achieved." Frankel, supra note 45, at 34.
See also Reid, A Rebuttal to the Attack on the Indeterminate Sentence, 51 WASH. L.
REv. 565, 573-82 (1976).
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states, wardens have placed greater blame for prison violence
upon dissatisfaction with the indeterminate sentence than
upon food, overcrowding or conditions of incarceration.
12
The medical model, the rehabilitative ideal and the inde-
terminate sentence thus came under attack from both ends of
the political spectrum. Those who emphasized crime control
argued that it was not working, and those concerned with pris-
oners' rights protested that it was unfair. Arguments such as
these were major forces behind the movement toward determi-
nate sentencing.
With these arguments came a major shift in philosophy
from rehabilitation to retribution. The California Uniform De-
terminate Sentencing Act, for example, begins with a startling
and frank statement of policy: "The legislature finds and de-
clares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punish-
ment.' 2 Suddenly and completely, rehabilitation is no longer
the law in California's prisons; at least in the language of the
law, the medical model has been finally and completely aban-
doned.'30 Even in a state known for rapid swings of the pendu-
lum, the abruptness of the change wrought by determinate
sentencing is impressive.'3 '
'1 COUNCIL OF STATE GovERNMENTs, DESINITE SENTENCIM: AN EXAMINATION OF
PROPOSALS IN FOUR STATES 10 (1976) [hereinafter cited as CoUNcIL ON STATE
GOVERNENTS].
CAL. PENA CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West Supp. 1979).
,: "The now taboo word 'rehabilitation' has been dropped from the lexicon of
sentencing language, even though the concept apparently remains a goal." Cassou &
Taugher, supra note 11, at 27.
"I The shift was actually not as abrupt as the statutory change alone would
indicate. The California Supreme Court had long since shown concern for the potential
disproportionality of indeterminate sentences, holding some such sentences unconsti-
tutional. E.g., In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921 (Cal. 1972) (one-year-to-life for indecent
exposure). The court later set forth a three-part test for proportionality in In re Foss,
519 P.2d 1073 (Cal. 1974). In In re Rodriguez, 537 P.2d 384 (Cal. 1975), the court
required the Adult Authority to set definite, final parole release dates ("Rodriguez
terms") for each offender proportional to his offense. A mass of individual challenges
to allegedly disproportionate sentences followed. Cassou & Taugher, supra note 11, at
15. The California Supreme Court responded to this flood of cases by refusing review
until the Adult Authority had had a reasonable opportunity to set a proportionate term
within the indeterminate limits. People v. Wingo, 534 P.2d 1001 (Cal. 1975).
In the meantime, the Adult Authority, having decided that rehabilitation was
neither a measurable nor a proper guide for parole, was initiating administrative re-
forms. In Adult Authority Chairman's Directive 75/20 (April 15, 1975) and Adult
Authority Chairman's Directive 75/30 (September 2, 1975), the Authority created
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2. Is Determinate Sentencing Inconsistent with
Rehabilitation?
Many observers may question whether California has not
sacrificed something of significance with this change of objec-
tives. There are still supporters of indeterminate sentencing
who argue that it has failed only because it has not been pro-
perly adopted, administered or evaluated.'3 2 Even those who
reject the indeterminate sentence may not accept a wholesale
abolition of rehabilitation and a turn to retributive justice as
the sole purpose of prison sentences. Does determinate sentenc-
ing have to imply this change? Is it inconsistent with
rehabilitation?
The answer is that it need not be. First, the factors deter-
mining the sentence will invariably include those associated
with susceptibility to rehabilitation, such as criminal record,
mental state and nature of the crime. 3' Furthermore, decisions
respecting sentencing and parole do not necessarily imply una-
vailability of services for self-improvement or restrictions on
the rights of inmates to use them; determinate sentencing sim-
ply means that the length of time served will not be subject to
the unfettered discretion of a person or agency interested in
coercing the appearance of rehabilitation. Counseling, educa-
tion, work release, community facilities and half-way houses
are not inconsistent with deterninate sentencing. Most impor-
tantly, the California statement of policy encourages release or
probation.'34 The "punishment" policy does not extend beyond
rudimentary determinate systems for setting both parole dates and Rodriquez terms.
The systems were of a base-plus-enhancement nature, dependent on the kind and
gravity of the offense. They eliminated consideration of the ability to rehabilitate. But
75/20 was struck down on the ground that the indeterminate sentence law imposed a
statutory requirement that rehabilitative potential be considered. In re Stanley, 126
Cal. Rptr. 524 (1976).
Thus the Lynch-Foss principle, the Rodriquez term and 75/20 were all precursors
to the California Uniform Determinate Sentence Act of 1976 and Stanley, in turn, was
the straw that broke the camel's back. See generally Comment, supra note 65.
"= E.g., Reid, supra note 128.
in See notes 193-209 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the factors
favoring limitations on an individualized sentencing system, and notes 222-26 infra
and accompanying text for a discussion of "the right level of discretion" to be accorded
a judge in a workable determinate system. See also, e.g., CAL. RuLFs OF CouRT 414-25.
"' Cf. J. WILSON, supra note 21, at 202 ("deprivation of liberty" under Wilson's
[Vol. 68
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prisons, and by forthrightly recognizing that prisons are not
benevolent, the Act strikes a blow against their overuse.
Thus it is possible-though by no means clear-that the
greater equality and freedom from unproductive coercion that
determinate sentencing may bring will engender greater re-
spect for the legitimate purposes of sentencing and make reha-
bilitation a limited reality rather than an unattainable
dream.135 Indeed, the drafters of the California Act premised it,
in part, upon this hope.13 It is paradoxical, but nonetheless
probably true, that by using rehabilitation as the only factor
in sentencing decisions in the past, we have interfered with the
rehabilitative process. It remains to be seen whether sentence
guidelines are the corrective that is needed.
B. Deterrence
It is possible that determinate sentencing will also affect
another traditional goal of sentencing-deterrence-although
it is difficult to predict the direction of the effect. The debate
that preceded enactment of the California law, for example,
included both assertions that it was too harsh and assertions
that it was too lenient. 3 Some of the arguments seem to cancel
each other. For example, supporters of definite sentencing may
argue that the statement of explicit terms of imprisonment will
give the public greater awareness of them and hence increase
their deterrent value,13 but opponents could suggest just as
strongly that because determinate sentences tend to be shorter
than maximums authorized by indeterminate systems, the
suggested "uniform" standards "need not, and usually would not, entail confinement
in a conventional prison").
' This view appears to be shared by the majority of commentators. E.g., Bayley,
supra note 12, at 561-62; McGee, supra note 9, at 9; Cf. M. FRANKEL, supra note 5, at
101-02 ("[F]or the great majority of cases, sentences ought to be stated with maxi-
mum certainty, based almost entirely upon factors known on the day of sentencing,
and determined with the nearest approach we can make to objective, equal, and
'impersonal' evaluation of the relevant qualities of both the criminal and the crime.")
But see Reid, supra note 127, at 601-06.
121 Interview with Raymond I. Parnas, Professor of Law, University of California,
Davis, and Counsel to the California Senate Select Committee on Penal Institutions,
in Davis, California, Oct. 4, 1978 (interview conducted by telephone from Houston).
1,' Cassou & Taugher, supra note 11, at 18-22; McGee, supra note 9, at 4.
135 See TwENTrETH CENTURY FUND, supra note 27, at 33 n.1.
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public perception of sentence lengths and hence deterrent ef-
fects will be diluted.3 9 The first argument is undercut by the
greater complexity of determinate sentencing and the second
by public awareness that sentences served are usually less than
authorized maximums.
There are, however, reasons to believe that a well-written
determinate sentence law can increase deterrence. Severity of
sentences is undoubtedly a factor in deterrence, but certainty
is also important.' While no one knows the reason, it appears
that human beings, if they are influenced by consideration of
the consequences at all, tend to discount those consequences in
a haphazard system more than logic alone would dictate; thus
the certainty that a sentence of moderate severity will be im-
posed is probably a greater deterrent than the less likely possi-
bility of a more severe one. Of course, a determinate sentencing
system is only as good as its certainty, and discretionary proba-
tion, avoidable enhancements and the unpredictable rewriting
of the law by appellate courts all detract from it.'" But the net
effect of sentencing guidelines is likely to be increased certainty
and thus, if severity remains constant, increased deterrence.
Enhancements directed at particular elements of the of-
fense or offender provide another means by which it is possible
that deterrence will be increased. The addition of relatively
severe enhancements for circumstances that the society partic-
ularly feels the need to discourage serves to identify that socie-
tal purpose in a highly visible way and to put a quantifiable
price upon it.' 4  For example, the California Act contains a two-
year enhancement for the use of a firearm. Although the com-
plexities of the Act may not be generally understood, the mes-
sage that California intends to deal more severely with offenses
commited by firearm is likely to be clear to most affected of-
,3' See id. at 55-56 and unnumbered footnote contained therein.
'o See J. WILSON, supra note 21, at 179-80; Dershowitz, Background Paper,
TWENTTH CENTURY FUND, supra note 27, at 72.
"I See notes 362-73 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems
in interpreting determinate sentencing laws and the concomitant distortions of such
laws.
,42 See J. WILSON, supra note 21, at 162-63 (advocating that recidivism




fenders. Thus if the theory of general deterrence is valid,M such
enhancements should serve better than ad hoc sentencing in
discouraging the criminal use of firearms. Determinate sent-
encing also enables the use of severe, highly visible enhance-
ments based on recidivism; again, examples are to be found in
the California Act. These provisions may act as specific deter-
rents against those for whom discouragement is most neces-
sary.
14 4
However, determinate sentences can also be set so that
they undermine the possibility of deterrence. For example, a
definite sentencing proposal by the Twentieth Century Fund
creates a presumptive sentence of probation not only for the
first but also for the second offense of shoplifting, 41 and it
further provides a presumptive probated sentence for a person
shown to have "occasionally" received stolen property, ir-
respective of the amount involved141-a proposal that is tanta-
mount to a Fence's Relief Act. As James Q. Wilson points out,
there is no basis for assuming that property criminals are so
different from ordinary humans that their activities remain
uninfluenced by rational consideration of the balance of costs
and benefits. 141 Probation (perhaps with minor deprivation of
liberty or fine as a condition) should be an available, perhaps
even a typical, disposition of some of these offenses,' but a
" Specific deterrence operates on the convicted individual, while general deterr-
ence operates on the population at large through its perception of the treatment of the
convicted individual.
I See J. WLSON, supra note 21, at 162-63.
14 TwENTri CENTURy FuND, supra note 27, at 61. The terms of probation are one
year; the amount limit is $100 for the offense. The Fund even proposes that if the
second offense occurs during the one-year period of probation for the first, revocation
on that ground be prohibited. Only after the third conviction for shoplifting up to $100
does the Fund recommend incarceration-for one month.
"I "Occasionally" is said to mean "one or two instances." TwEmm CENTURY
FUND, supra note 27, at 59. The recommended presumptive sentence upon a second
conviction for "occasional" receiving is one month.
The Fund also establishes an offense of "fencing," which presumably consists of
professionally receiving stolen goods, and creates a presumptive sentence of one year.
Id. The sentencing structure overlooks the difficulty of convicting fences for receiving
even once, let alone "occasionally" or "professionally."
J. WILSON, supra note 21, at 202-03.
"3 [A minimal] penalty may be appropriate in many cases, but
whether it should be advertised in advance as the only possible sanction for
certain crimes is another question .... A degree of uncertainty... may
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sentencing structure should not be designed so as to ensure
deterrable offenders that they will suffer no significant ill ef-
fects at all'49 if apprehended. 5 '
C. Incapacitation
Incapacitation refers to imprisonment for the sake of pro-
tecting the public from further crimes by the same individual.
It is probably the most important single purpose for sentencing
the dangerous offender, and it requires the ability to impose
very severe sentences in a few cases. 15' Determinate sentencing
tends to compress permissible sentence ranges, and hence it
may be expected to result in decreased achievement of the
incapacitative function in some cases unless other dispositions
are available. A provision allowing for disregard of presumptive
sentences, as in Indiana,' 2 or dangerous special offender stat-
utes, such as the federal government has adopted,151 may be the
answer. Some commentators have suggested that indetermi-
nate sentences be retained for those cases in which incapacita-
tion is a major goal. '54 It is also possible to include a category
have deterrent value, and. . . it does not seem inconsistent with [the prin-
ciple of just desert] to bark a bit harder than we will probably want to
bite . ..
Alschuler, supra note 7, at 568 n.50.
"I The Fund report contains a vigorous dissent on this point. TWv__riir CENTURY
FUND, supra note 27, at 55-56 and unnumbered footnote.
' The California Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act, for instance, avoids the
difficulties encountered by the Fund proposal in that it does not apply to misdemean-
ors and does not affect probation except by requiring the California Judicial Council
to formulate general criteria. Thus it does not insure absence of punishment even for
minor offenses. See notes 65-91 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
California Act.
5I Such sentences should be available for a Charles Manson, for example, or a
Richard Speck. See D. CrMmp & G. JAcoBs, CAPrrAL MuRDER 274-76 (1977). But cf.
TWENTIErH CENTURY FUND, supra note 27, at 57 (advocating presumptive 10-year sent-
ence for first-degree murder).
"I See notes 102-06 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Indiana
system which permits sentences of up to fifty years by allowing variation from the
presumptive twenty-year sentence for murder.
"I See notes 251-56 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of 18 U.S.C. §
3575 (1970), which allows an increase in sentence to a maximum of twenty-five years
for certain dangerous offenders.
'11 E.g., Frankel, supra note 45, at 35. While recognizing that "[w]e may have to
hold him [the dangerous offender] for an uncertain and long time," Judge Frankel
argues that it should be done under an indeterminate sentence allowing for release:
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of very severe determinate sentences-life imprisonment, life
imprisonment without possibility of pardon or parole or capital
punishment-for very serious offenses by dangerous offenders,
and some jurisdictions adopting determinate sentencing have
done so. '
Nowhere has the incapacitative function been more the
subject of debate than in California, where a very few serious
offenses are dealt with by lengthy terms, but where the major-
ity of crimes, even if committed by persons who appear to be
dangerous, are not. Drafters of the California Uniform Deter-
minate Sentencing Act explain the omission of a dangerous
offender or extended confinement law by pointing out that it
would interfere with the primary purpose of the California
Act-that of consistency-and by the argument that prediction
of dangerousness is unreliable. ' A collateral concern is that
such prediction often involves the use of evidence that many
find distasteful, such as psychiatric testimony or evidence of
criminal transactions not involving conviction.'57 A dilemma
arises, however, in that the rigidity of the California Act some-
times mandates virtually identical treatment of the extraordi-
nary crime and the run-of-the-mill one, and, more specifically,
does not allow for a difference of more than a few years in
sentence terms (absent enhancements) for most offenses even
if it appears that public safety requires a more lengthy incar-
ceration. The choice made by the California drafters is sup-
portable by rational arguments, but it is an uneasy compro-
mise. The opposing argument is rational too, and public desires
may ultimately lead California to the adoption of a dangerous
"we ought to be willing to forego certainty and absolute security, remembering that
freedom and risk are inseparable." Id.
1, See note 75 supra and accompanying text for descriptions of these sentences
in California. Death sentences, for example, must always be "determinate" in the
sense that they must be produced by a system of guided discretion, although they
apparently cannot be mandatory. Cf. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9 (Supp. 1978) (providing
for death penalty for certain murders).
i" Interview with Raymond I. Parnas, Professor of Law, University of California,
Davis, and Counsel to the California Senate Select Committee on Penal Institutions,
in Davis, California (Oct. 4, 1978). Professor Parnas was one of the principal architects
of the California Act. The interview was conducted by telephone from Houston.
is? Id.
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offender law, wider ranges of discretion or other means for ex-
tended confinement.
1 58
For lesser offenses-crimes against property in particu-
lar-a system of fixed or presumptive sentencing could, if pro-
perly executed, have significant incapacitative effects. If it re-
sulted in increased detention of recidivists through enhance-
ments, it would better incapacitate a class of offenders respon-
sible for a disproportionate share of property crimes. There is
some evidence that even relatively slight increases in the de-
tention of these offenders can be significant in reducing crime
by the mechanism of incapacitation. 59 A discretionary system,
while it would undoubtedly result in increased sentences for
recidivists, would not do so with the accuracy of guidelines
based directly on recidivism. 16 0
I" Id. Professor Parnas observes that proposals in California for wider ranges
between base terms-up to five years, rather than two, for example-would create
disparity. They might, but they might also serve other rational purposes of the crimi-
nal law, such as incapacitation, and they might allow for gradations according to the
nature of offenses and offenders greater than is possible today. The compromise is an
unpleasant one whichever alternative is chosen.
"I For example, James Q. Wilson says of the failure to use imprisonment gener-
ally:
It is no defense of this policy of deprisonization to say that criminals, if sent
to prison, would, on their release, merely resume the commission of crimes.
Many no doubt would, but the gains to society from crimes not committed
while they were in prison would be real and substantial, and if the policy of
prison sentences were consistently followed, even with the relatively short
(one or two years) sentences, the gains would be enduring."
J. WILSON, supra note 21, at 173 (emphasis added).
This observation applies to sentencing generally. As for the recidivist, Wilson
concludes that "separating repeaters from the rest of society, even for relatively short
periods of time, may produce major reductions in crime rates." Id. (emphasis added).
Wilson also argues persuasively that recidivists are responsible for the majority of
serious crimes-and, what is more interesting, that they are all virtually certain to be
apprehended, at one time or another, because of the large number of offenses each
commits. Id. at 162-63. "These gains," he adds, "would exist even if the prospect of
going to prison deterred no one from committing a crime." Id. at 173.
11* Wilson states that, because of discretionary sentencing, "we have pursued vir-
tually the opposite policy." Id. at 173. It should be added, however, that a determinate
sentencing system may also be so written as to defeat these goals. See notes 145-46
supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the system set forth in Tvwirmi
CNTURY FUND, which establishes a sentencing structure for repeated offenses.
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D. Retribution
It is difficult to assess the effect of determinate sentencing
upon a goal so poorly understood as retribution. Some sentenc-
ing philosophers have rejected retributive justice altogether,'6'
and, although it seems clear today that this view is no longer
dominant, 6 ' the historical view has left us with less under-
standing of the reasons why we accept retribution than of the
reasons why we accept any other sentencing goal." 3 But it is
important to assess the impact of determinate sentencing upon
retributive justice, because it has been an important battle-
ground for the politics of sentence reform, ' and it seems likely
to be an important battleground for the courts as well.
M81 "Sentences should not be based on revenge and retribution." NATIONAL COUNCIL
ON CRIME AND DEUNQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING ACT § 1 (2d ed. 1972). In Common-
wealth v. Ritter, 13 D. & C. 285 (Ct. Oy. & Term. Phila. 1930) the court concluded
that "[t]he entire course . . . of the refinement and humanizing of society has been
in the direction of dispelling from penology any such theory" as retribution, and it
supported the conclusion with quotations from Plato, Seneca, Beccaria and Hobbes.
Id. at 290-91. See also S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRmENAL CORRECTION 409 (1973).
"I2 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). "'Retribution is no longer the
dominant objective of the criminal law'. . . but neither is it a forbidden objective nor
one inconsistent with our respect for the dignity of men." Id. at 183 (plurality opinion
of Justice Stewart). See also United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (four-month sentence of incarceration for several white-collar offenses held justi-
fied in part on the ground that it should not depreciate the seriousness of the offense).
"I There are many kinds of retributive philosophies. For example, the "limiting
retributivist" uses the principle of just desert to set a maximum, not a minimum, for
punishment; that is, he holds that a person may ethically be punished less than he
deserves but never more. The retributivist who recognizes the condemnatory function
of punishment, on the other hand, sees the principle as setting both a maximum and
a minimum upon the "appropriate" sentence. The retributivist who values consistency
sees it as a way to measure achievement of this goal. The "retributivist in distribution"
wishes mainly to insure that punishment is not imposed for utilitarian purposes upon
persons who are not morally blameworthy. See generally N. WALKER, SENTENCING IN A
RATIONAL Socory (1971). To complicate matters further, it has been persuasively
argued that many supposed retributivist theories "are in spite of their protestations
disguised forms of Utilitarianism." H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSMILrrY 8-9
(1968).
Much of the debate on the propriety of retributivism, furthermore, has consisted
of name-calling, with detractors denouncing it as "revenge" and supporters praising
it as "justice." See note 161 supra and authorities cited therein for arguments that
penology and retribution are philosophically and socially incompatible.
"I4 See, e.g., Dershowitz, Background Paper, in TwENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra
note 27, at 73. The battle erupted in the Fund task force's own deliberations. Id. at
55-56 and unnumbered footnote. For examples of the debate in California, see authori-
ties cited note 137 supra.
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Retributive justice implies that there is, or ought to be, a
connection between the moral blameworthiness of a criminal
act and the consequences that follow it. It is a shorthand rendi-
tion of a principle that carries out a number of disparate pur-
poses."6 5 Retribution is an expression of condemnation for the
criminal act, and it teaches the shared system of values that is
the glue holding a society together. 66 In a civilized society, it
serves the additional function of preventing private revenge. 1 7
Retribution also arguably makes penitence or expiation by the
offender possible; that is, it provides a measure by which he
can expect society to recognize that he has paid his debt and
is fit for reacceptance. '5 It additionally provides a method by
which people as a group can express solicitude for, and solidar-
ity with, victims of crime." 9 Finally, there have been a number
of other purposes that commentators suggest are served by
retributive justice.1 70 Current sentencing philosophy does not
"1 The listing of "purposes" makes retributive justice appear utilitarian, and
perhaps it is. See note 163 supra and authorities cited therein for more information on
retributive philosophies.
"I6 "Its true function is to maintain social cohesion intact ... " E. DURcIM,
TaE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SocIgrY 108 (1933). "[R]eprobation . . . is the State's
marking its disapproval of the breaking of its laws. . ." ROYAL CosNUSSION ON CAPI-
TAL PUNIsHmENT, REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISH,ENT, 1949-1953
17-18 (1953). See also J. FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 98-118 (1970); H. PACER, THE
Lanrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 43-44 (1968); N. WALKER, SENTENCING IN A RATIONAL
SocmrY 1-22 (1971); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-85 n.30 (1976) (plurality
opinion of Stewart, J.).
67 "When people begin to believe that organized society is unable or unwilling to
impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they 'deserve,' then there are sown the
seeds of anarchy-of self-help, vigilante justice and lynch law." Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). "This function may be unappealing
to many, but it is essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal
processes rather than self-help to vindicate their wrongs." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.). See also R. HOFSTAEnTER, VIOLENCE
IN AMERICA (1975).
"I See Meuller, Punishment, Corrections and the Law, 45 NEB. L. REv. 58 (1966).
See also E. Duicam, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN Socuwry 108-09 (1933).
"I This purpose has been more widely recognized by the popular press than by
philosophers, but has sometimes been advanced by them as well. See, e.g., Van den
Haag, The Collapse of the Case Against Capital Punishment, NATIONAL REvIEw, March
31, 1978, at 406. It has occasionally, but only occasionally, found its way into the
written decisions of courts. E.g., State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 446 (Alaska 1970),
disapproving the trial court's one-year sentence in part because "[sleemingly all but
forgotten in the sentencing proceedings is the victim of appellee's rapes and robbery."
"I As examples, retributive justice serves the purposes of the mitigation of punish-
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say much about the relative weights of these considerations,
but it tends to indicate that most of them are respectable goals
and that it is relevant to consider whether a particular sentenc-
ing system is treating them in an appropriate manner.
Determinate sentencing holds some promise that offense
types for which retributive considerations have traditionally
been neglected-white collar offenses, for example "7'-will be
addressed in a manner more consistent with the purpose of
condemnation. A process of case-by-case adjudication pro-
duces sentences that belie the seriousness of such offenses be-
cause highly visible mitigating factors tend to overcome sub-
stantial aggravating ones. It also appears likely that the identi-
fication of specific factors in aggravation or mitigation of the
offense, or the use of enhancements, can highlight the purpose
of condemning conduct or results that are particularly harmful.
The California Act, for example, provides enhancements in the
event that great bodily injury is caused to the victim or in the
event of large monetary loss. 17 2 In specific kinds of cases, these
ment where justice makes it appropriate, the protection of the morally blameless from
punishment and consistency. In addition, one commentator has identified the pur-
poses of "authoritative disavowal" (as when one society punishes a member that has
transgressed against another society, so as to communicate disavowal of the transgres-
sion), "symbolic nonacquiescence" (the avoidance of a society's seeming endorsement
of, and vicarious participation in, the crime), "vindication" (reaffirmation of the law),
and "absolution" (as when a society punishes the one guilty member of a small group
of possible suspects and so communicates by its differential treatment that the others
are blameless). Some commentators, however, have considered that "purposes" are
irrelevant in evaluating retributive justice. For the great philosopher Emanuel Kant,
the principle of justice was "a categorical imperative"; when a crime was committed
it became necessary to exonerate literally the entire society. Even if all other retribu-
tive or utilitarian concerns were removed, said Kant, such as by the formal disbanding
of a society, "the last Murderer .. . ought to be executed" first, so that
"bloodguiltiness may not remain on the people; for otherwise they might all be re-
garded as participators in the murder. . . ." I. KANT, PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 195-98
(Hastie trans. 1887).
"I' The "high loss" enhancement in California specifically calls upon the court to
sentence persons more severely who steal large amounts. The abuse of a "position of
trust" and the exercise of "planning, sophistication or professionalism" are circum-
stances in aggravation; they are also set forth as criteria affecting probation. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 12022.6 (West Supp. 1978); CAL. RuLEs OF CoURT 414 (c)(7)-(8), 421
(a)(8) & (13) (1979). These criteria, if actually applied, could mean more severe sen-
tences for white-collar offenders than for street criminals committing property of-
fenses. ILL. REV. STAT. 38 § 1005-5-3.2 (1979) sets forth nearly identical factors in
aggravation.
In See note 70 supra for the enhancement system of the California Act.
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enhancements may result in more severe sentences than would
result from discretionary adjudication. In any event, enhance-
ments may serve the purpose of identifying that portion of the
sentence that expresses societal denunciation, increased bur-
den of expiation or solidarity with the victim.
173
Ironically, however, determinate sentencing seems likely
to decrease the achievement of retributive justice in some seri-
ous cases. The five-, six- or seven-year penalty for second-
degree murder initially adopted 7 ' in California is an exam-
ple.1 5 Second-degree murder requires the taking of human life
with malice aforethought,'76 and published opinions show that,
in California, it covers the most repugnant kind of criminal
conduct. 7 Although supporters of the new Act might correctly
'73 It might be argued that these enhancements are deterrent in purpose. However,
they focus on the result rather than on the offender's conduct. The California provi-
sions related to firearms are an example of deterrent enhancements, since they are
aimed at an aspect of the defendant's conduct within his control. CAL. PENAL CODE §§
12022, 12022.5 (West Supp. 1978). The loss and injury enhancements do not depend
on control by the defendant. The accidental causing of serious injury during a crime,
for instance, or the taking of property with greater value than the offender believed,
would be as effective in triggering the enhancement as the intentional causing of these
results. There may arguably be some deterrent value to these principles in that they
may, for example, be surmised to make robbers more careful to avoid even accidential
injury, but it is submitted that the main concern supporting them is retributive.
"I The Act has been amended to increase these terms. See note 221 infra for a
discussion of this amendment.
"15 See text accompanying notes 65-91 supra for a discussion of the California Act.
.. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 187-90 (West Supp. 1978).
I" People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942 (Cal. 1968), is an example. The defendant
murdered a ten-year-old girl left in his care by stabbing her so that more than sixty
wounds appeared on her corpse. He left her body nude, with postmortem vaginal
lacerations, and undertook elaborate (if unsuccessful) efforts to conceal his culpability.
Blood, including bloody footprints of the victim, was found in every room of the house
and on the defendant's undershorts. There was no issue of mental deficiency. Never-
theless, the court found that these facts would support only second-degree murder. It
reasoned that the premeditation and deliberation elements of first-degree murder in
California required some evidence of planning, of motive or of a method of killing
displaying conscious forethought. Id. at 954.
The consequence of Anderson and similar decisions is that a killing for a compre-
hensible reason is treated more severely than a senseless one. It may not be too much
to say that the more bizzare, wanton and grotesque the offense, the better the chance
that it will qualify in California for the presumptive seven-year term for second-degree
murder rather than the life term for first degree. For precisely this reason, the Model
Penal Code rejects the homicide formulation used in California and provides for a
single category of murder. "As much cruelty, as much indifference to the life of others,
a disposition at least as dangerous to society, probably even more dangerous, is shovn
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note that the new base term approximates the average time
served by second-degree murderers in California under the in-
determinate sentence, 17 8 the open advertisement of this base
term seems to trivialize rather than condemn the taking of
human life. It does not deliver the right message to victims or
their families, and there is danger that many citizens will scoff
at the notion that the penal system setting such a penalty for
such a crime is capable of expiating any offender's debt to
society. Nor is the California law the only proposal to exhibit
this phenomenon."'
The irony is that the condemnation inherent in an indeter-
minate sentence with greater maximums would be more in
keeping with the harm done in serious cases even if parole were
to reduce the sentence. Condemnation is above all a symbolic
function, and the phenomenon of discretionary parole, for all
its evils, keeps alive the fiction that the early release of a seri-
ous homicidal offender is due to his rehabilitative progress
rather than to a low valuation of human life. One of the drafters
of the California Act, while stating that this retributive aspect
was not considered in drafting the Act itself, points out that the
new law did not change life imprisonment sentences and re-
tained the parole concept with respect to them. 8 The retribu-
by sudden as by premeditated murders." ABA - ALI MODEL PENAL CODE, Tent. Draft
No. 9, Comments to § 201.6 at 70 (1959).
119 Adult Authority Chairman's Directive 75/20 (April 15, 1975) sets forth the
typical confinement of second-degree murderers as 42 to 66 months, a range quite
similar to probable results under the new law with its good time provisions. See Com-
ment, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 133, 160. See also Cassou & Taugher, supra note 11, at
31; and TWENTiErH CENTURY FUND, supra note 27, at 57.
"I The Twentieth Century Fund proposal for example recommends a presumptive
sentence of ten years for first-degree murder. TwENTrETH CENTURY FUND, supra note 27,
at 55-57. The task force recognizes that this presumptive sentence "may seem...
extremely low," but justifies it on the ground that it is "congruent with the average
term of imprisonment actually served." Id.
A dissent to the Twentieth Century Fund Proposal expresses opposition to the
recommended presumptive sentence of ten years for first-degree murder and also to a
provision that "designates a four-year sentence that could be applied to .. . the
LaGuardia Airport bombing of December 1975." Id. at 55-56, 58. The dissent over-
states its case, since the task force recommends this four-year sentence for offenders
killing with extreme recklessness rather than intent (and it would only be presumptive
even then); nevertheless, the case is there to be made.
I" Interview with Raymond I. Parnas, Professor of Law, University of California,
Davis, and Counsel to the California Senate Select Committee on Penal Substitutions,
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tive function may have been part of the reason.
This problem serves to emphasize that sentencing is a
matter of reconciling pluralistic and partly inconsistent values.
Some loss of condemnation, expiation and victim solidarity
may be the inevitable cost of the compression of sentencing
ranges that determinate sentencing brings about. Retention of
discretionary parole, as in Arizona,' 8 ' would effectuate the re-
tributive function in a better way, perhalSs, and so would the
use of presumptive sentences within a range of higher maxi-
mums, as in Indiana.'82 But sentence guidelines, particularly
comprehensive ones, are premised on the assumption that
some loss in condemnation is compensated for by what can be
gained in terms of equality, proportionality and rational grad-
ing of offenses. It is in this latter area-sentencing uniform-
ity-that determinate sentencing holds both its greatest perils
and its greatest promise.
E. Uniformity and Individualization
An attitudinal poll of attorneys experienced in the han-
dling of criminal cases, conducted for this article, demonstrates
deep dissatisfaction with the lack of uniformity in the present
sentencing system.' 3 Sixty-eight percent of respondents agreed
in Davis, California, (Oct. 4, 1978). The interview was conducted by telephone from
Houston.
," See note 107 supra for a discussion of Arizona's presumptive sentencing system
in which the sentences are slightly higher than California's, and hence the difference
in effects is small.
"I See notes 102-06 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Indiana's
system.
113 Written responses were obtained from a sample of forty-four lawyers attending
the Advanced Criminal Law Refresher Course sponsored by the State Bar of Texas
during the week of July 7, 1978. The main purpose of the poll was to determine whether
initial attorney attitudes toward determinate sentencing were favorable or unfavora-
ble, whether the problem of irrational disparity was seen by attorneys as a serious one,
whether reforms short of determinate sentencing might be preferred and what objec-
tions attorneys might hold.
The responses showed little agreement; indeed, their most interesting characteris-
tic was the absence of strong consensus on any of the subjects at issue. The questions
and responses were as follows:
1. Do you think the problem of sentencing disparity or inconsistency is
serious enough so that there should be sentence reform aimed at making
sentences more consistent? YES 32; NO 13.
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that disparity was "serious enough so that there should be
sentence reform." One lawyer elaborated by saying, "Disparity
and inconsistency are rampant, and [the] public is very aware
of the problem. . . . [T]his results in [a] general cynical
feeling about 'justice."' Other respondents used words like
"ridiculous" to describe present sentencing practices. The evi-
dence bears out the complaint that a substantial number of
sentence differences cannot be explained rationally.'84 Statisti-
cal comparisons show that individual judges in the same geo-
graphical areas differ widely in the percentage of cases in which
they grant probation, in the lengths of terms they assess and
in their willingness to consider alternative dispositions.8 5 Aver-
2. Does it sound to you as though determinate sentencing is a sufficiently
promising solution so that it should be studied by the Texas legislature? YES
25; NO 13; DON'T KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT IT TO SAY 6.
3. What sorts of objections would you consider probable, or what sorts of
problems do you see with the idea of determinate sentencing? ....
4. Of the types [of determinate sentencing] suggested, which sounds most
promising to you-assuming that it were necessary to select among them?
PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING 7; GUIDELINES THAT ARE ADVI-
SORY ONLY 25; THE BASE-PLUS-ENHANCEMENT TYPE 15.
5. Explain why you have selected the method you have selected....
6. There are many methods other than determinate sentencing that can be
used to create greater consistency. For example, judges can be provided with
information regarding sentencing decisions of other judges; sentencing juries
or judges can be given instructions concerning what to consider in assessing
a sentence; appellate review of sentences can be allowed; a judge who renders
a sentence can be required to state reasons on which the sentence is based,
etc. Do you think that some of these techniques should be used instead of
attempts at determinate sentencing? YES 24; NO 11.
7. My criminal practice is primarily on the DEFENSE SIDE 26; PROSE-
CUTION SIDE 12; NEITHER 2 [members of the judiciary].
8. Are you a certified criminal law specialist? YES 9; NO 33.
284 The Wilkins study found that "approximately 50 percent" of sentences that did
not conform to the guidelines derived by the study were explainable by reason of some
item of information not included in the guidelines. Thus, the remaining 50 percent,
by inference, were probably what the study calls "unjustified or disparate" decisions.
L. WILNs, supra note 16, at 26. It is to be remembered, furthermore, that the Wilkins
study bases the development of guidelines on actual sentencing practices of judges, as
opposed to guidelines developed by legislatures or commissions. See notes 92-95 supra
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Wilkins system. It may be hypothesized
that if sentencing decisions were measured by criteria developed more publicly, the
deviations would be more pronounced.
'9 One study found that two federal district judges chosen at random from the
Eastern District of New York and Illinois differed, on the average, by 46 percent of the
mean of the two (taking the mean of the two as 100 percent). Diamond & Zeisel,
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age sentences vary from one city to another in the same legal
system, showing differences that cannot be based upon appli-
cation of similar standards. Is' And when one expands the in-
quiry to include offenses that differ in kind and degree-price
fixing and burglary, for example-one questions whether the
results bear the kind of proportionality that they should. 87
Every inmate serving a lengthy term has stories about persons
similarly situated who received relatively trivial sentences,,"
and the frequency of disparity in serious cases makes the prob-
lem well known; consequently, disparity in sentencing engen-
ders a disrespect for the criminal justice system dispropor-
tionate to its actual magnitude.
But the attitudinal poll indicates that attorneys also har-
bor a deep distrust of sentence reform because they suspect it
Sentencing Councils: A Study of Sentence Disparity and Its Reduction, 43 U. CHI. L.
REv. 109 (1975). For two chosen at random from the Northern District of Illinois, the
average difference was 37 percent. Id.; see also Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 56, at
884-85. An Ohio study showed that certain judges sentenced without incarceration four
times as often as certain others for the same offense. COUNCIL ON STATE GOVERNMENTS,
supra note 128, at 8. Similar disparities among judges in Detroit were reported in
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 23 (1976) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION]. In a California survey two judges said that they sent 80 percent of
convicted felons to prison, one reported 10 percent, two 60 percent, sixteen between
25 and 50 percent, and the rest between five and 20 percent. Comment, Disparity and
Discretion in Sentencing: A Proposal for Uniformity, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 323, 334 n.73
(1977), citing L.A. Times, June 2, 1977, § 1, at 24, col. 2.
'1 For example, comparison of narcotics sentences in one year showed an average
of 44 months in one federal circuit and 83 months in another. PRESIDENT'S COMMnfISSION,
supra note 185, at 23. A Washington study showed that in one county, 17.5 percent of
felons were sentenced to prison, in another county 32 percent were sentenced to prison,
and in a third county 14 percent were sentenced to prison. Bayley, supra note 112, at
536 n.22, citing WASH. DEP'T OF SOCIAL & HEALTH SERVICES, OFFICE OF RESEARCH, ADULT
CORRECTIONS DATA 20, 105 (1975). For other examples of area-to-area disparity, see
Comment, supra note 185, at 334 nn.69-72.
Disparity from one geographical area to another, of course, is not as serious a
concern as disparity within a single court or other unit. One has notice, ip going from
one district to another, that practices are different; the difference is expected. It is in
part based on rational differences in values and concerns, such as the differences
between rural and urban communities. Geographically based differences are also less
visible, less glaring, less offensive and less likely to create disrespect for law.
,8 See M. FRANKEL, supra note 5, at 18-22.
' "The convicted criminal is left to devise his own explanation for such dispari-
ties and the end result is often to instill in him a deep sense of the unfairness of the
system." Bayley, supra note 112, at 536.
DETERMINATE SENTENCING
may result in sentencing that is not sufficiently individualized.
Forty-three percent of respondents were unable to bring them-
selves to agree that determinate sentencing was promising
enough even to merit study by the legislature.189 "People get
sentences, not crimes," said one of these respondents. Another
added that determinate sentencing "fails to take into account
the human factor." Some of this resistence was apparently due
to a lack of understanding that determinate sentencing need
not be mandatory, 9 ' and some may have been due to economic
interests-such as the complaint of one lawyer that determi-
nate sentencing would "take away [a] defendant's desire to
hire the best attorney who could get [a] lighter sentence";'
nevertheless, it is clear that the major reason for these respon-
ses is profound suspicion of the reduction of discretion in sen-
tencing.
Each of these viewpoints is correct insofar as it goes, but
neither is an adequate guide by itself. The best approach is not
one of preserving complete discretion or one of removing all
discretion, but of searching for the right level of discretion. '
2
As a starting point, the two extremes-that of excessive discre-
tion and that of inadequate discretion-must be examined to
see the problems they create.
"' See note 183 supra and accompanying text for the results of an attitudinal poll
among lawyers regarding determinate sentencing conducted by the State Bar of Texas
during 1978.
19" Many respondents seemed to assume, as one of them stated, that determinate
sentencing would "take away the judge's discretion." The argument that determinate
sentencing "fails to take into account the human factor" is a variant of this basic
theme. The confusion of determinate sentencing with mandatory sentencing is a com-
mon misunderstanding. There were also a few respondents who thought that determi-
nate sentencing was the same as indeterminate sentencing (and who therefore opposed
it on the ground that it was, as they understood it, too discretionary). But perhaps the
most surprising group of responses came from lawyers who stated general opposition
to all kinds of determinate sentencing-but who then opted for the most stringent
models of determinacy when asked to choose among different types. See note 183 supra
and accompanying text for other assumptions of the participants in the attitudinal
poll.
191 This conclusion not only is a dubious basis for decision but is almost certainly
wrong as well. It misapprenhends the effect of complicated new regulatory legislation
on the fortunes of attorneys. Cassou and Taugher, for example, cheerfully assert that
California's new determinate sentencing law "ought to be dubbed the 'Lawyers Relief
Act of 1976,'" and the last sentence of their article advises the befuddled practitioner
to "think of it as job security." Cassou & Taugher, supra note 12, at 106.
"I See K. DAvis, supra note 18.
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1. The Problem of Excessive Discretion: The
"Individualized" Sentencing Model
While few jurisdictions have adopted systems so rigid as
to eliminate consideration of individual characteristics,"3
determinate sentencing does imply the restriction of this
consideration. Some commentators, postulating that
"individualized" adjudication is a positive benefit in its own
right, see any restriction of discretion as a drawback even if
more consistent and rational results are produced in the long
run. '94 Fixed, presumptive or even guideline sentences are un-
desirable in this view not so much because they give the wrong
results, but because they focus upon the calculation rather
than upon the individual offender.
The argument is laden with intangibles and is difficult to
express, but it is also difficult to dismiss. Professor Alschuler
puts it this way:
Although a corrective for the undue optimism of the past is
undoubtedly in order, the corrective may be carried too far.
We may find ourselves thinking: "Don't tell us that a robber
was retarded. We don't care about his problems. We don't
know what to do about his problems and we are no longer
interested in listening to a criminal's sob stories. The most
important thing about this robber is simply that he is a rob-
ber. He committed the same crime as Bonnie and Clyde.""95
Professor Alschuler concludes that "should this sort of senti-
ment prevail, we will almost certainly have lost something, not
in terms of the effectiveness of the criminal justice system, but
as human beings."'1 8 The argument is persuasive, even elo-
"Habitual offender statutes, as an important exception, have generally been
interpreted to allow for individual characteristics in exceptional cases, but they apply
to a tiny minority of dispositions. See note 21 supra for a consideration of TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 12.47(d) (Vernon 1974), an example of a "habitual offender"
statute.
"I E.g., NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CiuME & DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING ACT § 1
(2d ed. 1972). See also notes 195-98 infra and accompanying text for the position that
discretion in sentencing should be unrestricted to promote "individualized" adjudica-
tion.




quent, so far as it goes, but it may be a signpost in the wrong
direction." 7
A partial answer to the argument is that sentencing discre-
tion can and should be guided in such a manner that retarda-
tion and a number of characteristics similar to it are empha-
sized as mitigating factors. The jurisdictions that have adopted
determinate sentencing do take such factors into account-by
specific guidelines."' But the real answer is that discretion for
discretion's sake will not necessarily produce a more "human"
system, and it may very well produce a less human one. The
crux of the problem is that it is not clear how a sentencing
decider without standards will take factors such as retardation
into account. A judge inevitably has before him some offenders
who are retarded, some who are average and some who are
highly intelligent, and it does not take great imagination to
construct rational arguments for lenient treatment of each of
the three classes."' A sentencing judge given the latitude to do
so is quite likely, in fact, to empathize with persons who are
most "normal"-that is, people who conform most closely to
the image of desirability that he personally holds.2" In other
"I Professor Alschuler's work so recognizes, and it equally condemns the extreme
of the opposing view: "'Did someone rob a bank? If so, this person must never have
had a chance. We will give him that chance. We will teach him to be a welder, and he
will not rob banks any more.' . . . [S]tudies that demonstrate the nalvet6 of our
earlier rehabilitative ambitions have diminished our buoyancy." Id. at 557-58.
"' Cf. CAL. RULES OF COURT 414(d)(4), 423(b)(2) (defendant's "health" and
"mental faculties" to be considered in granting probation; furthermore, if defendant
"was suffering from a mental or physical condition that significantly reduced his
culpability," this circumstance mitigates sentence). It is also significant that enumer-
ated aggravating circumstances tend to support higher sentences for offenders without
mental or emotional problems. Cf. CAL. RULES OF Couirr 421 (a)(8) (planning, sophisti-
cation or professionalism).
"I The intelligent offender, for example, is arguably more susceptible to rehabili-
tation. The person of average intelligence may be most easily deterred and in any event
this person is more likely than the retarded offender to have others who depend upon
him for support. The California guidelines would tend to reduce the impact of these
arguments at least insofar as imprisonment is concerned (though perhaps not as to
probation). CAL. RULES OF COURT 414, 416, 423.
20 One study has challenged the "assumption. . . that it is possible to individual-
ize a sentence," because most observed sentences were "directly dependent on the
judge's background and unconscious biases rather than upon the defendant's needs."
Comment, Discretion in Felony Sentencing-A Study of Influencing Factors, 48 WASH.
L. REv. 857, 872 (1973) (emphasis in original), cited in Bayley, supra note 112, at 537
n.28. James Q. Wilson sees the same phenomenon: "The reasons for sentencing pat-
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words, what is likely to happen in many cases is that the re-
tarded offender will be treated not less harshly in a discretion-
ary system, but more harshly.
There is at least one area in which this result has been
judicially recognized, and that is in death penalty cases. In
Furman v. Georgia, 201 a number of justices concluded that un-
fettered sentencing discretion led to "wanton and freakish re-
sults,' 2 2 and others, taking the argument one step farther, con-
sidered that it resulted in harsher sentences for the poor, the
underrepresented and members of racial minorities 2°3-
precisely those for whom a humanitarian system presumably
should show greater solicitude. There is no treason to suspect
that noncapital sentencing is different in other than a consti-
tutional sense. Wealth or poverty, educational level, personal-
ity disorders, family status, employment, social class, even
race or sex-all of these factors are likely to enter into a stan-
dardless discretionary adjudication, but the way they affect
it may not be what we would expect from a criminal justice
system attuned to the human factor.0 4
Thus the fallacy of individualized sentencing, when car-
ried to its extreme, is that it results in such haphazard weight-
ing of factors that even the direction of their influence, whether
terns in many courts have little or nothing to do with achieving some general social
objective, but a great deal to do with the immediate problems and idiosyncratic beliefs
of judges." J. WILSON, supra note 24, at 166. See also L. WLKNS, supra note 16, at 26.
The Presidential Clemency Board began with a discretionary system, and the
results, two participants report, were "disturbing:"
If any pattern emerged in this first collection of decisions, it was a favoring
of the applicant with a middle-class background, with a demonstrated re-
spect for authority, and with a conventional life-style. In fact, statistical
analysis of those sixteen cases shows that "conventionality of life-style" was
a more significant predictor of Board judgments than any of the officially
designated aggravating and mitigating factors. (emphasis added).
Strauss & Baskir, supra note 59, at 925. Adoption of rules and other techniques for
reducing disparity resulted in a "startling and measurable degree of consistency." Id.
at 921. Of course, the rules need not be mandatory or exclusive to be effective. Cf. ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (West Supp. 1978) (allowing courts to consider in aggravation
or mitigation of a sentence any factors which seem appropriate to the ends of justice).
201 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
202 Id. at 291-95 (Brennan, J., concurring).
203 Id. at 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J. concurring).
21 See Bayley, supra note 112, at 536-37.
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aggravating or mitigating, becomes distorted.215 There is
mounting evidence, indeed, that the differences produced by
unguided discretionary sentencing are as likely to be the result
of differing prejudices held by sentencing judges as of differ-
ences in circumstances." 8 Standardless sentencing does noth-
ing to prevent the carrying out of prejudices; it encourages it
by romanticizing discretion and camouflaging its inadequacies.
It is objectionable not only because it produces inconsistencies
but because its sloppiness permits discrimination for the sake
of discrimination against the very individuals it seeks to pro-
tect, and thereby makes the process less human rather than
more so.
There is a further, and more direct, reason for limiting the
"individualized" model of sentencing. An offender sentenced
in today's criminal justice system may feel justified in conclud-
ing that his term of imprisonment is based not so much on what
he has done as what he is.*27 Thus the message that an indivi-
dualized sentencing philosophy conveys to the imprisoned of-
fender is counterproductive to both rehabilitation and retribu-
tive justice .2  An offender may, through effort, refrain from
criminal conduct, but an offender who believes that his person-
ality or lifestyle is the basis of his sentence can be expected to
respond with alienation and rebellion. Discretionary sentenc-
ing increases the likelihood that the sentence will be so per-
ceived. It is a substantial cause of prison unrest today.00 The
21 See K. DAvis, supra note 18, at 133-41.
m See note 200 supra and authorities therein cited for further explanation of this
proposition.
I07 See Motley, "Law & Order" and the Criminal Justice System, 64 J. CriM. L.C.
& CRn. 259, 268-69 (1973). Judge Motley puts it thus: "The defendant knows that the
kind of treatment he receives from the criminal process is not primarily a function of
the crime he has committed. It is more likely to be a reflection of the judge's estimate
of him as a person." Id. at 269. It is submitted that this formulation overstates the
case; it is doubtful that judges really decide to give offenders long prison terms
"primarily" because of personality rather than criminal conduct. But the prevailing
sentencing philosophy encourages offenders so to perceive their terms of imprisonment,
and this encouragement is sufficient cause for concern in and of itself.
203 A difficult philosophical question is presented if there are rational bases for
sentencing on such factors as personality or lifestyle. For example, an offender might
sensibly be incarcerated for a longer term because he has not only committed an
offense but is dangerous. See generally notes 227-36 infra and accompanying text for
a conclusion as to the "right level of discretion" to be permitted a sentencing judge.
"' See generally COUNCIL OF STATE GovNMENTs, supra note 128.
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elimination of unnecessary discretion would do much to reduce
this problem.
2. The Problem of Inadequate Discretion: The "Uniform"
Sentence Model
The objections to an excess of discretion, however, do not
end the inquiry, for another concern in adopting a determinate
sentencing system is the avoidance of undue rigidity. A statute
or rule can be written so as to weight important factors impro-
perly just as an individual adjudication can distort them.','
Furthermore, the varieties of deviant behavior are infinite, and
even if it were possible to devise a rigid system that took a
sufficient variety into account so as to produce acceptable re-
sults, it would be too cumbersome to be workable in practice.' "
One might consider the following offenses, which were actually
charged in Harris County (Houston), Texas:
-A man rapes a woman and then, as part of the same crimi-
nal episode, forces her to have intercourse with a dog; 12
-A man kills another under circumstances amounting to
murder, then attaches the corpse to a hook on his wrecker
vehicle and drives about town with it displayed there;213
-A man and his wife resist arrest by a police officer, but part
of their motivation for doing so is concern over the death of
their son at the hands of another police officer, a crime for
which they were important witnesses for the prosecution. 21
In each of these situations, the proper sentence is not assessa-
ble according to any sort of mathematical formula. No one
could have predicted these cases, much less established reason-
abld values in advance for the unusually aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances they present. And yet those unusual cir-
211 See K. DAVIS, supra note 18, at 15-25. Professor Alschuler criticizes the Twen-
tieth Century Fund proposals on this ground. The Fund suggests six degrees of robbery,
but "robbery with a machine gun is treated no differently than robbery with a .22
caliber target pistol." Alschuler, supra note 7, at 560.
222 See K. DAvis, supra note 18; Alschuler, supra note 7, at 561.
212 Interview with Gerard W. Guerinot, Assistant District Attorney of Harris
County, in Houston, Texas (Oct. 26, 1978).
213 Id.
214 Id. The defendants were acquitted of resisting arrest but convicted of public
intoxication. The conviction was reversed on trial de novo.
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cumstances are the essence of the sentencing decision in each
case.
The problem of inadequate discretion has already arisen in
jurisdictions with narrow sentencing guidelines. Indeed, the
first case decided by the California Supreme Court under that
state's new determinate sentencing system resulted in an ill-
fitting sentence produced not by discretion, but by standards
so rigidly fixed that they placed the judiciary in a straitjacket.
People v. Caudillo""' involved a nightmarish crime-an abduc-
tion, robbery and rape combined with repeated forcible anal
and oral sodomy that produced knife wounds on the victim's
neck. 16 The jury found that the victim had suffered "great
bodily injury," and this finding, if valid, would have subjected
the defendant to a three-year enhancement. The California
Supreme Court, however, found the evidence insufficient to
support the finding on the gound that rape, without more, was
not bodily injury, and it shortened the sentence accordingly. In
doing so, the majority took pains to indicate that it was acting
not out of a sense of natural justice but out of deference to the
statute; it labeled the offense as "outrageous, shocking and
despicable. ' 17 The Chief Justice, in a concurring opinion,
stated, "This court has'no choice in this matter. It must accept
the Legislature's intent despite personal feelings to the con-
trary."2
18
In the wake of Caudillo, there have been efforts in Califor-
nia to broaden discretionary ranges for sentencing judges.
2 1
215 580 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1978).
216 At different times, defendant used a knife to cut both the front and the back
of the victim's neck. During the anal copulation, the victim twice had diarrhea, and
during the oral copulation she gagged, spit and vomited repeatedly. She was blind-
folded through most of the episode. Id. at 276-77. The defendant was alleged in the
charging instrument to have had two prior felony convictions. One allegation was
admitted as true, the other struck. Id. at 276 n.1.
217 Id. at 281.
216 Id. at 290. For another example, see People v. Tanners, 587 P.2d 1112 (Cal.
1979), in which the trial judge refused to follow CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.6 (West Supp.
1978), prohibiting probation in robbery cases in which a firearm was used. The judge
characterized the case as "very, very rare," because defendant testified credibly that
he had done the act as a "sham" to convince the victim to resubscribe to defendant's
security service. The California Supreme Court affirmed.
2M6 Interview with Raymond I. Parnas, Professor of Law, University of California,
Davis, and Counsel to the California Senate Select Committee on Penal Institutions,
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The suggestion of a statutory change to this effect has been
opposed by at least one of the California Act's principal
drafters, who observes that it "would lead to disparity."' o
While this observation may be true for some cases, the di-
lemma is that in other cases, such as Caudillo, the appearance
of uniformity produced by the statute is arguably misleading,
and a somewhat greater discretion might in these cases bring
more proportional results.22
1 -
3. The Right Level of Discretion
Rational sentencing is neither a matter of discretion for the
sake of discretion nor of rigidity for the sake of rigidity, but of
setting discretion at the right level. The question immediately
follows: What is the right level? It is submitted that the best
answer to that question is the one given by Professor Kenneth
Davis in his landmark work Discretionary Justice:22 discretion
should be reduced to the level that is necessary, and remaining
discretion should be structured, confined and checked. More
injustice is probably done on account of discretion that is too
broad than discretion that is too narrow. 22s Notwithstanding
in Davis, California (Oct. 4, 1978). Professor Parnas was one of the principal architects
of the California Act. The interview was conducted by telephone from Houston.
220 Id.
"I The Act was, indeed, amended to increase sentences as well as ranges for
certain kinds of offenses committed after January 1, 1969. For example, second-degree
murder base terms were changed from five, six, and seven years to five, seven, and
eleven years. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (West Supp. 1979). Robbery base terms were
increased from two, three and four years to two, three and five years; rape, from three,
four and five years to three, six and eight years; first-degree burglary, from two, three
and four years to two, four and six years; etc. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 213, 264, 461 (West
Supp. 1979).
The increases in length make possible better service to several sentencing goals,
including particularly retribution and incapacitation. The wider ranges make possible
better tailoring of the sentence to the individual case without sacrificing overall con-
sistency, and hence, it is submitted, they enhance uniformity.
22 K. DAvIS, supra note 18, at 216. "The broad framework of the [recommended]
approach . . . is expressed in this one sentence: The vast quantities of unnecessary
discretionary power that have grown up in our system should be cut back, and the
discretionary power that is found to be necessary should be properly confined, struc-
tured and checked." Id.
223 "In a government of men and of laws, the portion that is a government of men,
like a malignant cancer, often tends to stifle the portion that is a government of laws.
Perhaps nine-tenths of injustice in our legal system flows from discretion and perhaps
only one-tenth from rules." Id. at 25.
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Professor Alschuler's eloquent argument to the contrary, it is
unlikely that we can reduce necessary discretion to such a point
that we will eliminate the human factor, provided we structure
it so that the extraordinary case, such as Caudillo, can be dealt
with appropriately. A presumptive sentence within an ade-
quate discretionary range would produce this result.
To return once more to Professor Alschuler's example,2 4 a
retarded offender should, as Alschuler argues, be the subject of
individualized sentencing. But it should not be a romanticized
sort of individualized sentencing. Discretion ought to be re-
sorted to only when a presumptive sentence or guideline is
inappropriate, and insofar as is possible, the discretion for de-
parting from the presumptive sentence should be guided at
least by general principles. The California Act, for instance,
allows the judge discretion to select a lower base term for a
retarded offender, and applicable rules provide guidance as to
the direction of that discretion.2 2 The range of discretion al-
lowed in California is open to criticism, and one may easily
argue that it is too narrow, but the principle is sound. The
result will probably be fairer treatment of all concerned, in-
cluding (one might say especially) retarded offenders, for it can
hardly decrease a court's concern for humanitarian goals to
have its attention specifically directed to retardation as a fac-
tor in mitigation. All of this is to say we must necessarily rely
in this area upon a government of men and women, but we
should do so only to the extent that a government of laws is
impractical.226
224 See notes 195-97 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
"individualized sentencing" which Professor Alschuler would accord a retarded robber.
m These rules also allow retardation to be taken into account in probation deci-
sions; indeed, for those crimes for which probation is restricted by statute to unusual
cases, the rules provide that such an unusual case may be present if "the crime was
committed because of psychological problems," the defendant is not dangerous and
treatment will be required as a condition of probation with a likelihood of success. See
notes 198-99 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the California rules as
they relate to California's determinate system.
12 K. DAvIs, supra note 18, at 216-17 (1969).
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4. The Most Difficult Cases: Conflicts Between the Goal of
Uniformity and Those of Deterrence, Incapacitation or
Rehabilitation
The most difficult philosophical problems of determinate
sentencing, however, will concern not the proper treatment of
discretion but the conflict of sentencing goals. One can readily
imagine cases in which offenders A and B are equally blame-
worthy in a moral sense, but the incarceration of offender A
would serve deterrent, incapacitative or rehabilitative purposes
while the incarceration of offender B would not. In such a situa-
tion, if offender B is incarcerated for a term equal to that im-
posed upon A, the sentence seems cruel because it fails to carry
out any sentencing purpose other than slavish uniformity. If,
on the other hand, B's term is less than that given A, the
sentencing process appears unfair because it treats equally
blameworthy offenders unequally.2 7 Examples of this dilemma
are commonplace. They appear whenever a white collar of-
fender's sentence is compared to that of a burglar, whenever
the sentence of a police officer who has engaged in violent
conduct toward a suspect is compared to that of a violent street
criminal, and in an infinite range of other situations.
It is a problem with no satisfactory solution other than
compromise. That is to say, the best possible disposition might
be to set offender B's sentence lower than offender A's to reflect
the difference in utilitarian purposes but not so much lower as
to offend utterly the retributive goal of uniformity." Under a
discretionary system, the court is free to strike the balance on
an ad hoc basis, but the practical result is certain to be a loss
m See J. WILSON, supra note 121, at 162-82.
221 See United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Frankel, J.).
Bergman, an elderly rabbi with a long history of philanthropy, pled guilty to two
counts of an eleven-count indictment involving large medicare frauds. The court de-
cided upon a sentence of four month's imprisonment as a result of a process harmoniz-
ing retributive and utilitarian concerns (though there may be debate upon whether
balance was truly reached by this sentence). But cf. CAL. RumFs OF Cotmr 410, which
lists protection, punishment, specific deterrence, general deterrence, isolation, restitu-
tion and uniformity as sentencing goals, and concludes: "Because in some instances
these objectives may suggest inconsistent dispositions, the sentencing judge shall con-
sider which objectives are of primary importance in the particular case." This rule




of uniformity. As we consider determinate sentencing in an
effort to regain uniformity, we should ask whether it will pro-
duce superficial equality at the cost of other goals. If we incar-
cerate offender A because we need to, and if we then also incar-
cerate offender B for an equal term to produce equality, we will
be sending many more offenders to prison for more time with
no more reason for doing so, and we may feel in the end that
we have lost more than we have gained.29
There is some indication that determinate sentencing may
present this difficulty. Some proponents of determinate sen-
tencing have suggested decreased emphasis upon factors re-
lated to stability of the offender, factors such as employment
and family circumstances21 These factors undoubtedly lead to
discriminatory sentencing; they cause married offenders to be
preferred over single ones and employed offenders over unem-
ployed ones. But these factors may correlate closely with the
offender's susceptibility to rehabilitation, with effectiveness of
deterrence and with the need for incapacitation. It may be that
the decision in a given instance to give emphasis to the equality
factor could be justified; the point, however, is that the deci-
sion should be based upon a recognition that utilitarian goals
are being de-emphasized and upon a purposeful weighing of the
two against each other.41 Moreover, there will be some cases
that require the opposite result-cases in which unequal sen-
tences may have to be tolerated in order to make the results
rational in pragmatic terms or in rehabilitative, deterrent or
incapacitative terms-and this choice will be an exceedingly
difficult one.2 2 Determinate sentencing will force us to face it,
and if it quantifies differences so as to make a necessary in-
equality seem bald and offensive, the structure may force the
wrong decision.
225 See J. WSON, supra note 21.
211 E.g., Bayley, supra note 112, at 536-37; see also L. WnUWNs, supra note 16, at
8.
2*" For example, California allows full consideration of such factors as "age, educa-
tion, health, mental faculties and family background and ties" as criteria affecting
probation, but further limits their use in cases where probation is restricted by statute,
and omits them from a list of mitigating circumstances affecting the length of a prison
term. CAL. RuLEs or CouRT 414(d)(4), 416(f)-(g), 423. This is a purposeful weighing of
the type called for here, and the result seems sensible.
212 See note 116 supra and accompanying text for the point that the necessity of
making difficult choices mandates formulation of a careful sentencing philosophy.
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It is for all these reasons that an attempt to reduce discre-
tion to its lowest necessary level should still leave enough so
that the courts will be touched by the human problems of
people affected by them. The most workable solution to these
conflicts appears to be retention of wide discretion to depart
from guidelines. It may be, therefore, that a presumptive sys-
tem accompanied by a wide range within which a court can
fashion an extraordinary sentence is preferable, at least in
these difficult cases, to a quasi-mandatory one. Thus Califor-
nia's more rigid system may not reconcile the conflicting pur-
poses of sentencing as well as the Wilkins, federal or Indiana
systems.
III. PROBLEMS OF LEGALITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
Even if there were agreement that the general effects of
determinate sentencing were desirable, several questions would
remain. Among these questions are constitutional issues re-
garding due process,2ss confrontation, cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, the right to jury trial, multiple jeopardy and other
doctrines. The broad scope of decisions construing these provi-
sions makes it difficult to know precisely what they mean in the
context of determinate sentencing.2s4 Nor is it merely a matter
233 For a discussion of some of the due process issues raised by the California Act,
see Uelmen, supra note 8. See also Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes Permitting
Increased Sentences for Habitual or Dangerous Criminals, 89 HIv. L. REv. 356 (1975).
211 It is difficult to comprehend, at first, the breadth and variety of constitutional
attacks that defendants are likely to make upon determinate sentencing. At least one
district court, for example, has held that enhancements based on separate criminal
activity violate the fifth amendment guarantee of grand jury indictment (the appellate
court expressly refused to approve this holding). United States v. Neary, 552 F.2d 1184
(7th Cir. 1977). Another has held sentencing enhancements in violation of U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 2 on the questionable reasoning that a jury trial is required for all crimes.
United States v. Duardi, 384 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Mo. 1974). See Uelmen, supra note
8, at 746-48. Separation of powers presents an interesting dilemma; it can be argued
on the one hand that sentencing is a judicial function and that legislative or executive
participation in the fixing of sentences violates the separation doctrine. See Imlay,
supra note 95, at 55. But on the other hand, it can be argued that sentencing guidelines
applying to cases generally involve the development of substantive law rather than
adjudication and should therefore be done by the legislature, not the judiciary. Cf.
Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) ("apportionment" and "severity" of
sentence are "peculiarly questions of legislative policy"); Frankel, supra note 45, at
41; see also M. FRANKEL, supra note 5, at 104-05, 123. Both of these arguments seem
overtechnical, and many determinate systems use both legislative and judicial officers
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of adopting careful procedures, for the constitutional argu-
ments are such that they would make the entire idea of deter-
minate sentencing impractical if pushed to extremes. Although
this result seems neither likely nor necessary, the possibility
does indicate the importance of analysis of the constitutional
questions.
A. Due Process: What Standard Is Applicable?
Perhaps the due process case that could support the most
serious constitutional challenge to determinate sentencing is
Specht v. Patterson,2 5 in which the Supreme Court held that
procedures incorporated in the Colorado Sex Offenders Act
were constitutionally insufficient. The Colorado Act provided
for enhanced sentencing of a sex offender if the judge found
that the defendant was dangerous or was mentally ill and a
habitual offender.25 No hearing was required for this determi-
nation, nor was any evidence required other than a psychiatric
report. Mr. Justice Douglas began the Court's opinion by not-
ing that the Court had previously upheld the discretionary
model of sentencing in the landmark decision of Williams v.
New York. 237 In that case, the Court had explicitly allowed
sentencing judges to consider material from any source, includ-
ing hearsay reports. That sentencing method was still viable
where sentencing was within a discretionary range, Justice
Douglas concluded; however, he considered that the "new find-
ing of fact" required for enhancement made the Colorado Act
to fix guidelines. See notes 80-84, 96 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
the California system as such an example. Arguments based on provisions respecting
ex post facto laws (since retroactivity is usually a concern), equal protection or even
bills of attainder can be constructed. See, e.g., United States v. flacqua, 562 F.2d 399
(6th Cir. 1977). Some such arguments seem tenuous at first but gain credibility upon
reflection. Other arguments may seem to remain tenuous after reflection but may then
be accepted by courts (for example, the Neary and Duardi district court decisions cited
above).
Determinate sentencing is especially likely to be the subject of such attacks: it is
new; it is revolutionary; it involves a sensitive process; and it produces a veritable army
of disgruntled individuals, each of whom has a right to representation by counsel who
are themselves likely to have strong opposition to it.
386 U.S. 605 (1967).
2" COL. Ray. STAT. § 16-13-201 (1978).
- 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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"radically different" from ordinary sentencing. 8 The proce-
dures leading to this new finding of fact had to provide "the
full panoply of the relevant protections which due process guar-
antees in state criminal proceedings."2 9 The opinion lists some
of those protections, including the right to notice, an opportun-
ity to be heard, confrontation of the witnesses against the de-
fendant, cross-examination and the right to offer evidence.20
If read broadly, Specht v. Patterson would make determi-
nate sentencing virtually unusable. The "full panoply" re-
quirement seems to apply the same tests required for the guilt
stage of criminal trial to any proceeding at which a "new find-
ing of fact" is to be made.2 1 Since new findings of fact are at
the heart of sentencing guideline systems, 2 2 some commenta-
tors have suggested, in light of Specht, that reliance upon hear-
say in the sentence hearing might violate the confrontation
clause, that facts at the sentencing stage must be found by a
jury, that sources of information must be subject to cross-
21 386 U.S. at 608-10. The Court also emphasized that the sentence was not based
on "the commission of a specified crime" but on "another proceeding under another
Act."
229 Id. at 609, quoting Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 312 (3d Cir. 1962).
M Id. at 610.
2,, The opinion cited the following language from Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d
302 (3d Cir. 1962):
It is a separate criminal proceeding which may be invoked after conviction
... .Petitioner therefore was entitled to a full judicial hearing before the
magnified sentence could be imposed. . . . [D]ue process cannot be satis-
fied by partial or niggardly procedural protections. A defendant in such a
proceeding is entitled to the full panoply of the relevant protections which
due process guarantees in state criminal proceedings. He must be afforded
all those safeguards which are fundamental rights and essentials to a fair
trial ....
Id. at 312 (emphasis added). Following this quotation, Justice Douglas wrote: "We
agree with this view." Id.
In light of the italicized language, it is difficult to read Specht other than as
equating sentencing and trial for due process purposes in enhancement cases. It has
not been so read, however, because of the peculiar nature of the Colorado law at issue
and because of implicit but widespread rejection of the "full panoply" dictum. See,
e.g., United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160, 1172 (5th Cir. 1977).
2 It might be possible to distinguish presumptive or guideline systems on the
theory that although they involve factual issues, the court may consider the facts
within a system of discretion. The better approach, however, would be to reject the
"new finding of fact" reasoning. See note 244 infra and accompanying text for a
consideration of the desirable approach which requires a more restrictive reading of
Specht.
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examination, that sentencing criteria must meet stringent tests
of specificity and that detailed pre-trial notice of sentencing
factors must be given in each individual case. 43 Such an ap-
proach might cause an increase in the cost of the sentencing
process so great as to make determinate sentencing prohibi-
tively expensive. It might also have such undesirable proce-
dural results as making reports of presentence investigations
inadmissible.
But such a broad reading of Specht does not seem appro-
priate. A few courts have noted the ironic contrast between the
Williams approval of unregulated discretionary sentencing and
the insistence in Specht upon stringent protections whenever
"new facts" are involved; these courts have rightly noted that
judges exercising sentencing discretion always do so on the
basis of facts which they first must "find." 44 This analysis
alone has led to a narrower view of Specht. More importantly,
the Supreme Court itself has retreated from the "full panoply"
dictum. In Morrissey v. Brewer,245 the Court stated:
Once it is determined that due process applies, the question
remains what process is due. It has been said so often by this
Court and others as not to require citation of authority that
due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protec-
tions as the particular situation demands.
2"1
Morrissey involved revocation of parole, a process akin to sen-
tencing but crucially dependent upon new findings of fact.
Chief Justice Burger began the Court's opinion by stating that
"the full panoply of rights due a [criminal] defendant . . .
does not apply" 4 to parole revocation, and he went on to con-
clude that an "informal" hearing, with reliance upon "letters,
affidavits and other material that would not be admissible in
an adversary criminal trial," was appropriate.14 More recently,
243 Uelmen, supra note 8. See also Note, supra note 233.
4 E.g., United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160, 1174 n.6 (5th Cir. 1977); Note,
supra note 233, at 366. The Williams case, for example, involved the upholding of a
death sentence issued in part because the trial judge was furnished information allow-
ing him to conclude that the defendant had committed thirty burglaries and was
influenced by "morbid sexuality." 337 U.S. at 244.
2- 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
2 Id. at 481.
247 Id.
241 Id. at 489.
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in Gardner v. Florida,49 the Court implicitly approved the use
of hearsay in presentence reports for determinate sentencing.
A plurality opinion states, "The fact that due process applies
does not, of course, implicate the entire panoply of criminal
trial procedural rights."' 0
Actually, the constitutional cases most closely analogous
to determinate sentencing problems after Specht v. Patterson
are those analyzing the federal dangerous special offender stat-
ute.21 This statute, which creates a hybrid of discretionary and
determinate sentencing, allows enhanced sentencing of a fed-
eral offender found by a court to have a certain kind of prior
criminal record or to have engaged in certain kinds of conspira-
torial or profit-making activities, 52 provided the court also
finds him to be dangerous.23 The length of the enhancement is
discretionary, but the total sentence cannot exceed twenty-five
years and may not be disproportionate to the ordinary maxi-
mum for the offense.2 4 Although the statute contains due pro-
249 430 U.S. 349 (1977). Gardner involved the Florida death penalty statute, a type
of determinate sentencing law. The Court held that presentence reports must be dis-
closed to the defense.
11 Id. at 358 n.9. See also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), in which
the Court refused to extend to sentencing the requirement of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. 684 (1975), that elements of the offense be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Mullaney, said the Court, "should not be broadly read" in the sentencing context. 432
U.S. at 214-15.
22! 18 U.S.C. § 3675 (1970). A similar statute applies to drug-related offenses. 21
U.S.C. § 849 (1970).
212 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) contains three sections defining different types of "special
offenders." Subsection (1) covers any person twice previously convicted on separate
occasions of offenses carrying potential sentences exceeding one year, imprisoned for
at least one such offense and released within the past five years-i.e., habitual or
repeat offenders. Subsection (2) covers any person engaged in a pattern of crimes that
produced substantial income and demonstrated special skills-i.e., professional crimi-
nals. Subsection (3) covers certain conspiratorial conduct in which the defendant was
a leader or financier or which involved bribery or force-i.e., organized crime.
"Dangerousness," which is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3575(f), means that "a period
of confinement longer than provided for [the underlying] felony is required for the
protection of the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant." Id. Thus the
defendant need not be violent or physically dangerous to be "dangerous."
-4 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1970). Pretrial notice must state "with particularity" the
information relied upon to establish that the defendant is a dangerous special offender;
the defendant has a right to confront witnesses who appear and testify, as well as the
right of compulsory process; the court must make fact findings; and appellate review
is provided. On the other hand, there is no right to jury trial; hearsay may be used;
and the burden of proof is by the "preponderance of the information"--a phrase
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cess protections greater than those applicable to ordinary sen-
tencing, these protections are not as stringent as the guilt-
innocence stage would require. 25 Nevertheless, cases involving
the statute have reached the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh
Circuits, and each has upheld it against broad due process
challenges incorporating claims such as those dealt with in
Specht. 8
It thus appears that neither the Williams "complete dis-
cretion" approach nor the Specht "full panoply" approach
should be directly applied to determinate sentencing. The
Specht language equating sentencing due process with guilt-
innocence due process is little more than careless dictum. And
yet the significance accorded to specific facts by determinate
sentencing does suggest that greater care ought to be exercised
in the finding of those facts than is provided by the unregulated
procedure approved by Williams. An intermediate standard
should apply.27 This standard, even though not so stringent as
a guilt-innocence standard, involves consideration of due pro-
cess problems regarding notice, proof, evidence and vagueness.
B. The Due Process Issues in Determinate Sentencing
1. Vagueness
Criminal legislation defining guilt and innocence must
have a degree of specificity that does not require persons of
ordinary intelligence to "guess at its meaning."' 5 The purpose
indicating not only that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required but also that
facts may be established by data that would not be competent evidence in a trial. 18
U.S.C. §§ 3575(a)-(b), 3576 (1970). See also Uelmen, supra note 8, at 730-31.
2 United States v. Williamson, 567 F.2d 610 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Neary, 552 F.2d 1184 (7th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Stewart, 531 F.2d 326 (6th Cir.) cert. denied 426 U.S. 922
(1976); Cf. Ianelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 786-87 (1975) (the Supreme Court
cited 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) and stated, "The content of the Act reflects the dedication
with which the Legislature pursued this purpose [of combatting organized crime]").
=' When the question arises as to how to apply the due process clause to a particu-
lar criminal-justice context, "there must be mutual accommodation between institu-
tional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general
application." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (denying the right of
confrontation in prison discipline cases).
21 See generally Uelmen, supra note 8.
2 Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); cf. Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) (prohibition upon being a "gangster" unconstitutional).
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of this requirement is to allow individuals fair warning of the
consequences of their conduct, to protect conduct from unduly
harsh punishment and to give reasonable guidance to deciders
of fact. It is a standard that has rarely been applied to sentenc-
ing. 59 However, with the adoption of fixed, presumptive or
guideline sentencing, the sentence is controlled more visibly by
discrete facts than it would be in a discretionary system,"' and
consequently there have come suggestions based on Specht
that enhancements and other aggravating factors must be de-
fined in terms more specific than might otherwise have been
expected. 6'
The proponents of this argument rely not only upon
Specht but also upon Gregg v. Georgia"'2 andArnold v. State,"3
in which the Supreme Courts of the United States and of Geor-
gia, respectively, indicated that a finding that a defendant had
"a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convic-
tions" '264 was an unconstitutionally vague standard upon which
.to base death sentences. The death penalty context is not com-
pletely analogous to the problem of determinate sentencing,
since higher standards apply to capital cases (indeed, the Geor-
gia Supreme Court hinted that it might accept the "substantial
history" test in cases of lesser magnitude);65 but just as cer-
tainly, some commentators argue, there are some minimum
standards of specificity that must be applicable to determinate
sentencing. 66 The argument is appealing and may well be
See generally Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U.
PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
"I But cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (applying the cruel and unusual
punishment rationale).
2" But ef. note 244 supra and accompanying text. Discretionary sentencing is also
controlled by fact findings; the only difference is that they are not findings on issues
set forth by guidelines.
21, E.g., Uelmen, supra note 8, at 731-35.
262 428 U.S. 153, 202 (1976).
2- 224 S.E.2d 386, 391 (Ga. 1976). Reliance might also be placed upon State v.
Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974) (the terms
"especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" could be saved from unconstitutional vague-
ness by limiting construction). Other examples of the vagueness concern can be found
in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 200-03 nn.52-55 (1976).
254 GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (b)(1) (1978).
26 224 S.E.2d at 392.
2 Uelmen, supra note 8, at 735. See also Note, supra note 233, at 375; United
States v. Duardi, 384 F. Supp. 874, 885-86 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
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adopted by a court at some time.
For all its appeal, however, the argument has the potential
for preventing the structuring of discretion and, thereby, most
meaningful sentencing reform. A high degree of flexibility is
necessary if the proper degree of discretion is to be built into a
sentencing system."5 7 Many factors relevant to sentencing can
only be expressed in guideline form. For instance, the Califor-
nia Judicial Council, in fulfillment of its statutory duty to pro-
mulgate rules for the uniform imposition of aggravating and
mitigating factors, 8 has created several standards that are
necessarily more vague than the one condemned in Arnold and
Gregg;' 9 an allowance of aggravation if the defendant "has
engaged in a pattern of violent conduct" is an example strik-
ingly similar to the language in those cases.2 ° Nor is this the
only factor that will probably be challenged as vague; aggrava-
tion in California is also allowed if the victim was
"particularly" vulnerable, the amount of contraband was
"large," the defendant's previous probationary conduct was
'unsatisfactory" or the defendant's record shows crimes of
"increasing seriousness."' 17 Likewise, a sentence may be miti-
gated if the defendant played a "minor" role in the crime,
caused a "small" amount of damage or harm, was motivated
to provide family "necessities," has an "insignificant" prior
criminal record or has had "good" performance on probation. 2
I" K. DAS, supra note 18, at 55 (1969). Davis says that the use of both "rules in
the form of generalizations" and "rules in the form of hypotheticals" should be encour-
aged. Id. at 61. The use of "policy statements" will never satisfy a person insisting on
strict specificity, even though it may be the best alternative-indeed, the only feasible
alternative to lawless, unstructured discretion-in many cases.
.S CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.3 (West Supp. 1979).
"I See notes 262-63 supra and accompanying text for a consideration of Arnold
and Gregg.
70 The full text of the aggravating circumstance is: "ie has engaged in a pattern
of conduct which indicates a serious danger to society." CAL. RULES OF COURT 421(b)(1).
The rule structures discretion in a meaningful way. If the defendant's conduct is a
single isolated instance, it can be said with certainty that it does not meet the test. A
course of frequently repeated dangerous acts over a long period of time can be said with
certainty to meet the test. Of course, there is no bright line of demarcation between
the two, but that is typical of rules of law. In the gray area, the elasticity of the
standard is itself healthy, because it allows the court discretion to give it a lesser weight
when it is balanced against other factors in aggravation or mitigation.
2' CAL. RULES OF COURT 421(a)(3), (11), (b)(5).
272 CAL. RULES OF COURT 423(a)(1), (6), (8), (b)(1), (6).
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It is clear beyond peradventure that some of these standards
would be insufficiently specific in a statute defining criminal
conduct for guilt-innocence purposes,23 and yet it is equally
clear that their elasticity is necessary, because what is "large,"
"small," "unsatisfactory" or "minor," or who is "particularly
vulnerable," depends on the circumstances of the case.2 These
rules are simply an effort to structure discretion without de-
stroying individual adjudication.
There is, moreover, an element of circularity in arguments
against the "vagueness" in standards such as these. Attempts
to reform discretionary sentencing necessarily involve the in-
clusion of more specific (though still elastic) factors in the sen-
tencing structure. But precisely because of their increased
specificity, the argument goes, these factors take on the status
of "facts" to be "proved" and require an even greater degree
of specificity. Thus no attempt at increasing, specificity in a
discretionary system can be constitutional, because the result-
ing guidelines become, ipso facto, insufficiently specific if any
flexibility remains whatsoever. One commentator on the Cali-
fornia Act, recognizing this result, has written: "My own pre-
diction is that the inevitable injection of all of these procedural
2713 Conviction itself often depends on elastic standards. How large is a
"reasonable" doubt? What-does it mean to say that a person was "reckless"? In
California, "premeditation" and "deliberation" are terms that can make a life or death
difference (literally). But it seems fair to conclude that juries will have difficulty
understanding them-not to mention such amorphous neologisms as "malice afore-
thought" or "diminished capacity." When one contemplates a California jury charge
containing all of these terms-such as that recommended by the California Supreme
Court in People v. Conley, 411 P.2d 911, 920 (Cal. 1966)-the California Rules of Court
governing sentencing look like models of specificity by comparison.
274 For example, Professor Uelmen writes: "Every victim, of course, is 'vulnerable.'
What makes a victim 'particularly' vulnerable is left to our imagination: age? sex?
physical incapacity? stupidity? time of day or night?" Uelman concludes that this
standard is a "startling example of vagueness," which could be applied to "every
crime" and which may be unconstitutional. Uelmen, supra note 8, at 735-36.
Uelmen makes some valid points in this passage. But they do not prove his conclu-
sion; in fact, they prove the opposite. Uelmen, by this passage, has persuasively docu-
mented the futility of attempting to list specifically all categories of "particularly
vulnerable" victims. The California Judicial Council was wise not to attempt to do so.
The Council went right to the heart of the matter; a sensible application of the stan-
dard will produce aggravated sentences in cases where the victim is vulnerable in some
unusual way or degree but will not produce such results where he or she is not vulnera-
ble. Of course, sensible adjudication is necessary, but so it is with every rule of law.
Id. Cf. People v. Schmidt, 146 Cal. Rptr. 516 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (victims were
"particularly vulnerable" since they were elderly and defendant used a knife).
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rights into the sentencing process will render the 'aggravation'
procedure a useless dead letter which will seldom be in-
voked." 75 If dictum in Specht v. Patterson is blindly followed,
this pessimistic view may prove to be correct.
But the decisions indicate that the destruction of guided
discretion is no more necessary than it is desirable. The Califor-
nia trial courts are today responding to the aggravation rules
set forth by the Judicial Council in precisely the manner the
legislature appears to have intended."6 Death penalty cases,
particularly Proffitt v. Florida,27 Jurek v. Texas,ss Woodson v.
North Carolina29 and Lockett v. Ohio, 21 indicate that guided
discretion through flexible standards is desirable. Finally, deci-
sions construing the federal dangerous special offender statute
show the resolution of the question that the appellate courts are
m Uelmen, supra note 8, at 752.
27 For example, during the quarter from July 1, 1977, to September 30, 1977,
California trial courts selected the upper (aggravated) term in approximately 25% of
cases, the middle term in approximately 65% of cases and the lower (mitigated) term
in approximately 10% of cases. Sentencing Practices Quarterly, Sept. 30, 1977, at 1,
col. 2 (newsletter of the California Judicial Council).
- 428 U.S. 242 (1976). The Florida statute upheld in Proffitt included mitigating
factors quite similar to some in California-including "no significant" criminal history
and "relatively minor" participation. Id. at 248 n.6; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 921.141 (6)(a),
(d) (West Supp. 1977-78).
8 428 U.S. 262 (1976). The Texas death penalty laws require a jury finding that
"there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society." TEx. CODE CraM. PROC. ANN. art.
37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1978). This formulation is more vague (or, if one chooses, more
flexible) than many of the California standards, but the Texas court, as well as the
United States Supreme Court, saw in this "vagueness" the very factor that saved the
statute from unconstitutionality. 428 U.S. at 272-73, aff'g Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d
934, 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). See Crump, Capital Murder: The Issues in Texas, 14
Hous. L. REv. 531, 555-60 (1977); see also Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality
of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1690 (1974); Comment, House
Bill 200: The Legislative Attempt to Reinstate Capital Punishment in Texas, 11 Hous.
L. REv. 410 (1974). But see Dix, Administration of the Texas Death Penalty Statutes:
Constitutional Infirmities Related to the Prediction of Dangerousness, 55 TExAs L.
REv. 1343, 1377, 1384 (1977).
-7 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (North Carolina's mandatory death penalty declared un-
constitutional).
- 438 U.S. 586 (1978). The Ohio statute was construed as mandating a sentence
of death unless one of three mitigating factors was present: (1) inducement by the
victim; (2) duress, coercion or strong provocation; or (3) mental deficiency. Id. at 607-
08. See Comment, The Constitutionality of Imposing The Death Penalty for Felony
Murder, 15 Hous. L. Rlv. 356, 381-85 (1978).
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likely to reach. Application of the federal statute has been
repeatedly attacked on the ground that the term "dangerous"
is unconstitutionally vague, and similar challenges have been
made against language in the statute that limits enhancements
to a term "not disproportionate" to the maximum provided for
the underlying felony. In each of the circuit courts that has
considered these arguments,21 the statute has been upheld,
apparently because the courts have recognized that the elastic-
ity inherent in the standards is necessary."'
None of this analysis should be taken to imply that the
drafting of standards for determinate sentencing is a matter of
indifference. The choice of words is important. Unquestiona-
bly, it is possible to write sentencing criteria that are unconsti-
tutional. For example, if a standard misdirects the exercise of
discretion rather than structuring it in meaningful ways, it
ought to be considered unlawful. Thus a standard is vulnerable
to attack if it forces the sentencer to decide the case on the
basis of irrelevant criteria,m if it nullifies significant relevant
factors2s4 or if it requires an unreasonable weighting of conflict-
28, United States v. Williamson, 567 F.2d 610, 613 n.7 (4th Cir. 1977) ("sentencing
judges are not unfamiliar with the problem of determining dangerousness . . . . [18
U.S.C. § 3575 provides] more information on which to base [a] decision"); United
States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160, 1175 (5th Cir. 1977) ("[T]he addition of this term
simply grants greater protection to the defendant. . . ."); United States v. Neary, 552
F.2d 1184, 1194 (7th Cir. 1977) ("The concept of dangerousness as defined in § 3575 is
a verbalization of considerations underlying any sentencing decision"); United States
v. Stewart, 531 F.2d 326, 36-37 (6th Cir.), cert. den., 426 U.S. 922 (1976) ("Congress
undertook to improve upon State statutes. . . by prescribing standards .. ").
2 Indeed, a few courts have recognized that the dangerousness and proportional-
ity provisions operate as safeguards in excess of constitutional requirements, in that
the decision could lawfully be based on no standards at all. E.g., United States v.
Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160, 1175 (5th Cir. 1977). See also note 281 supra for other cases
dealing with dangerousness as it relates to the task of sentencing.
m One commentator, for instance, has attacked Texas' death penalty sentencing
standards as "fundamentally misleading" on the ground that, although the
probability-of-future-violence question is supposed to allow balancing of aggravating
and mitigating factors, its words do not so inform the jury. Dix, supra note 278, at 1384.
But see Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934, 945, 948 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (Odom, J.
and Roberts, J., dissenting), and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 279 (1976) (statute has
a "common-sense core of meaning," White, J., concurring). See also Crump, supra
note 278, at 555-57.
2m See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); cf. Alschuler, supra note 7, at 560-61
(criticizing Twentieth Century Fund proposals, as well as death penalty statutes, for
attempting to produce an exhaustive list of criteria).
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ing considerations.2 Justice White has said that sentencing
standards should possess a "common-sense core of meaning."' 6
A traditional vagueness analysis of the kind that one would
apply to the definition of crimes is inapposite,2s7 however, for
if completely discretionary adjudication is valid, the enuncia-
tion of rational rules for its exercise ought, by implication, also
to be considered valid. And since flexibility is usually the only
alternative to having no standard at all, it should not be possi-
ble to cause reversion to standardless discretion merely by the
rhetorical device of calling it vagueness.2ss
2. Problems of Proof: Burden of Proof, Evidence, Illegally
Seized Evidence, Confrontation and Like Issues
Once aggravating factors, mitigating factors and enhance-
ments are defined, the adversary process is likely to produce
constitutional challenges based upon the method of proving
them. Determinate sentencing systems will be subjected to
demands, for instance, that the sentencing facts be proved by
the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt, that evidence be
confined to sources similar to those applicable to trials on guilt
or innocence and that rights of confrontation, discovery and
21 "The presumptive-sentencing structure should also recognize that some miti-
gating or aggravating factors may be more important or serious than others and there-
fore could be assigned different weights." TWENTMTH CENTURY FUND, supra note 27, at
46 and unnumbered footnote; cf. CAL. RuLES OF CouRT 408, 410 (the weight assigned
to factors may vary; "primary" objectives are to be determined for each particular
case). But see Alschuler, supra note 7, at 561. Alschuler maintains that "[A] list of
unweighted aggravating and mitigating factors does little to confine judicial discre-
tion." Id. But the same arguments Alschuler expresses against specifying all sentenc-
ing factors in advance would also apply to an effort to specify their weights in advance,
and there is no reason to assume that statements of policy concerning factors to be
considered will fail to guide judicial discretion. See authorities cited notes 267-84 supra
for further examination of this problem.
m Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 279 (1976).
2" For example, Professor Uelmen's argument, to the effect that sentencing stan-
dards are constitutionally suspect if they leave prosecutors discretion concerning what
to allege as governing the sentencing disposition, should be rejected. Uelmen, supra
note 8, at 752. Cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976) (argument that
"unfettered" prosecutorial discretion with reference to death sentencing standards "is
not determinative of the [constitutional] issues before us. .. .")
2n "It would indeed be ironic if procedural due process required the absence of
legislative guidance in order for the sentencing proceeding to be informal." AmaucAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING To SENTENCING ALTERNATIVE AND PROCEDURES
§ 5.5(c), Comment (approved Draft, 1968) (emphasis in original).
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cross-examination attach.289 These procedural attacks, if suc-
cessful, would have enormous impact upon the feasibility of
determinate sentencing.
The burden-of-proof problem does not seem an insur-
mountable one in constitutional terms. Although the decisions
of the Supreme Court indicate that proof of every element of
the substantive crime must be supplied by the prosecution
under the reasonable doubt standard,290 the Court has treated
the sentencing decision differently. In Patterson v. New
York, 291 for instance, it permitted the burden of proof to be
placed upon the defendant. The dangerous special offender
decisions uphold the use of a preponderance-of-the-
information test with respect to enhancement under that stat-
ute. 292 These decisions, however, have been criticized as de-
pending upon the mere manipulation of labels, 23 and it re-
mains to be seen whether the assessment of heavy enhance-
ments will be permitted without proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, whether leaving the burden undefined (as is often done
in presumptive sentencing) is constitutional and whether fac-
tors closely identified with the crime itself can be removed from
the reasonable doubt standard.
Closely related to the question of proof standards is the
question of evidence. Under the Williams standard, and under
current law in many jurisdictions, a sentencing judge may con-
sult any source and consider almost any factor, giving each
such weight as he deems appropriate. 24 Thus the inclusion of
hearsay, opinion and arrest records not resulting in conviction
is a routine part of presentence reports in many jurisdictions. 9 5
There is some authority for the proposition that the court may
2g See, e.g., Uelmen, supra note 8, at 738-45; Note, supra note 233, at 383. See
also authorities cited in notes 234 and 256 supra for further discussion of other constitu-
tional attacks that may be made on determinate sentencing.
"I See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
291 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
292 See authorities cited note 274 supra.
293 Uelmen, supra note 8, at 741-45.
294 See note 23 supra and accompanying text for further discussion of judicial
freedom in terms of scope and kinds of information which a sentencing judge may
consult.
"I "The use of probation officers' reports is permissible because they are trained




even consider the facts underlying arrests resulting in dismissal
because of the exclusion of illegally seized evidence, so long as
the court is aware of that result."8
It seems clear that determinate sentencing will bring great
impetus for change in some of these evidence principles. In a
system of standardless discretion the court can give less weight
to factors proved by unreliable evidence, but in a determinate
system if the court finds a factor in aggravation the conse-
quences may be definite-even if the finding is based on opin-
ion, arrests not resulting in convictions or the like. Exactly
what effect this conclusion should have, however, is not clear.
It seems doubtful that the shift to sentence guidelines requires
a shift to less complete information or a shift away from the
efficiency offered by the presentence report. 9 ' Again, the death
penalty and dangerous special offender cases are important
analogues, and again, these cases indicate that reliance on
presentence reports for enhancements is justified.298 The right
of confrontation and cross-examination, in these cases, is ex-
tended only to live witnesses, so that hearsay materials can be
considered.2 9 Thus the evidence question may have to be re-
solved on a case-by-case basis, with the key test being a
"sufficiency of the evidence" approach that focuses upon
whether the evidence is weighty enough, and reliable enough,
to sustain the conclusion made.5 ®
211 United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972); see also United States v.
Johnson, 507 F.2d 826 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950 (1975).
A related problem concerns the use of illegally seized evidence itself. A few courts
have allowed the use of such evidence, reasoning that it is collateral in nature and that
extension of the exclusionary rule will not increase deterrence. E.g., United States v.
Schipani, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Williamson, 567 F.2d 610 (4th
Cir. 1977).
M Insistence on strict factual accuracy would, as one commentator has noted, lead
to "a possible paradox": it might mean that sentences would tend to be determined
by relatively less relevant criteria because those criteria simply happened to be veri-
fiable. Note, supra note 233, at 385.
"I Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (death-penalty case) (by implication).
r- Of course, the defendant has the right to compulsory process under death
penalty and dangerous special offender laws. This right may provide a partial substi-
tute for the confrontation right. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1970).
1 " The increased concern for reliability is reflected in a number of factors. Cf. CAL.
RuLEs OF COURT 437, Comments (aggravating or mitigating factors to be disregarded
unless supported by the record, by reports "properly filed" or by "other competent
evidence"); United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971) (unsubstantiated
allegations denied by defendant cannot be considered).
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There is one further complication that is more difficult to
unravel. The practice in many jurisdictions is to keep portions
of the presentence investigation confidential. There are already
constitutional challenges that spell limitations on this prac-
tice-including the decision in Gardner v. Florida,"' holding
that it is unconstitutional in the context of death penalty sen-
tencing-but confidentiality is defended in other instances on
the ground that it leads to more complete information. In the
case of dangerous offenders or persons closely identified with
the defendant, this approach undoubtedly has some validity.
Nevertheless, it may be that determinate sentencing, with in-
creased emphasis upon discrete factual variables, will require
an increased reliability in the fact finding process that is incon-
sistent (absent special circumstances) with confidentiality and
its corresponding lack of testing of the evidence. 2
3. Notice
Due process requires reasonable notice for the purpose of
allowing the defendant to meet the contentions of the opposi-
tion. Determinate sentencing, because it narrows discretion
and focuses the attention of the sentencing judge upon specific
facts, should probably trigger a greater requirement for notice
of the facts to be relied upon than ordinary sentencing. The
exact nature of the notice that should be required, however, is
unclear. While relatively few authorities provide guidance,
there is a variety of possible notice methods, and the nature of
the sentencing factors may themselves influence the answer to
the notice question.
The Federal Dangerous Special Offender Statute contains
a requirement of "particularized"30 3 pretrial notice of the fac-
tors relied upon to show dangerousness. The requirement is
onerous and difficult to meet. There are decisions indicating
that notice merely apprising the defendant that he is consid-
ered dangerous is insufficient to comply with the statute, and
so is notice specifying only the defendant's prior convictions.3 4
430 U.S. 349 (1977).
302 The Federal Dangerous Special Offender Statute authorizes withholding of
information under certain circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1970).
" 18 U.S.C. § 3575(a) (1970).
1 United States v. Duardi, 529 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Kelly,
519 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1975).
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Notices that have been held sufficient are highly detailed and
resemble proffers of the testimonial and evidentiary basis for
the sentencing hearing.05
The death penalty decisions suggest another analogy that
may be helpful. These cases indicate that notice less particu-
larized than that required by the Dangerous Special Offender
Statute may be sufficient in appropriate circumstances. The
statutes that have been upheld require only general notice of
the aggravating factor that is to be used to support the use of
capital punishment, and aggravating and mitigating factors
that actually control the decision are not required to be set
forth in advance at all. The general availability of an
aggravation-mitigation list published in court opinions or stat-
utes appears to satisfy the notice requirement."' Yet another
analogy may be found in habitual offender statutes, which
usually allow lengthy enhancement of punishments upon proof
of specific kinds of prior convictions. Such statutes have gener-
ally been interpreted to require that the convictions be set forth
with particularity in the indictment. 07
Thus, although the decisions do not speak directly to the
problem of determinate sentencing, they do indicate that dif-
ferent kinds of notice are applicable to different situations. The
requirement that the Constitution imposes is one of reasonable
notice. For enhancements of a specific number of years de-
pendent upon specific aspects of the offense or offender,
greater notice is possible and desirable. Such enhanced sen-
tencing approaches the mandatory model, and greater due
process protection should be available."'8 On the other hand,
for guidelines containing general aggravating and mitigating
factors that are to be weighed in the balance in an unspecified
115 E.g., United States v. Stewart, 531 F.2d 326, 337-39 (6th Cir. 1976); cf. United
States v. Duardi, 384 F. Supp. 861 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (requiring government to submit
all policy guidelines used and all evidence intended to be used to prove dangerousness).
See also CAL. RuLEs OF CouRT 437(c) (requiring "general description" of evidence).
311 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 921.141(5)-(6) (West Supp. 1979) (setting forth general
aggravating and mitigating circumstances applicable to all cases), upheld, Proffit v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934, 939-40 (Tex. Crim. App.
1975) (setting forth a set of factors to be considered together with others by the jury),
aff'd., 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
3 E.g., Reed v. State, 500 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
Specificity is also more feasible. See Note, supra note 233, at 383 n.140.
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way, a particularized notice requirement may be less practi-
cal.3°9 Such sentencing factors are closer to the discretionary
model, although the discretion is structured-and the avail-
ability of the published list of potentially applicable factors
gives the defendant considerably more notice than the discre-
tionary model would.
4. The Due Process Advantages of Determinate Sentencing
As counterweights to these due process arguments against
determinate sentencing, there are many ways in which deter-
minate sentencing provides greater due process protection to
criminal defendants than the discretionary method. First and
foremost, determinate sentencing is likely to decrease arbitrary
disparity. Since the due process clause prohibits invidious dis-
crimination, this decrease can be viewed as a significant due
process advantage." ' Secondly, the notice provided by determi-
nate sentencing, even when the notice comes in the form of a
list of aggravating or mitigating criteria, is greatly superior to
that available in traditional sentencing. Under the discretion-
ary model the possibilities are literally infinite and guessing at
the thinking of the judge or jury is a real and important goal.
3
11
Finally, determinate sentencing will tend to focus the judge
away from inappropriate criteria. There is strong evidence that
sentencing without structured guidelines results in the unin-
tended consideration of such factors as race, lifestyle and asser-
tion of constitutional rights.312 Even conscientious sentencers
are probably affected by these improper factors more than they
realize.
Thus even if there are disadvantages to structured discre-
"I For example, specifying all factors and all evidence relevant to a "pattern of
violence" would produce a lengthy document. However, that is what appears to be
required by CAL. RuLEs OF CouRT 437. The requirement applies to mitigation as well
as to aggravation-i.e., to the defense as well as the prosecution.
3,0 See L. TRmn, AMmcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 992, 1144-46 (1978).
" "Because of the resulting diffuse nature of issues at sentencing [under the
discretionary model], counsel has no way of crystallizing the arguments that would
best serve his client." Note, supra note 233, at 363. See also Crump, The Function and
Limits of Prosecution Jury Argument, 28 Sw. L. J. 505, 528-31 (1974) (argument on
sentencing tends to be "standardized," "hollow," "illogical" and "emotional," partly
because of "inadequate instructions to the jury").




tion in sentencing, their existence should not end the due pro-
cess inquiry. It may be profitable to ask whether the due pro-
cess advantages in terms of reduction of the effect of inappro-
priate matter, reduction of discrimination and provision of bet-
ter notice significantly outweigh the due process disadvan-
tages. A few decisions upholding sentence guidelines have fol-
lowed this "balancing" analysis. 33 These decisions have con-
cerned systems providing relatively loose control of discretion,
and the upholding of such systems may indicate that a guide-
line system or a presumptive system with broad discretion for
departure will be more likely to survive due process challenges
than a more rigid model.
C. Other Constitutional Doctrines
Although the most complex constitutional limitations on
determinate sentencing are those arising under the due process
clause, the cruel and unusual punishment provision34 may also
be relevant. The death penalty decisions, '5 which indicate that
haphazard sentencing may be a violation of this provision,
seem a powerful argument in favor of sentence guidelines.3 16
But the cruel and unusual punishment clause has also been
construed to prohibit disproportionate sentences, 317 as well as
"I E.g., United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160, 1171 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Stewart, 531 F.2d 326, 335-37 (6th Cir. 1976) (dangerous special offender
cases).
" See generally Crump, The Prohibition on Cruel and Unusual Punishments and
Its Application in Texas, in CONsTrrUioNAL LAw IN TEXAS 4-1 (National College of
District Attorneys 1977).
"I E.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (death penalty); but see Rummel
v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1978) (habitual criminal statute unconstitutional as
applied), reu'd, 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
"' See note 5 supra and accompanying text for authorities cited on constitutional
necessities of sentencing guidelines.
Determinate sentencing guidelines themselves could produce haphazard results.
For example, it has been argued that California's law may mean that less serious
offenders will serve more time in some cases. Cassou & Taugher, supra note 11, at 30,
McGee, supra note 9, at 4. Thus the "haphazard distribution" argument could be
asserted against determinate sentencing, as well as in favor of it. This sort of reasoning
was used to strike down the Ohio death penalty statute (a type of determinate sentenc-
ing law) in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
"I In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921 (Cal. 1972). See also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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certain kinds" 8 of mandatory sentencing."9 In Rummel v.
Estelle,320 the Fifth Circuit used these doctrines to hold the
Texas habitual criminal statute,32 ' which it construed as re-
quiring a sentence of life imprisonment322 upon proof of two
sequential prior felony convictions, 31 to be constitutional on its
face 324 but unconstitutional as applied to the particular defen-
dant before it.25 Though the holding was reversed by the court
en banc, the implication of decisions such as Rummel for deter-
minate sentencing is that the court must have an escape valve
to avoid disproportionate dispositions.2 Both the California
3,8 Sentencing which does not allow consideration of relevant mitigating factors is
particularly suspect. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
3,9 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
568 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
322 TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974). The provision under
which Rummel was sentenced was an earlier codification with wording that differed
slightly but not materially. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 63 (Vernon 1925).
3" The court so interpreted the statute on the basis of its literal wording. It has
long been construed, however, as allowing the trial court to impose a lesser sentence
by the device of "failing to find" one of the prior convictions. See note 19 supra and
accompanying text for their discussions of habitual criminal statutes.
3 The mere fact of two prior felony convictions is not enough. The prosecution
must prove that the second offense followed the first conviction; in other words, the
sequence must be: crime, conviction; crime, conviction; crime, conviction. TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974).
32, This holding was mandated by Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, reh. denied, 386
U.S. 969 (1967).
3 The court applied four "objective" factors: the "nature of the crimes"; the
"legislative objective"; a comparison "with the punishment accorded other crimes"
under the law of the same state; and a comparison with the "sentence imposed in other
jurisdictions for similar offenses." 568 F.2d at 1197-99. The factors were borrowed from
the opinion in Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983
(1974).
126 However, the required nature and coverage of such an escape valve is unclear
because, as the dissent of Judge Thornberry in Rummel points out, the four
"objective" factors used by the majority are not objective at all. 568 F.2d at 1201 n.3.
The dissent notes that the four-part test has not been applied consistently in the past,
citing Griffin v. Warden, 517 F.2d 756 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 990 (1975)
(three property crimes characterized as "serious" and as having "potential for vio-
lence") and Wood v. South Carolina, 483 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1973) (refusal to apply
four-part test to five-year sentence for obscene telephone call). 568 F.2d at 1201
(Thornberry, J., dissenting). The result of Rummel "will surely be an attack on the
habitual offender statute in every instance. . . . [NIothing in the court's opinion in-
forms state prosecutors, courts, or legislatures of the possible limits of error." Id. at
1202. On rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit held that the Texas habitual criminal
statute does not violate the eighth amendment, although some criminal sentences may
be so disproportionate as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 587 F.2d 651
(5th Cir. 1978).
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Act and the Federal Dangerous Special Offender Statute, for
example, contain provisions designed to accomplish this re-
sult."7 The escape valve itself may be subject to criticism in
that it allows inequality to re-enter the system 328 or is unduly
vague, 329 but its inclusion is an improvement over both manda-
tory sentencing and unguided discretion.
The multiple jeopardy provision is another consideration
in the drafting of a determinate sentencing statute. There are
those who have insisted, with logic, 30 that the prosecution as
well as the defense should have the right to appeal an unlaw-
fully assessed sentence, 331 but the decisions do not make the
constitutionality of such a practice clear. In United States v.
Sisson,3 1 for example, the Supreme Court stated that an appel-
late court could not reform an arrest of judgment it had held
erroneous as a matter of law. But other decisions imply that
this result may not be applicable to sentencing decisions,3 3 and
some appellate courts have simply assumed the power to in-
crease sentences on appeal. 34 An additional problem may be
s CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1(g) (West Supp. 1979) (allowing striking of punish-
ments for enhancements); 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1970) (confining sentence to a term
"not disproportionate" to that for the base offense).
"I See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 563. California has catalogued circumstances
in mitigation to guide the decision for precisely this reason. CAL. RULES OF COURT 423,
Comment.
12 Such an attack was asserted and rejected in United States v. Stewart, 531 F.2d
326, 330, 337 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976).
-11- Thus, for example, the Supreme Court has indicated that a jury hearing a
capital case must be given all relevant evidence as to "why a death sentence should
be imposed" as well as to "why it should not be imposed." Jurek v. Texas. 428 U.S.
262, 271 (1976) (emphasis added).
"I E.g., L. WLKNs, supra note 16, at 2. Jeopardy questions can conceivably arise
from resentencing provisions allowing the trial court to recall the defendant, and from
like procedures, as well as from appeal. See note 86 supra for a description of resentenc-
ing procedures in California.
32 399 U.S. 267 (1969).
m E.g., in Colton v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972), the Supreme Court
held that a de novo trial in a higher court upon defendant's appeal could constitution-
ally result in a higher sentence, and in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973),
the Court held that a harsher sentence could be imposed at retrial by the jury.
I- The circuit courts have generally assumed, without deciding, that the rein-
statement of dangerous special offender sentencing struck down by a district court is
constitutional. E.g., United States v. Ilacqua, 562 F.2d 399, 402 (6th Cir. 1977), (vaca-
tion of sentence and remand for consideration of enhancement); United States v.
Stewart, 531 F.2d 326 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 347 (1976) (case remanded for
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posed by the collateral estoppel doctrine of Ashe v. Swenson, "
which holds that a fact cannot be redetermined adversely to
the accused. A finding of fact pertaining to the defendant as
distinguished from the crime, such as a finding that an offender
has not exhibited a "pattern of violence, 336 probably cannot be
redetermined by another court considering another charge that
arose about the same time;37 likewise, it would appear that fact
findings on sentence may not be redetermined adversely to the
accused on appeal. Difficulties will probably arise with this
concept since most sentencing issues will be mixed questions
of fact and law, and eventually the collateral estoppel doctrine
may have to be adapted to fit the new problem of determinate
sentencing.
38
The advent of determinate sentencing has also created
new arguments relating to the right to jury trial. The Constitu-
tion does not appear to create any such right at the sentencing
stage, 39 and jury sentencing has been widely criticized as both
inaccurate34  and inconsistent; 31 nevertheless, some jurisdic-
possible higher sentencing). See also United States v. Denson, - F.2d - (5th Cir.
1979) (sentence found illegal; cause remanded for resentencing) (en banc).
397 U.S. 436 (1970).
131 A "pattern of violence" is an ingredient of one of the aggravating circumstances
set forth in CAL. RULES OF COURT 421.
3 For example, prosecutors in the Harris County (Houston) District Attorney's
Office decided that trial of a second capital case against a defendant whose first trial
ended in a life sentence because of jury fact findings pertaining to the offender could
result in no higher sentence than life imprisonment, and they consequently declined
to try the second case. Interview with Ted Busch, Assistant District Attorney of Harris
County, Texas, in Houston, Texas (March 15, 1977) (approximate date).
" Other jeopardy arguments could, of course, be constructed. For example, it
might be argued that the use of a circumstance more than once to increase a sentence
would create jeopardy problems. The issue was dealt with in Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S.
728 (1948), which held that enhanced sentencing based upon prior convictions did not
constitute multiple punishment or violate the jeopardy clause. See also Oyler v. Boles,
368 U.S. 448 (1962). Multiple use of other kinds of factors may pose different questions.
"I E.g., Uelmen, supra note 8, at 746-47. Professor Uelmen observes that the
decisions of the Supreme Court appear to exclude the argument. Proffit v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242 (1976) (judge sentencing in death penalty case constitutional); McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (jury trial not required in juvenile proceedings).
311 "[T]he jury is as totally unequipped to fashion a proper sentence as the twelve
would be to perform brain surgery on the poor soul." Chamberlain, A New Look at
Sentencing from a Court that Doesn't Exist, 37 TEx. B.J. 235, 236 (1974). See also
ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 1.1 (1968).
"I "Sentencing by a distinct jury at each trial is necessarily a guarantee of signifi-
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tions have statutes or constitutional provisions respecting jury
sentencing,342 and it may be, therefore, in these states, that
sentence guidelines will have to be reconciled with the right to
trial by jury. At first blush, the combination seems impossible.
However, juries already perform certain kinds of determinate
sentencing functions;34 3 in death penalty cases, for instance,
they render both specific factual decisions and general, discre-
tionary verdicts controlling sentence, " and in habitual crimi-
nal prosecutions they render fact findings concerning the de-
fendant's prior criminal record. 45 These examples raise the
possibility that juries might make fact findings in a determi-
nate sentencing scheme or that they might render a general
verdict controlled by instructions (or even by a presumptive
sentence with guidelines for departure). The drafting of jury
charges for such a system could be a formidable task; it could
require extensive instructions 346 and induce reversals based on
minute differences in wording. But simpler instructions, such
as advising the jury of permissible considerations in sentenc-
ing347 or of general aggravating and mitigating factors,348 could
cant disparity between sentences." ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTER-
NATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 1.1, Comment (1968).
"I E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.410 (Vernon 1953) (repealed, effective Jan. 1, 1979);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2310 (1975); TEx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 37.07(2)(b) (Vernon
1966). See generally S. RUBIN, supra note 161, at 145 n.78 (1973).
31 As Justice Stewart observed in Gregg v. Georgia, "while some have suggested
that standards to guide a capital jury's sentencing deliberations are impossible to
formulate, the fact is that such standards have been developed." 428 U.S. at 193
(emphasis added).
3,, For statutes requiring determination of specific factors, see FLA. STAT. ANN. §
921.141(5)-(6) (Supp. 1979) (aggravating and mitigating circumstances); GA. CODE
ANN. § 27-2534.1(c) (1978) (aggravating circumstances); TEx. CODE CaM. PROC. ANN.
art. 37.071 (Vernon 1979) (defendant's deliberateness, probable future violence and
provocation). As to discretionary decisions, the Georgia statute requires a decision
between life and death when an aggravating circumstance is found, the Florida statute
requires a balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors and the Texas decisions
allow a wide variety of factors to be weighed as part of the process of answering the
determinative questions.
"I E.g., Gardner v. State, 486 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
311 See Moore, Texas' "Jury in a Vacuum" System Leaves Jurors Disappointed,
Confused, Houston Chronicle, July 27, 1975 § 2, at 4, col. 1.
"I For example, a jury might be told that, for certain kinds of crimes, probation
should be restricted to unusual cases, perhaps with guidelines as to the existence of
an unusual case. This is the sort of guidance given by CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(d) (West
Supp. 1979) and CAL. RULES OF COURT 418. Likewise, for certain other offenses, a jury
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68
be useful. Such a system could change the jury from the hap-
hazard sentencer it is today349 to a rational and consistent en-
tity. However, the risks are also great, and the introduction of
determinate sentencing into a jury system ought to proceed on
a piecemeal basis.
These problems are a few of the potential constitutional
difficulties for determinate sentencing. Unfortunately, it ap-
pears that the type of system most likely to withstand constitu-
tional attack-a system with elaborate protections-may lack
the flexibility or administrative feasibility necessary for a
workable scheme. However, it is easy to exaggerate the impor-
tance of constitutional problems. The Federal Dangerous Spe-
cial Offender Statute was carefully planned to avoid unconsti-
tutionality, and it has withstood nearly all constitutional at-
tacks to date.350 The legislative debate over the California Act,
ironically, was devoid of constitutional arguments, and consti-
tutional attacks upon it have thus far been few and unsuccess-
ful."' Thus, in the final analysis, administrative difficulties
may loom as the most formidable obstacles to determinate
sentencing.
might be told of a presumption in favor of probation where the defendant has no prior
convictions. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(a) (West Supp. 1979).
11 Modern penal codes, for example, often begin with declarations of purpose.
E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West Supp. 1979); CAL. RuLns oF CoUir 410;
TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.02 (Vernon 1974). If such declarations serve to guide
lawyers and judges, juries might benefit equally from being told the object of their task.
Attorneys are likely to allude to these objectives in argument, but in an emotional and
partisan way. See Crump, supra note 311 at 528-39. This kind of instruction can
probably be given by the court without new legislation, since the declaration of pur-
poses is already in the penal code in many states.
With enabling legislation, jurors might be given lists of aggravating or mitigating
factors (again, jurors presumably need the guidance even more than judges). Or they
might be given better descriptions of sentencing alternatives. Sentencing juries in
many places are given no information concerning probation or parole. Id.
"I' For a persuasive argument against standardless jury discretion in another con-
text, see Brawner v. United States, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) in which the court
rejects instructions telling jurors to acquit on basis of insanity if defendant could not
"justly be held responsible".
"I See notes 252-55 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Federal
Dangerous Special Offender Statute.
' Interview with Raymond I. Parnas, Professor of Law, University of California,
Davis, and Counsel to the California Select Committee on Penal Institutions in Davis,
California (Oct. 4, 1978) (conducted by telephone from Houston). For an example of a
constitutional challenge, see People v. Superior Court, 144 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1978).
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IV. PROBLEMS OF ADMINISTRATION
If the philosophical and constitutional problems of sen-
tence guidelines can be solved, there remains the problem of
making the system work as a practical matter. Determinate
sentencing presents questions regarding cost, complexity,
delay, plea bargaining and responsiveness to change.
A. Complexity and Confusion
There is no question that some determinate systems make
sentencing a more complicated process. The California system,
for instance, with its four categories of sentences, its three base
sentences for each, its general enhancements and its specific
enhancements, has prompted one commentator to refer to it as
"new math." 35 - The comparison may be justified. There are
enhancements under the California law, for example, that re-
quire the application of as many as five separate criteria, some
of which are cross-referenced to other statutory provisions that
also contain multiple criteria. 3 3 New terminology in the Act
introduces subtle but important distinctions: for instance, if an
enhancement is disregarded by the court, it makes a difference
whether it is "stayed" or "struck." 34 Determination of the total
352 Oppenheim, Computing a Determinate Sentence .. . New Math Hits the
Courts, 51 CAL. ST. B. J. 604 (1976).
For an even franker evaluation, see Bedsworth, The Screendoor Repairman and
Certified Criminal Law Specialist's Examination, 53 CAL. ST. B. J. 186, 187 (1978).
Mr. Bedsworth's "examination" contains the following question:
24.) Which of the following is the funniest?
A) the infield fly rule




Mr. Bedsworth's "key" gives the correct answer as "B, although you get part credit
for E, which is really indistinguishable from B." Id. at 189.
E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(a) (West Supp. 1979). This section imposes a
three-year enhancement if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the present
offense is a violent felony listed in § 667.5(c); (2) the defendant has a prior conviction
for a listed violent felony; (3) the defendant served a separate prison term for the prior
conviction; (4) the prior conviction is pleaded and proved; and (5) the prior conviction
has not been superseded by a ten-year period (the "washout" period) during which the
defendant remained free of imprisonment or of offenses resulting in conviction. See
Cassou & Taugher, supra note 11, at 48.
' "Staying" the enhancement means that it is found to be valid but that the
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length of consecutive sentences is another example of Califor-
nia's new math: it involves an algebraic equation with more
potential calculations355 than are required to compute the alter-
native maximum marital deduction in a community-separate
estate for tax purposes.3 15 The Act also contains a few impor-
tant internal contradictions. For instance, it refers at one point
to factors in aggravation or mitigation "of the crime," a phrase
that has already required an appellate court to answer the
question whether factors peculiar to the offender are intended
sentence will not be enhanced. "Striking" the enhancement means that it is invalida-
ted. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1(c) (West Supp. 1979); see Cassou & Taugher, supra note
11, at 41. The difference can become important if, for example, the enhancement
concerns use of a firearm; it can affect eligibility for probation in both present and
future cases. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(d) (West Supp. 1979).
.. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1 (West Supp. 1979).
The calculation of a consecutive term begins with the fixing of the principal term,
which is the longest single term for any offense of which the defendant stands convicted
for consecutive sentencing. Then, increments of one-third the middle base term of any
other offenses (or of enhancements for listed violent felonies), called subordinate
terms, may be added. Cassou and Taugher give the following calculation for the sen-
tence of a defendant convicted of both second-degree murder and robbery with great
bodily injury in separate courses of conduct:
6+ [(/3 X3) (/3 X3)] = 8years
In this calculation, the principal term is six years (the presumptive middle term for
second-degree murder); the first subordinate term is one-third the three-year middle
term for robbery; and the second subordinate term is one-third the enhancement for
great bodily injury. Cassou & Taugher, supra note 11, at 57 n.380.
Actually, however, the algebra is only the end result, coming into play after the
judge "has considered the multiple punishment aspects of Penal Code Section 654 and
any merger problems under Penal Code Section 669, and has chosen or been compelled
to sentence consecutively. . . ." Id. at 53. As for the multiple punishment law in
California, Cassou and Taugher predict, "It seems probable that the doctrine will
break down under the determinate sentence law. . . ." Id. at 56.
It is worth adding that many persons, with considerable justification, may take
exception to an eight-year maximum sentence for a defendant who has committed a
murder and, in a separate incident, has caused serious bodily injury to another victim
in the course of robbing him.
3 The "minimax" marital deduction is given by
A - [B - (C - D)],
where A is $250,000, B is the amount of community property in the gross estate, C is
the amount of allowable deductions under I.R.C. §§ 2053-2054 and D is the amount of
such deductions allocable to separate property. I.R.C. § 2056. See generally Johanson,
Marital Deduction Planning After the Tax Reform Act of 1976, ADvANcED ESTATE
PLANNING AND PROBATE COURSE D-4 (State Bar of Texas ed. 1978). The maximum
marital deduction is the larger of this amount or half the adjusted gross estate. Id. at
D-2.
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to be included.57 In the wake of this confusion, attorneys (in-
cluding the statute's drafters themselves) have evolved a color-
ful jargon to help them cope, including such terms as
"washout,""3  "bad dude hearings ' 58 and "the dirty eight. '360
While complexity of this degree may be tolerable in a stat-
ute governing estate taxes, it seems less tolerable as a means
of divining the lengths of prison sentences. Unless carefully
written, a law of this sort might require a level of expertise that
some criminal practitioners may not be able to achieve, and it
might make criminal law even more than before a field of which
the successful general practitioner will feel justified in washing
his hands. Indeed, the California Act presents such an array of
principles that they are difficult to keep straight even if one
understands them, and hence it may lead to miscalculated
sentences. Unless carefully administered, it may lengthen de-
lays in sentencing and review, and it will undoubtedly create
unintended loopholes.3 16 A pessimistic observer might even re-
'- CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (West Supp. 1979). The phrase has been interpreted
by the California Judicial Council to include facts relating to the offender (such as
absence of criminal record), but its legislative history seems to indicate otherwise.
Compare CAL. RuLEs or CoURT 421, 423 with Cassou & Taugher, supra note 11, at 40-
41. An appellate court followed the Council's interpretation of the matter in People v.
Schmidt, 146 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1978).
3 The washout period is the time of freedom from incarceration for offenses
resulting in felony conviction that is sufficient to avoid enhancement for prior convic-
tions. See note 331 supra for the "washout" period in CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(a) (West
Supp. 1979). See also Cassou & Taugher, supra note 11, at 49-53.
' This colloquialism is a consequence of the retroactivity provisions of the Cali-
fornia law. Inmates who were sentenced before its effective date are nevertheless to be
released in accordance with the new Act. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.2(a) (West Supp.
1979). But under certain circumstances, the Community Ralease Board may impose
an increased term on a convict. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.2(b). In order to do so, the
Board must hold what is called a serious offender (or "bad dude") hearing. Cassou &
Taugher, supra note 11, at 94 n.625.
0 This phrase refers to the listed violent felonies of CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(c)
(West Supp. 1979). See note 331 supra for an explanation of the role these felonies play
in California's enhancement system. Cassou & Taugher, supra note 11, at 48 n.320. It
is perhaps a fitting anomaly that the felonies referred to are more than eight in number
(and also that some are not violent).
For example, the high-loss enhancement, CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.6 (West
Supp. 1979), specifically excludes arson (and related burning offenses), robbery and
burglary. Furthermore, it is written so as to exclude, apparently, many other property
offenses (e.g., forgery). Thus, if a person is convicted of stealing or destroying valuable
property other than by burning it, he is liable to a one- (or two-) year enhancement,
but if he is convicted of burning the same property or of forging documents leading to
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gard it as conceivable that a strict determinate sentencing re-
gime might product new disparities that are merely different
in distribution from the ones of the past, though this conclusion
does not seem applicable to the California statute.
B. Distortion of the Legislative Intent
Actually, the complexity of a strict determinate sentenc-
ing law is not only in the array of applicable principles; it is in
what each of them means. For example, when a determinate
sentencing law provides (as California's does) for an enhanced
sentence if the offender personally "possesses" a "firearm"
during an offense, what does it mean?362 If the firearm is acces-
sible during a part of the offense, is that sufficient?1 3 Other
problems are raised when several provisions are construed to-
gether. For example, the use of a firearm in California supports
imposition of an enhancement, 64 and a "particularly vulnera-
ble" victim is a factor in aggravation 365-but if both increments
are imposed, might it not be possible to argue in a given case
that without the firearm the victim would not have been vul-
its acquisition he may not be. See Oppenheim, supra note 65, at 657 n.25. Another
anomaly is presented by the list of violent felonies that may create three-year enhance-
ments. The list includes the nonviolent offense of "lewd conduct" with a child, but it
excludes sodomy or oral copulation with the same child, and it also excludes assault
with a deadly weapon, assault with intent to commit murder, and attempted murder.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.&(c) (West Supp. 1979); see Cassou & Taugher, supra note 11,
at 52.
.8 CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022(b) (West Supp. 1979); see also Cassou & Taugher,
supra note 11, at 43 n.285. For appellate decisions dealing with ambiguities in the
"arming" and "use" clauses and in their imposition, see People v. Roberson, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 777 (1978); People v. Hunt, 568 P.2d 376 (Cal. 1977).
36 For an example of particularly dubious reasoning by a court in construing
statutory language similar to that construed in Roberson and Hunt, see Blount v.
State, 542 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). Blount's victim testified that she
submitted to his raping her after a co-defendant procured a knife and that the men
made clear that they would kill her if she reported the crime. The court concluded from
these facts that "[n]o weapons were used" and "no . . . threats" were made. A
dissent pointed out that it would have been difficult to communicate a threat more
effectively to the victim because she was a deaf-mute, but the majority's cryptic
response was that this argument was "a dissent without reason."
U4 See note 70 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of California's en-
hancement system.
3 See note 254 supra and accompanying text for Professor Uelmen's consideration
of the "vulnerable" victim. Uelmen, supra note 8, at 735-36.
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nerable and that the single factor of firearm use has thus been
used twice to increase the sentence-an increase that would be
in violation of the limitations of the Act?366 These ambiguities
are the sort that are unavoidable even in a well-drafted statute,
but a narrow-discretion determinate sentencing law is likely to
contain an uncommon number of them.367 Words and phrases
of the most apparent simplicity may find their way into dis-
putes at the appellate level, and reasonable decisions by prose-
cutors or judges may create wholesale miscarriages of justice
when hindsight shows them to have been wrong.38
Cases decided under the Federal Dangerous Special Of-
fender Statute are an example of the haphazard results that a
jurisprudence based on such semantics may produce. One fed-
eral court, for instance, has construed fhe Dangerous Special
Offender Statute to mean that indictable offenses could not be
considered in deciding whether an offender was "dangerous,"
a conclusion that led to the anomalous result that only inno-
cent conduct could be used to aggravate the sentence. 69 An-
other district judge concluded, by application of a mathemati-
cal formula invented by him for the occasion, that a ten-year
base sentence could not be enhanced by more than one day
"' See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (West Supp. 1979); cf. People v. Roberson, 146
Cal. Rptr. 777 (1978) (trial court could not use firearm and prior conviction for both
aggravation and enhancement; however, court could use prior conviction for enhance-
ment and also use other convictions to support "pattern of violence" aggravation).
" For example, it has been predicted that the word term (as in base term) "will
likely lead to litigation." Cassou & Taugher, supra note 11, at 38 n.179.
Cf. People v. Caudillo, 580 P.2d 274, (Cal. 1978) (appellate construction of "great
bodily injury"); People v. Hunt, 568 P.2d 376 (Cal. 1978) (effect of failure to recite
findings on enhancement); People v. Schmidt, 146 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1977) (appellate
construction of "particularly vulnerable").
- For example, in Reynolds v. State, 547 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), the
court held that a theft indictment containing the word "unlawfully" rather than
"without the owner's effective consent" was fundamentally defective, though the in-
dictment tracked the relevant statute which defined unlawfulness as meaning
"without the owner's effective consent." Reynolds involved a construction of Tax.
PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 31.03(d)(4)(B) (Vernon 1974), and was rendered three years
after the code had taken effect. The effect of Reynolds was to void all theft convictions
(including plea-bargained convictions) in Harris County (Houston), Texas, over that
three-year period. Broad changes in criminal law inevitably produce some results of
this sort.
' United States v. Duardi, 384 F. Supp. 874, 883 (W.D. Mo. 1974), affd on other
grounds, 514 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1975). Contra, e.g., United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d
1160, 1175-76 (5th Cir. 1977).
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without making the total sentence "disproportionate;" hence
he assessed an "enhanced" sentence of ten years and one day
rather than ten years.30 Each of these decisions was rendered
in the course of construing a statute less ambiguous than the
California Act. A decade or two of appellate construction
might, under a worst case hypothesis, make a narrow discretion
statute unrecognizable to the legislators who drafted it; or to
put it another way, it may take a decade or more before it is
clear what the Act really means. 71 The task of making sense
at the appellate level of a field so fraught with philosophical
inconsistencies as sentencing may be as difficult in its own way
as making sense of search and seizure, school desegregation or
capital punishment. 2
There are, of course, less complicated determinate sen-
tencing plans. A presumptive system allowing the judge a fair
degree of discretion to deviate from the prescribed sentence
may be superior to the narrow-discretion model in terms of the
complexity factor. General definition of aggravating and miti-
gating factors, such as is contained in the Indiana statute,
37 3
might be used to structure the remaining discretion in a pre-
370 United States v. Neary, 552 F.2d 1184 (7th Cir. 1977). The court stated, "We
do not regard similar exact calculation necessary for legitimate implementation of the
statute." Id. at 1191 n.4.
17, "[T]he appellate review process is quite time-consuming, and a common law
of sentencing may well take several decades to develop." L. WxIuNS, supra note 16,
at 2.
I" As for search and seizure, years of appellate litigation have created a situation
in which "[a] great deal of difficulty arises in applying the many guidelines to a
particular set of facts . . . . [T]he decisions dealing with search and seizure appear
to be in a constant state of flux." Rawitscher & Carnahan, Search and Seizure, in
ADVANCED CRIMINAL LAW COURSE K-1 (State Bar of Texas ed. 1978). In the capital
punishment area, no statement expresses the confusion that has been produced by the
Supreme Court's decisions better than those of State v. Winkle, 528 P.2d 467, 468
(Utah 1974). The Utah court referred to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1979, with
the epithet "expletive deleted," and it pointedly observed: "[T]he U.S. Supreme
Court (with its nine separate opinions) has created the confusion; now let it lead this
state and the others out of this morass." 528 P.2d at 468. Many years and a dozen major
opinions later, in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), the Court recognized that clear
guidelines were still wanting. As to school desegregation decisions, see L. GRAGLIA,
DISASTER By DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISIONS ON RACE AND THE ScHooLS (1975).
Sentencing is a matter of complexity and conflicting values similar to those of
these three areas, and appellate jurisprudence on the subject may have similar results.
"I See notes 102-06 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Indiana
statute.
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sumptive system without undue complexity. Of course, where
something is gained, something else is often lost; a broad pre-
sumptive system may not produce results as consistent as a
narrow-discretion system.
C. Cost
Some increase in cost is probably an unavoidable conse-
quence of the adoption of a determinate system. What such a
system seeks is more specific attention to sentencing decisions,
and it follows that the goal will not be reached without commit-
ment of resources. For some kinds of systems, the cost may be
modest. But for a complex scheme, particularly if steps are
taken to maximize uniformity through appeals or statements
of reasons and to minimize consequences such as plea bargain-
ing, the increased cost may be significant.
Advocates of non-binding guidelines have pointed out that
the calculation necessary for implementation takes only a few
minutes per sentence and can be delegated to a clerkY.4 This
claim exaggerates the simplicity of the guideline approach,
since counsel for both sides will need to verify the calculation,
and it neglects the fact-finding that will be necessary before
guidelines can be applied.7 5 Thus even the use of non-binding
guidelines will probably produce some increase in cost. How-
ever, it is reasonable to hope that the increase will be small.
The cost of a narrow-discretion system, on the other hand,
would be far more significant in the absence of plea bargaining
over sentences. A judge would have to receive evidence directed
at a number of specific, additional issues in an adversary hear-
ing for every case." 6 The calculation would require extensive
data collection, testing of that data in a manner consistent with
' L. WiLKus, supra note 16, at 24-25.
' See note 227 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the importance
of factfinding in the sentencing process.
311 While ten to fifteen percent of California defendants now avail them-
selves of all of the procedural rights of a trial, all convicted defendants are
ultimately subject to the sentencing process, including the eighty-five to
ninety percent who plead guilty. . . . [W]e face the possibility of a vast
multiplication of the commitment of judicial resources to what is now a
rather routine and expeditious process.
Uelmen, supra note 8, at 727.
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due process, hearing of adversary argument and appeal-in
short, an additional adversary hearing for every case. Such a
system might require a number of judges, prosecutors and de-
fenders many times that of today, preparation of records for
appeal in many cases that are not now appealed, additional
probation officers to prepare additional and better presentence
reports, additional court reporters and even additional storage
facilities to maintain the additional records that would be nec-
essary.
One may argue, with considerable justification, that addi-
tional commitment to this neglected process of sentencing is
desirable even at great expense. As James Q. Wilson has said,
"[M]ost of the time, for most of the cases in our busier courts,
the important decisions concern the sentence, not conviction or
acquittal." 7 But whether the enormous commitment that may
be required for a narrow-discretion system is attainable or de-
sirable in a time of strained resources is another question. The
inevitable argument that criminal justice is priceless and the
cost irrelevant"7 fails to consider that there are only two sources
from which funds can come: increased taxation, which is not
likely in the near future, or decreases in other governmental
expenditures. An expensive sentencing system, in other words,
may be purchased by the loss of -hospitals, schools, mosquito
control or police salaries. Presumptive or guideline sentencing
would, it seems, produce more consistency for the dollar,
though it might not produce as high a level of consistency as a
more definite system.
... J. WLSON, supra note 21, at 182.
'71 For example, Professor Alschuler, in referring to plea bargaining, concludes: "I
am not at all persuaded that our society is too impoverished to give its criminal
defendants their day in court." Alschuler, supra note 7, at 565. This kind of analysis
fails to consider the allocation of resources between criminal trials and other worth-
while endeavors.
Alschuler also argues that other, poorer nations do not plea bargain. Id. But other
countries may not have a jury trial system so elaborate as ours, may use government
terror to control crime, or may tolerate crime rates we would regard as unacceptable;
furthermore, plea bargaining may be present, though less visible, in countries that
purport not to use it. None of these arguments justifies a complete refusal to restrict
plea bargaining, but they are arguments in favor of keeping costs firmly in mind.
[Vol. 68
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D. Effects on the Nature and Frequency of Plea Bargaining
No system for reform in sentencing should be undertaken
without consideration of its effects on plea bargaining.
39
Changes in the factors that induce plea bargains automatically
cause changes in the method and frequency of bargaining, for
good or for ill. In the case of determinate sentencing, the effects
depend upon practices already in existence and upon the type
of discretion control adopted. A few jurisdictions have coupled
sentence-guideline systems with prohibitions upon plea bar-
gaining, but in most such systems, bargaining remains and
must be dealt with.
1. Charge Bargaining and Sentence Bargaining
The subjects of plea bargains are usually either charges or
sentences. In charge bargaining, the prosecution makes conces-
sions by abandoning charges, enhancements or counts that
could otherwise make the sentence more severe. 8 Sentence
bargaining, on the other hand, involves a promise to recom-
mend (or not to oppose) a specific sentence, with "or without
charge reduction.3"' Sentence bargaining has the arguable dis-
advantage of shifting to the attorneys greater discretion than
would charge bargaining, but charge bargaining has the argua-
ble disadvantage of distortion, since it changes the nature of
the conviction obtained.
The type of bargaining used is influenced by a number of
factors in the sentence structure. Sentence bargaining, for ex-
ample, depends upon the existence of relatively wide sentence
ranges, while charge bargaining depends upon a reasonably
continuous distribution of lesser included charges (or on a law
authorizing conviction for related offenses). Thus a jurisdiction
with comparatively few offenses, each of which carries wide
discretionary ranges, would be likely to produce less charge
bargaining than sentence bargaining. The nature and fre-
quency of bargaining is also influenced by other factors such as
"' See Dershowitz, Background Paper, in TwENTEm CENTURY FUND, supra note
27, at 81.




the caseload and resource balance of the jurisdiction, by the
power and respect customarily accorded the court, by laws at-
taching collateral consequences to particular dispositions and
by direct regulation under court rules or internal policies of a
district attorney's office.
If a given system, then, has broad sentence ranges and
indulges in frequent sentence bargaining, the introduction of
determinate sentencing-whether quasi-mandatory, presump-
tive or guideline-will narrow the discretionary range available
to attorneys in most cases and discourage the ordinary method
of bargaining."2 There will be pressure to switch to charge bar-
gaining, but this pressure will be checked by the limited availa-
bility of-lesser included offenses or enhancements that can be
abandoned,3s3 and the result will probably be a reduction in
plea bargaining."4 Texas is a good example of a jurisdiction
that might exhibit this effect. Current sentence ranges in Texas
are broad-they include ranges of five to ninety-nine years with
probation alternatives for a wide variety of common felon-
ies-and bargaining over both sentences and charges is in wide-
spread use.8 ' While lesser included offenses are generally avail-
able, their ranges overlap the probable sentence for higher of-
fenses, 8 and therefore any increase in charge bargaining pro-
duced by determinate sentencing would probably not offset the
decrease in sentence bargaining. Thus, if Texas were to narrow
sentencing discretion, the result might well be a decrease in
plea bargaining.
312 See TWENTIETH CENruRy FUND, supra note 27, at 26; DFINITE SENTENCING,
supra note 7, at 34-35.
But see TwNTlrwm CENTURY FUND, supra note 27, at 26.
:' DarsNrrE SENTENCING, supra note 7, at 34.
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 12.32 (Vernon 1974) sets forth this penalty for
first degree felonies, which include murder, aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping,
aggravated robbery, delivery of heroin and other offenses. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit.
3 §§ 19.02, 20.04, 21.03, 29.03; (Vernon 1974); TEx. CON. SUBS. Ac ANN. § 4.03 (Vernon
1974).
3m Each of the felonies named in note 385 supra contains a lesser-included offense
that is a felony of the second degree, carrying two to twenty years rather than five to
ninety-nine years. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.04 (Vernon 1974) (voluntary manslaugh-
ter); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20.03 (simple kidnapping); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §
21.02 (simple rape); Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02 (simple robbery); Tax. CON. SuBs.
ACT ANN. § 4.04 (Vernon 1974) (possession of heroin). The range of two years to twenty
years probably includes sentences for all but the most aggravated rapes, robberies or
heroin sales except those in which the accused is a repeat offender.
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If, on the other hand, a jurisdiction has relatively little
judicial discretion in sentencing ranges and adopts a determi-
nate sentencing scheme with a distribution of possible disposi-
tions that is nearly continuous, the result may be an increase
in bargaining. Such a description seems, at least superficially,
to fit California.3 7 The indeterminate sentence left little room
for bargaining other than by charge reduction or probation; if
a defendant was sentenced to imprisonment, the length of time
he would serve was beyond the range of any agreement among
attorneys.3 18 The new determinate sentencing law increases
opportunities for the abandonment of enhancements and for
agreements concerning aggravation or mitigation. It therefore
increases the number of potential subjects for agreements be-
tween attorneys. But the question is more complicated than
this. Charge bargaining was frequent in California prior to the
adoption of determinate sentencing, and it required reduction
that distorted the nature of the conviction.3 89 The main factor
that might increase bargaining after the Uniform Determinate
Sentencing Act is the new existence of rational "middle
ground" sentences; thus even if bargaining frequency is in-
creased it may produce more rational dispositions than the
concessions that preceded the Act." Actually, the simultane-
ous narrowing of sentence ranges, together with the adoption
of probation guidelines, will probably keep bargaining from
increasing significantly if, indeed, it increases at all.
2. Articulation of Bargaining Concessions on the Record
Many determinate sentencing proposals require reasons
for deciding sentences to appear on the record. California's
system, for example, requires that affirmative findings be
made if a base term other than the middle term is to be as-
sessed, probation is to be ordered or enhancements are to be
2 See also Alschuler, supra note 7, at 570-73.
"' The Adult Authority acquired jurisdiction after conviction and hence was not
directly influenced by considerations relating to the forgoing of trial. See note 31 supra
for a discussion of the Adult Authority, California's parole board.
"I Alschuler, supra note 7, at 573.
311 "[A] presumptive-sentencing system . . . can make plea bargaining a more
rational and equitable process." TwEN=mTH CETuRY FuND, supra note 27, at 26.
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struck.9 ' If the reason for any of these actions is a plea bargain,
the record may be required to contain an affirmative finding
by the court that the bargain, when weighed with other evi-
dence, warrants the action.
3 92
This requirement will not by itself eliminate plea bargain-
ing, because the prosecution may be able to make concessions
by failing to allege or prove aggravation or enhancements and
the court may be disposed to find mitigation on less evidence
when there is a plea bargain. But the statement of reasons
requirement does seem likely to limit bargaining discretion in
some kinds of cases. The first checkpoint is the trial judge; he
must enter explicit findings to take certain kinds of actions. A
second checkpoint may be found in review by the Community
Release Board, and a third in the appellate courts. Finally,
some reduction of plea bargaining may come about in that the
prosecutor will-in some cases, but not all-have to make or
accede to specific statements on the record in order to make
bargaining concessions. Prosecutors may be expected to be as
reluctant as anyone else, if not more so, to go on the record with
factually incorrect statements.
Indeed, determinate sentencing seems likely to present
new constitutional challenges to the very institution of plea
bargaining. 393 Placing so much of the sentencing process on the
record, as California now does, may strip it of some of the
ambiguity that sustains it. Plea bargaining under determinate
sentencing statutes may ultimately be subjected to require-
ments that the court quantify the concession that foregoing a
trial will produce, 394 and even if that added knowledge does not
make plea bargaining less frequent, it may create a political or
judicial environment that will keep concessions within rational
and consistent limits. Of course, there are disadvantages to
31, CAL. RuLEs OF COuRT 443, Comment.
In CAL. RuLFs OF CouRT 440, for example, provides that even in the event of a plea
of guilty specifying the sentence, the court may approve that sentence only "provided
there is evidence or a factual stipulation in the record justifying that term and appro-
priate facts and reasons for imposing that term are set forth on the record."
3" See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 575 n.72.
3" Alschuler, supra note 7, at 575 n.72. See CAL. RuLFs OF CouRT 423(b)(3) (fact




such a prospect. It seems possible that sentence concessions
given a witness-a John Dean, for example-who has aided in
the conviction of confederates might be impractical under a
regime of determinate sentencing. A future Judge Sirica might
be unable to ferret out the truth through the threat of heavier
sentences, and a future Leon Jaworski might not be able to
reach up the conspiratorial ladder through the judicious use of
plea bargaining. While some limits on this sort of discretion
seem desirable, determinate sentencing should not be con-
strued to require us to sentence little fish in such a manner that
big ones get away.
3. The Balance of Bargaining Power
Some commentators have voiced concern that determinate
sentencing might enhance the bargaining strength of the prose-
cutor at the expense of the defense attorney. In particular,
Professor Alschuler sees in the new California law a scheme
whereby lazy prosecutors may have greater power to induce
guilty pleas from the defense so that they can go home early
on a pleasant afternoon. 95 This picture of raw prosecutorial
power is an important concern but appears to be overdrawn.2
The California system may or may not increase the fre-
quency or style of bargaining, but it does not seem likely to
shift the balance of power to the prosecutor. The prosecutor's
main bargaining chips concern reduction of sentence. The Cali-
fornia Determinate Sentencing Act does not increase the sever-
ity of sentences or the range of sentences; it reduces them, and
it requires findings by the court before major concessions can
be made. By contrast, the main bargaining chip of the defense
concerns savings of time and cost in the adjudicatory process.
Thus the California Act, if anything, brings about an increase
Alschuler, supra note 7, at 575 n.72.
For example, Professor Alschuler repeatedly refers to "prosecutorial plea bar-
gaining" as one of the disadvantages of determinate sentencing. Alschuler supra note
7, at 563. If this phrase is intended to communicate the notion that plea bargaining
involves prosecutors, it is tautologous. If it is intended as a qualifying descrip-
tion-that is, if it is an effort to say that there are some kinds of plea bargaining in
which prosecutors (but not defense attorneys) engage-it is misdirected. The addition
of "prosecutorial" overstates the argument because it implies the existence of a one-
sided, unchecked source of bargaining power.
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in the bargaining power of the defense because it vastly in-
creases the potential cost and time consumption of the adver-
sary process. The unspoken threat of a defense attorney holding
out for significant sentence concessions might be something
like the following:
I demand that enhancements be abandoned and that you use
whatever influence you have to assure that my client will be
sentenced to the minimum base term on a reduced charge. If
you do not accede to this demand, we will not only try the
case on guilt or innocence before a jury; we will also, as is our
right, require trial of all enhancements before the jury. In the
event of conviction for either the charge or a lesser-included
offense, if the enhancement is also found, we will marshall
evidence and arguments in favor of disregarding enhance-
ments, since the court must make a finding on that issue.
And we will, at the sentence hearing, introduce evidence
against every factor in aggravation and in favor of every fac-
tor in mitigation. We will appeal the case on each of these
issues after petitioning the Community Release Board for
reduction. Needless to say, we expect the proceedings to be
time-consuming and expensive; they will interfere, as much
as we can make them do so, with your ability to handle the,
rest of your docket as well as the court's.
The California Act as ultimately drafted was supported by
many prosecutors, 37 but in light of the increased power that it
gives to the defense, the reason does not seem to have been a
desire for additional prosecutorial power. Sufficient reason was
to be found in dissatisfaction with the indeterminate sentence,
dissatisfaction with sentence disparity and dissatisfaction with
a plea bargaining system that required distortion of the convic-
tion and sentence for prosecution concessions to be made at
all.
398
This is not to say that determinate sentencing might not
in some cases be structured so as to shift bargaining power to
the prosecutor. Habitual offender statutes allowing for manda-
tory life sentences are an example. If drafters of a statute wish
"I See Cassou & Taugher, supra note 11, at 15, 17.
311 See generally Bayley, supra note 112. Mr. Bayley is the prosecuting attorney
for King County (Seattle), Washington.
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to avoid this effect, they might give the trial judge discretion
to strike the enhancement, make the enhancement an upper
limit upon a range of sentence that can be added or decrease
the length of enhancements in relation to base sentences. But,
in addition, care should be taken to avoid increased costs in the
sentencing process that would enable the defense to force con-
cessions on the basis of cost alone. The concern should not be
confined, in other words, to the position of the prosecutor, but
should extend to the balance between prosecution and defense.
E. Changes in Sentencing Structure or Sentence Lengths
A determinate sentencing structure also requires consider-
ation of workable methods for change. Criteria and the method
of their expression, as well as the length of sentences, need to
be adaptable to the social conditions of the future.399 Some
models of determinate sentencing use the writing of opinions
by panels or appellate courts to enunciate changes. Others,
particularly guideline or presumptive systems, use statements
of reasons to provide the basis for new guidelines. 0 By provid-
ing for periodic review of reason statements and sentencing
statistics in a council or committee charged with responsibility
for enunciating new guidelines, a jurisdiction can build a cy-
bernetic effect into its system."' Problems of retroactivity, no-
tice and uniformity are created by these solutions, but they are
superior to the unprincipled change that characterizes purely
discretionary sentences.
Determinate sentencing schemes created by legislatures,
of course, can be changed by legislatures. Some commentators,
indeed, have criticized determinate systems processes because
they allow public control over the criminal process. "Political
forces," Professor Alschuler says, "may push sentencing reform
away from the humanitarian objectives of its authors and to-
"' For example, sentences for marijuana possession today are not what they were
ten years ago. See, e.g., J. Bakalar, Marijuana: Six Years of Reconsideration, in L.
GmNsPoON, MARIJUANA RECONSIDERED 372 (1977). Sentences for offenses involving eva-
sion of military responsibilities may logically be more severe during wartime than
peacetime. See, e.g., Sentencing Selective Service Violators: A Judicial Wheel of
Fortune, 5 CAL. J. L. & SOCAL PROBLEMS 164, 177 (1969).




ward a sterner model," and he adds that this phenomenon may
defeat the aims of liberal reformers.41 2 Another commentator
has said, "Once a determinate sentencing bill is before a legis-
lative body, it takes only an eraser and pencil to make a one-
year 'presumptive sentence' into a six-year sentence for the
same offense.
4 3
Recent experience does not support the notion that deter-
minate systems will be easily influenced toward unduly harsh
sentences." 4 The base terms for California's Uniform Determi-
nate Sentencing Act, even after increases by amendment, 405
seem lenient for many offenses,00 and it was enacted by a het-
erogeneous legislature against a background of sensational
crimes. 47 Other states that have adopted determinate schemes
have, with few exceptions, enacted sentence proposals roughly
equal to, or less severe than, their existing practices.0 ' Further-
more, it is an exaggeration to assert that all it takes to sextuple
sentence proposals is "an eraser and pencil." It also takes legis-
lative sponsorship, staff drafting, committee assignment, hear-
ings, floor debate, the vote of a majority of two legislative
houses and a gubernatorial signature.
But the real point is that even if the public reaction to a
,0 Alschuler, supra note 7, at 569.
Zimring, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime: A Consumer's Guide to Sen-
tencing Reform, 6 HAsTINGs CENTER REPORT 15-16 (1976); see also Alschuler, supra
note 7, at 569.
"I See generally, Dershowitz, Background Paper, in TwENTiErH CENTURY FUND,
supra note 27, at 121-24. Indeed, the evidence cited by Dershowitz tends to indicate
the opposite, though "it is difficult to test the hypothesis." Id. "It is clear that no
matter what other factors govern sentence length, the inevitable result of the indeter-
minate sentence is that sentences over five years will strongly predominate; and in a
definite sentence state sentences of under five years will strongly predominate." Rubin,
Long Prison Terms and the Form of Sentences, 2 NAT'L PROB. & PARoLE Assoc. J. 337,
344-47 (1956).
"I See note 220 supra for a discussion of the amendment provisions of the Califor-
nia Act.
,01 Cf. notes 67-69, 360 supra and accompanying text (six-year sentence for mur-
der; eight-year sentence for murder and robbery causing serious bodily injury to the
victim in separate episodes).
"I The Act was introduced in basic form in 1975 and passed in 1976, with technical
and substantive amendments in 1977. Cassou & Taugher, supra note 11, at 18, 21. See
also V. BuGMosI & C. GENTRY, HLELTR SKuER (1974) (covering the Manson murder
cases). It has been amended to increase sentences slightly. See note 221 supra.
'3 See Halperin, supra note 54, at 13.
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serious crime wave were a call for increased sentences, better
understanding and public control over the criminal justice sys-
tem would not be an evil but a virtue. As Professor Alschuler
recognizes, one cannot validly complain that determinate sen-
tencing will make the criminal process well enough understood
so that frustration with serious offenses translates itself into
actual legislative action."9 The electorate may not share the
notion that liberal politics and humanitarian concern for the
defendant are the only permissible factors in sentencing, and
it should be able to express that belief.410 Basic questions of
policy in a democracy (other than constitutional ones) ought to
be decided by processes such as legislation rather than by adju-
dication, so that the decision is made by representatives ac-
countable to the people, rather than by solitary judges.41" ' In
fact, in some respects the people may have been wiser than the
experts all along; they have never been collectively fooled by
the notion that the rehabilitative ideal was an exclusive goal
or by the corresponding proposition that justice and uniformity
were unacceptable criteria for sentencing.4"2
Alschuler, supra note 7, at 569 n.53. "Of course, our system of discretionary
sentencing cannot reasonably be defended on the ground that it enables criminal
justice officials to fool most of the people most of the time. If the popular will favors
more severe sentences than judges in fact impose, the popular will should probably
prevail." Id. Nevertheless, Professor Alschuler concludes that legislative determinate
sentencing is dangerous because "the imperfections of the democratic process seem
especially pronounced in the criminal justice area, and I suspect that the popular will
is sometimes misperceived." Id. But the "imperfections" of democracy are no more
"especially pronounced" in the criminal area than they are in other controversial issues
pitting public policy against private disadvantage-natural gas rate regulation, for
example, or inflation control or foreign policy. Furthermore, an insulated judiciary is
not the solution to a misperception of the popular will.
410 See authorities cited note 382 supra for more information on the subject of
whether determinate systems produce harsh sentences.
411 "Apportionment" and "severity" of sentences are "particularly questions of
legislative policy." Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958). Accord, M. FRAN-
KEL, supra note 5, at 104-05; Dershowitz, Background Paper, in TwENTor CENTURY
FUND, supra note 27, at 123-24.
"I Cf. S. RuBiN, supra note 161, at 408-09 (1973) (criticizing newspaper editorials
calling for sentencing consistent with principles of just dessert on the ground that "the
stronger view today is that the purpose of punishment is not vengeance, but rather




Widespread dissatisfaction with sentence disparity, a per-
ception of unfairness in the sentencing process on the part of
those affected by it and a lack of democratic control over this
most important aspect of the criminal justice system are three
salient reasons why sentencing discretion should be confined
and structured. At the same time, the need to fit sentences to
individual offenders and offenses and the difficulty of reconcil-
ing conflicting sentencing criteria require the retention of a
significant degree of sentencing discretion. Determinate sen-
tencing means nothing more nor less than sentencing in which
discretion has been confined, guided and checked, but in which
discretion still remains to the extent deemed necessary. The
wide variety of determinate systems-including the base-plus-
enhancement model, presumptive sentencing and advisory
guidelines, together with combinations of these types-allows
a jurisdiction to tailor its system to the level of discretion it
wishes to retain.
In choosing among the several models, a legislature or judi-
ciary ought to consider the treatment it wishes to make of
traditional goals such as rehabilitation, deterrence, incapacita-
tion, uniformity and condemnation. Determinate sentencing as
it has thus far been adopted is, for the most part, sentencing
on the basis of factors other than rehabilitative potential. The
failure of attempts at rehabilitation in the past and the active
harm they have done may motivate such a shift, but the shift
should not signal the abandonment of rehabilitation as a
correctional effort. For deterrable offenses, the system should
be structured so that it does not mandate trivial sentences, and
it should provide such alternative dispositions for violent or
repeat offenders as enhanced sentencing, indeterminate ranges
or dangerous offender provisions. If these considerations are
attended to, determinate systems may offer improved deter-
rence and-for some offenses-improved incapacitation, par-
ticularly if enhancements identify those circumstances society
most feels the need to avoid or those offenders most necessary
to restrain. One negative aspect of determinate sentencing is
that the condemnatory function may be decreased by the com-
pression of sentences it produces. This result could be avoided
through the retention of wide discretion in the parole process,
[Vol. 68
DETERMINATE SENTENCING
but that approach might be undesirable in that it would com-
promise some goals of determinacy. Uniformity seems the
strongest argument for determinate sentencing; it too is depen-
dent upon the retention of a proper degree of discretion in the
system, because a sentence can be rendered disproportionate
by ill fitting criteria just as it can by the absence of criteria.
For all of these reasons, as well as for reasons having to do
with cost, administrative difficulties and constitutional com-
pliance, it appears that a presumptive system with wide ranges
of discretion, or a system of non-binding guidelines, would be
a safer alternative to a narrow-discretion system in the present
state of our experience. Wider discretion systems seem likely
to be less confusing and complex. They seem less likely to have
adverse influences upon plea bargaining. They seem less vul-
nerable to constitutional attack. And they allow for the accom-
modation of most sentencing goals without destroying the in-
terest in uniformity. Such systems could be improved, perhaps,
by the addition of presumptive or guideline enhancements, by
the requirement of articulation-of-reason statements and by
other refinements. The basic outlines for such an approach are
given by the Wilkins model. For the reasons given in this Arti-
cle, a legislatively-created system seems preferable to that pro-
posal, but the Wilkins model has the advantage of being sus-
ceptible to judicial adoption without implementing legislation,
or to legislative adoption or to judicial adoption followed by
legislation.
The only thing that is certain about these conclusions,
however, is that they are uncertain. The jury is still out, and
will be for some time, on the California Uniform Determinate
Sentencing Act of 1976. As one of the drafters of that Act has
candidly stated, the Act has a most indeterminate future. 1 3
The variety of legislation that has been adopted to date is
beneficial in itself, in that it increases the likelihood that the
best models will be identified. But it may also be true, as
another spokesperson for the California Act has argued, that a
halfway step in the form of nonbinding guidelines may perpet-
uate itself so as to prevent the adoption of more definite sen-
41" See Cassou & Taugher, supra note 11, at 106.
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tencing even if it proves superior." 4 Efforts must be under-
taken to avoid this result.
In the meantime, it may be expected that the rhetoric of
sentencing reform will polarize, not rationalize, the thicket of
conflicting considerations that underlie this most misunder-
stood part of the criminal system. Those wishing to talk about
discretion as a desirable thing will probably refer to it as
"individualization," "flexibility" or "attention to the human
factor," and they will denounce what they will call
"mandatory" or "rigid" sentencing. But others (or perhaps the
same commentators in other situations), wishing to attack the
evils of discretion, will refer to it as "arbitrariness,"
"vagueness," "disparity" or "unfettered discretionary power,"
and they will advocate the use of "guidelines," "standards" or
"rules" to eliminate it. None of these rhetorical devices will
make it easier to accomplish the difficult task of achieving
uniformity within a system of individualized adjudication. Per-
haps our best approach is to be cognizant of the risks but aware
of the substantial evils we now have, and to take initial steps
toward sentencing guidelines.
4' Interview with Raymond I. Parnas, Professor of Law, University of California,
Davis, and Counsel to the California State Select Committee on Penal Institutions, in
Davis, California (Oct. 4, 1978) (interview conducted by telephone from Houston).
It must also be recognized that an ambitious plan, once enacted, may be difficult
to remove even if ill-conceived; the indeterminate sentence lasted more than half a
century.
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